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INTRODUCTION

The American criminal justice adjudication system typically
produces numerous rapid-fire convictions based on pressurized
guilty pleas and a few complex, lengthy and highly adversary trials
that often provide more entertainment than justice. Yet, we are
unable or unwilling to make the fundamental reforms necessary to
create a system that would be fair and effective for its consumers,
i.e., victims, witnesses, defendants, and the general public.
In evaluating our criminal jury trial system and considering
reforms, we would benefit by examining the less adversary ap-
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proaches of the great majority of civilized countries today.' Judges
and lawyers 2 would be better able to evaluate their roles in the
trial process if they were fully aware of the excessive dominance of
our lawyers and the excessive passivity of our judges when compared to their counterparts in Europe, and, -ndeed, in nearly all
civilized countries. Similarly, we might have a different view of
our lay jury system if we realized how extreme our approach to lay
participation in fact-finding appears when compared to the course
taken by most of the world. The common law lay jury, for example, while still surviving to some degree in England and in Commonwealth countries, today flourishes only in the United States.
We conduct more than ninety percent of the total number of the
world's criminal jury trials, and nearly all of its civil jury trials.'
This Article will focus on the criminal jury trial, and will first
put our system in perspective by looking to the criminal trial systems of countries that utilize the less adversary or modified "inquisitory" model. For the sake of convenience, I will refer to this
model as the "nonadversary" approach.4 I will outline the funda-

1 Even this modest hope may be too optimistic. The comparative approach to reform, which looks "across the pond," is a well-traveled course that has done little thus far
to dispel the misconceptions of lawyers and judges concerning the character and operation of foreign procedures. Despite this "well-trodden path" (MIRJAN H. DAMASKA, THE
FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 3 (1986)), judges and lawyers still do not have
an accurate picture of the less adversary approaches used by most of the civilized world.
For example, they will often assume Continental systems provide no right of silence or
right to counsel, and that the accused is presumed guilty and must prove innocence. See
infra, part II.A.

2 These terms refer to both genders, but, for the sake of convenience and consistency, the pronoun "she" will be employed for reference to judges, and the pronoun
"he" will be used with regard to lawyers and defendants.
3 Gerald Casper & Hans Zeisel, Lay Judges in tm German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 135, 135-36 (1972). In their well-known work on the American jury, Kalven and
Zeisel chronicled the abandonment of the lay jury by numerous countries in the 19th
and early 20th Centuries and estimated that today the United States accounts for not less
than 80% of all of the world's criminal jury trials. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 12-14 (2d ed. 1971).
4 Use of the terms "adversary," "nonadversary," and "inquisitory" can be misleading.
Just as our current accusatory system has little in common with the brutal and unjust
systems of ancient England, current Continental systems cannot fairly be compared with

their inquisitorial ancestors. Furthermore, there is no single established model of either
system: our adversary procedures differ substantially from the English adversary form, and

there are significant differences between the various nonadversary systems in Continental
countries. See DAMASKA, supra note 1, at 4; Thomas Volkmann-Schluck, Continental European Criminal Procedures: True or Illusive Model?, 9 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 10 (1981). In some
contexts, adversary and nonadversary systems appear to be in the process of converging.
See Lidstone & Early, Questioning Freedom; Detention for Questioning in France, Scotland and
England, 31 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 488, 489 (1982).
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menfal attributes of the nonadversary model, using the Continental system as the prime example. For another perspective, I will
use the English trial to illustrate an alternative adversary approach
and to suggest that our system stands at the extreme end of the
adversary spectrum.5
Examination of our adversary system will reveal a number, of
unhealthy aspects that largely stem from our unquestioned worship
of what we perceive to be the adversary ideal. We strive to preserve its purity by resisting all reforms in the name of defending
against "inquisitorial" encroachments. Our insistence on extreme
forms of the adversary model results in judicial passivity and lawyer
domination of the jury trial, emphasis on the contest rather than
on the outcome, over-reliance on the lay jury, and formal, restrictive evidentiary and procedural rules. The ultimate result is the

5 The modern English criminal adjudication system generally is regarded as reasonably effective while meticulously safeguarding the rights of the accused. See Philip B.
Kurand, The Administration of CriminalJustice in England.- Some Invidious Comparisons, 26 U.
CHI. L. REV. 193, 193-94 (1958) (reviewing PATRICK DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
IN ENGLAND (1958)); Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery in England, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 749 (1964) (observing that English law displays "enduring attitudes conducive to a large-souled concept of fair trial"); see also Paul G. Kauper, Judicial
Examination of the Accused - A Remedy for the Third Degree; 30 MICH. L REv. 1224, 1235
(1932) (noting that criminal procedure in England is characterized by "the tradition of
scrupulous fairness to the accused"); Steinberg, A Comparative Examination of the Role of the
Lawyer in Our Present-Day Society, 15 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 479, 483 (1964).
This view of English criminal procedure is not universally shared among American
scholars. Some view aspects of the English system as strongly favoring the prosecution. See
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, TIGHTENING THE REINS OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 228 (1983); Graham
Hughes, We Try Harder, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 14, 1985, at 18 (reviewing MICHAEL H.
GRAHAM, TIGHTENING THE REINS OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1983)) ("English concerns for
fair criminal procedure, whether in legal analysis or judicial practice, remain trivial. The
calm of English courtrooms may resemble that of a desert."); cf. MONROE H. FRIEDMAN,
L.WYEW'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY gySTEM 105-12 (1975). Moreover, the British justice
system recently has come under increased criticism at home for abuses in the prosecution of alleged terrorists. See Craig R. Witney, Faith in British Justice Sludn by Abuses and
False Jailngs, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1991, Al, at 10. Nevertheless, most of the criticism
centers, not on English trial procedure, but on pretrial procedures relating to terrorist
cases, for which Parliament has passed special laws. Prior to reform legislation passed in
1984, criticism also focused on obtaining confessions by dubious means. Significant
protections for the accused were added by the Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the
Codes of Practice issued by the Home Office and approved by Parliament in 1985. For a
description and analysis of the Act and the Codes of Practice relating to police questioning of suspects, see Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a Source of Testimonial Evidence: A
Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASTINGS UJ. 1, 109-29 (1986). For
studies of the effect of the Act and the Codes on police interrogation, see BARRIE IRVING
& IAN K. MCKENZIE, POLICE INTERROGATION: THE EFFECTS OF THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE Acr 1984 (1989).
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most uncompromisingly adversary criminal trial structure in the
world.

We pay a high price for these excesses. In the past few decades, criminal jury trials have become so lengthy and complex
that we cannot, or will not, provide them to the vast majority of
defendants. Instead of offering a fair and expeditious procedure in
which the trier of fact has the opportunity to hear substantially all
relevant evidence and come to an informed decision, our system
relies on pleas of guilty that entirely displace the trial. This system
requires that the accused be subjected to threats of increased
punishment for going to trial. The few trials that do take place
often fall short of the primary goal of achieving a fair, expeditious, and reliable resolution of the charges. Excessive trial length
itself often diminishes the quality of the trial. Lawyer control,
highly contentious advocacy, and rigid procedural rules tend to
shift the focus of the trial from the accused and from truth-determining objectives to the contest between counsel. Over-reliance on
the lay jury and on formal and technical rules of evidence and
procedure hinder the prompt and reliable adjudication of guilt.
In the second part of this Article, I explore barriers to reform
stemming from our Constitutional system of government, our political institutions, and our national character. I discuss whether
deficiencies in our trial system should or can be corrected by
importing aspects of other systems or by moderating or altering
our current system while maintaining its essential adversary character.
Contrary to many other observers who have embarked upon
this comparative sea,6 I conclude that, at least in serious criminal
cases, we should reject as both impractical and undesirable radical
changes to our trial system through wholesale or piecemeal adoption of the main nonadversary procedures of Continental systems.
However, less radical reforms are both possible and desirable.
Without abandoning the essential adversary character of our criminal trial, we should take measured steps to restrain our lawyers,
and encourage judges to exercise greater authority. Judges should
control abuses by directing the course of the trial in such areas as

6 See, e.g., LLOYD L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 138-46 (1977); Albert W. Alschuler,
Implementing The Criminal Defendant's Right to Triak Alternatives to the Plea BargainingSystem,
50 U. CHI. L. REv. 931, 1003-11 (1983); William T. Pizzi, Judge Frankel and the Adversary

System, 52 U. COLO. L. REv. 357, 366 (1981). For a recent polemical critique of the
American adversary system and praise of the nonadversary approach, see Charles
Maechling Jr., Borrowing from Europe's Civil Law Tradition, 74 A.B.A. J. 59 (1991).
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case management, jury selection, and questioning of witnesses. We
should also seek to shift the focus of the trial from the battle
between the lawyers to the discovery of truth by modifying our
complex rules of evidence, encouraging the defendant to contribute to the search for truth, and requiring full and open discovery
from the prosecutor. Ambitious experiments with central features
of the Continental model should be undertaken in minor criminal
cases in those jurisdictions offering the strong promise of an independent and competent judiciary. For instance, misdemeanor trials
before federal magistrates who are subject to merit selection and
retention rules might prove a helpful testing site.
Finally, in endeavoring to moderate the extreme contentiousness of our lawyers and their desire to win at any cost, we should
concentrate our efforts on changing those structural aspects of our
adversary system that encourage and enable lawyers to frustrate
truth-determining objectives in the pursuit of victory rather than
pursuing reform primarily through modifying the ethical rules
governing lawyer conduct. By reducing adversary excesses in our
criminal trials, we will speed up the trial process and focus it more
sharply on the central character of the trial-the accused-and on
the most important issue-guilt or innocence.
II. FROM A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE
A.

Eliminating Our Biases and Gaining a Better Understanding
of Nonadversay (Continental) Systems

American courts and lawyers generally exhibit a self-righteous
adoration of the adversary model and an aversion to any structure
characterized as inquisitory, which is simplistically assumed to be
anything nonadversary. Worshippers of the adversary system blindly
assert that a clash of adversaries is "probably best. calculated to
getting out all the facts,"7 or "the most effective means of determining the truth,"' or "one of the most efficient and fair methods designed for finding [the truth]."' This reverence encompasses the Fifth Amendment privilege 0 as well as the right of crossexamination," both of which are regarded as essential underpin7 DAVID W. PEcK, THE COMPLEMENT OF COURT AND COUNSEL 9 (1954).
8 Monroe H. Friedman, Professional Responsibility of the Defense Lawyer The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1470 (1966).
9 Monroe H. Friedman, Judge Frankel's Seard for Truth, .123 U. PA. L. REV. 1050,
1065 (1975).
10 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 459-60 (1966).
11 Courts and commentators usually accept without question Wigmore's assertion that
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nings of the adversary model. In a sense, we have allowed ourselves to be held captive by a picture of a proper trial as being an
adversary one.
In direct proportion to our worship of the adversary structure
is our reactionary distaste for anything characterized as inquisitory.'2 Courts as well as common law lawyers often disparage anything inquisitory in nature by contrasting our adversary system
with the inhumane practices of the inquisition in medieval England and Europe which relied on various forms of coercion to
extract confessions from suspects. In Rogers v. Richmond' the Supreme Court declared, "[O]urs is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial system-a system in which the State must establish guilt
by evidence independently and freely secured and may not by
coercion prove its charge against an accused out of his own
mouth." 4 In extolling the virtues of the Fifth Amendment privilege, the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona"[ saw the privilege
as a reaction against "the inquisitorial Court of Star Chamber" 6
and characterized the privilege as "the essential mainstay of our
Adversary System." 7 Later, the Supreme Court in Garner v. United
States' 8 pointed to "the preservation of an adversary system of
criminal justice " " and avoidance of inquisitorial practices of the

"cross-examination is the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
Even Jeremy Bentham, a critic of many aspects of the English system, praised it for
"giving the parties the power of examining the witnesses . . . ." JEREMY BENTHAM, A
TREATISE ON JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 105 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. ed. 1981) (1825).
12 The popular American prejudice against inquisitory systems has been recognized
by many comparativists. Se, e.g., Ennio Amodio & Eugenio Selvaggi, An Accusatorial System
in a Civil Law County: The 1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, 62 TEMP. L.Q. 1211,
1213 (1989) (recognizing an "emotional attitude" which makes the accusatory approach "the
haven of guaranteed civil liberties" and the inquisitory method "the symbol of an investigatory and judicial technique that sacrifices those same civil liberties on the altar of law
enforcement"); Mirjan H. Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Coviction and Two Models of
Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 557 (1973) ("inquisitorial"
is surrounded with "the aura of dread and mistrust"); cf RENE DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND
FRENCH LAw 64 (1980) (noting the widely entertained prejudice in England that a
French prisoner is presumed guilty until he has proved his innocence).
13 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
14 Id. at 541.
15 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16 Id. at 459.
17 Id. at 460.
18 424 U.S. 648 (1976).
19 Id. at 655; cf Andersen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470 (1976); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974).
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English Courts of 'Star Chamber and High Commission as "the
fundamental purpose of the Fifth Amendment."" Still later, the
Court placed the involuntary confession rule squarely on the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and suggested that
it was bottomed on the. distinction between accusatory and inquisitory systems:
Although these [coerced confession] decisions framed the legal
inquiry in a variety of different ways, usually through the "convenient shorthand" of asking whether the confession was involuntary," . . . the Court's analysis has consistently been animated by the view that "ours is an accusatorial and not an
inquisitorial system," . . . and that, accordingly, tactics for elicit-

ing inculpatory statements must fall within the broad constitutional boundaries imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of fundamental fairness. 2'

On occasion, even English judges fall into the same trap of
disparaging anything "inquisitorial." Lord Simon's speech in a
House of Lords case noted that "[olur national experience found
that justice is more likely to ensue from adversary than from inquisitorial procedures-Inquisition and Star Chamber were decisive, and knowledge of recent totalitarian methods has merely
22
rammed the lesson home."

This aversion to anything inquisitory largely arises from a
failure to distinguish between ancient and modern inquisitory sys-

In rejecting the argument that admission of documents seized from the defendant
would "convert our accusatoial system of justice into an inquisitorial system," the
Andenen Court listed the following "characteristics of the accusatorial system and ,manifestations of its demands" which, it contended, would not be jeopardized by such admission: the requirement of -proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the rule against admission of
coerced confessions, the right to proper arraignment, and the right to assistance of counsel. 427 U.S. at 476. The Court mistakenly suggested that it is the existence of these
rights that sets accusatorial apart from inquisitorial systems of justice.
20 Gamer, 424 U.S. at 655.
21 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1985) (citation omitted). The Court also
suggested that the presumption of innocence distinguishes our system from those utilizing
"inquisitorial means." Id. at 116. See also Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991),
in which Justice White, writing for four members of the Court, emphasized that the rule
against coerced confessions is founded on the distinction between accusatorial and inquisitorial systems. Taking the view that the harmless error rule should not apply to coerced
confessions, he contended that "permitting a coerced confession to be a part of the evidence on which a jury is free to base its verdict of guilty is inconsistent with the thesis
that ours is not an inquisitorial system of criminal justice." Id. at 1256.
22 D. v. Nat'l Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 1978 App. Cas. 171,
231 (Simon, L.J.).
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tems, as well as inaccurate assumptions about the character of
contemporary Continental structures. It is true that inquisitory systems deserving our contempt have existed. During the 13th century, a system of judicial torture replaced trial by ordeal and other
old modes of proof based on divine intervention. Judicial torture
prevailed in most countries on the Continent, and ordinary criminal courts regularly employed it in the prosecution of routine
crimes.23 Until the 19th century, Continental systems featured
forms of compulsory interrogations, secret trials based on an investigating magistrate's
written summary of the case, and presump24
tions of guilt.
In the middle of the 18th century, however, the leading states
of Europe abolished judicial torture in a generation.2 5 As a result
of events set in motion by the French Revolution and the liberalizing influence of 18th century writers, Continental systems discarded other pernicious aspects of old inquisitory trials and at the
same time adopted many aspects of the English accusatory system.
Most Continental systems replaced secret proceedings
based on writings with a form of the English jury trial open to the
public and based on oral evidence.2 7 Although the all-lay jury was
abandoned during the first half of the 20th century, lay participation has been maintained in serious cases through the mixed
professional-lay court.2 8 Nearly all Continental countries now af-

ford an accused the right to counsel in serious cases and provide
a form of the right to silence and a presumption of innocence
that requires a level of persuasion similar to our reasonable doubt
standard.' As Judge Frankel points out, "all judicial 'systems' in
23 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 3-10 (1977).
24 See ADHtMAR ESMEIN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 288-350
(John Simpson trans., 1913); Damaska, supra note 12, at 556-57; Volkmann-Schluck, supra
note 4, at 2-3.
25 LANGBEIN, supra note 23, at 10.
26 This is the traditional explanation. See Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Comparative Criminal
Procedure: A Plea for Utilizing Foreign Experience, 26 BUFF. L. REv. 361, 363 (1977). However,
Langbein argues that the abolition of judicial torture was the result of liberalized rules of
proof which did away with the need for torture rather than public or political enlightenment. LANGBEIN, supra note 23, at 4, 61.
27 E.g., Schlesinger, supra note 26, at 363; Volkmann-Schluck, supra note 4, at 3.
The jury trial has been modified by most of Continental Europe in favor of a
mixed tribunal of professional and lay judges. Casper & Zeisel, supra note 3, at 135; John
H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental Alternative Fill the American
Need?, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 195-98.
28 Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Principles of German Criminal Procedure in Comparison with

American Law, 56 VA. L. REV. 239, 240-51 (1970); see infra part III.B.2.
29 See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 72 (1977)
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the Western world are today 'adversary' in the minimal sense that
parties in contention, including parties contending with the state,
are entitled to be heard through independent, trained, partisan
legal representatives. " "
Indeed, most Continental structures endow an accused with
important protection absent in our system of justice. For example,
criminal proceedings do not usually begin, as in this country, with
an arrest and continuing detention unless the defendant is able to
post sufficient money bail. The question of pretrial detention
depends on many factors, but is distinct from the charging process."1 Also, the defendant invariably enjoys broad discovery
rights. At an early stage of the proceedings the defendant has an
absolute right to inspect all of the evidence collected by the police, the prosecution, and the investigating magistrate.32 Even the

(The Continental right of silence varies from country to country, but usually plays a less
significant role than the American privilege against self-incrimination.); Manfred Pieck,
The Accmsed's Pivilege Against Sef-incrimination in the Civil Law, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 585
(1962) (All Continental West-European countries today recognize the accused's privilege
against self-incrimination in one form or another.); see also CA1rETON KEMP ALLEN, LEGAL
DUTIES AND OTHER ESSAYS INJURISPRUDENCE 253 (1931); RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE LAW 486 (5th ed. 1988); Lidstone & Early, supra note 4, at 508-509; Symposium, The Privilege Against Sef incrimination Under Foreign Law, 51 J.C.L. CRIM. & P.S. 161
(1960).
German law adheres to a standard of proof not materially different from our "beyond a reasonable doubt," though the burden is placed on the court rather than on a
party. Langbein, supra, at 201. The French burden of proof rests with the prosecution
and requires that the judges be inwardly convinced of the guilt of the accused: "Avez-vous
une intime conviction?" Wallace Mendelson, Sef-Incrimination in American and Frend Law, 19
CRiM. L. BULL. 34, 47 (1983); see also G.E.P. Brouwer, Inquisitorial and Adversay Procedures-a Comparative Analsis, 55 AUSL. L. J. 207, 209, 218 (1981); George W. Pugh,
Administration of Criminal Law in France: An Introductory Analysis, 23 LA. L. REV. 1 (1962);
Edward Tomlinson, NonadversarialJustice: The Frend Experience, 42 MD. L. REV. 131, 166,
n.122.
In one respect the German burden of proof is more protective of the accused than
our rules. If tht: defendant asserts facts which raise a colorable defense such as insanity
or self-defense, the burden of proving the contrary is not upon the defendant as it may
be in our country. Jescheck, supra note 28, at 709; cf Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228
(1987); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (upholding a New York law placing
the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove an insanity claim once the state has
proven its case "beyond a reasonable doubt").
30 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 7 (1978).
31

SCHLESINGER ET AL, supra note 29, at 480.

32 E.g., id. at 481-82 (defense counsel's basic right to timely inspection of the entire
dossier has become an article of faith throughout the civil law world-and, indeed, in
the socialist orbit as well); Damaska, supra note 12, at 533-34; Jescheck, supra note 28, at
246 (the German defense counsel has access to the prosecutor's entire file and may even
take it to his office for study and preparation). Richard Frase, Comparative Criminal Justice
as a Guide to American Lao Reform.. How Do the Frendt Do I, How Can We Find Out, and
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Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, which recently has been restructured to incorporate many accusatory elements, retains generous discovery rights for the accused."3 Contrast this feature with
the American system's aversion to unlimited pretrial discovery in
criminal cases. Professor Schlesinger has noted this country "stands
virtually alone " ' in this regard. Finally, neither Continental prosecutors nor judges, with positions similar to career civil servants,
are subjected to the political pressures inherent in periodically
having to stand for election, 5 and this greater independence
frees them to be more sensitive toward procedural fairness and
the rights of the accused.
Nevertheless, across the Atlantic, recognition of the revolutionary changes in the inquisitory procedures of Continental countries
has come slowly, and the myth of the cruel inquisitory process
remains dominant. Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court pointed
out that "the Continental countries which employ inquisitorial
modes of criminal procedure have themselves long ago given up
reliance upon [systems of torture]" and noted "the careful procedural safeguards which the inquisitorial system now maintains ...

."6 However, this recognition was buried in a footnote

to support the textual assertion of the standard myth, namely, that
the rule against coerced confessions "set off the accusatorial system from the inquisitorial." 7 The Court perpetuated the myth as
8 But in 1991, in a footnote
recently as 1985 in Miller v. Fenton."
to an opinion holding that a defendant's request for counsel at a
judicial bail hearing did not constitute an invocation of his
Miranda right to counsel, 9 Justice Scalia cogently responded to
the dissent's charge that the majority revealed "a preference for
an inquisitorial system of justice: 40

Why Should We Care?, 78 CAL. L. REv,. 539, 672-73 (1990) (the French defense counsel
has an absolute right to pretrial inspection of the full dossier).
33 See Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note 12, at 1218, 1223 (the new Code requires
mandatory pretrial discovery of the entire police and prosecution work product); Lawrence J. Fassler, Note, The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial System of Criminal
Procedure in Continental Europe, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245, 264, 277 (1991).
34 SCHLESINGER Ex AL., supra note 29, at 483.
35 Mirjan H. Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure 84

YALE L.J. 480, 502-03 n.4.; Volkmann-Schluck, supra note 4, at 11.
36 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 582 n.24 (1961).
37

Id.

38
39
40

474 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1985).
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S. Ct. 2204 (1991).
Id. at 2214 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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We cannot imagine what this means. What makes a system
adversarial rather than inquisitorial is not the presence of
counsel. ... but rather, the presence of a judge who does not(as the inquisitor does) conduct the factual and legal investigation himself, but instead decides on the basis of facts and arguments pro and con adduced by the parties."

Though the case concerned only pretrial procedures, hopefully the
Court will recall the distinction it made in this rather obscure
footnote when dealing with cases involving the trial process.
The misleading label attached to Continental systems impedes
serious consideration by American lawyersjudges, and politicians
of any proposal to import aspects of the Continental model.4' To
avoid misconceptions which may hinder efforts to find fair and
workable reforms, some scholars advocate assigning the words
"inquisitory" and "inquisitorial" to antiquity and using "adversary"
to denote the Anglo-American model and "nonadversary" for the
Continental-European model. 4' However, in view of the many adversary aspects of modem Continental systems, the term "nonadversary" also is misleading. No modern, civilized country has a pure
adversary or nonadversary system. All are mixed to some degree,
the Continental system even more so than ours. In fact, because
of the vast differences between the old and the modern inquisitory systems, the modem incorporation of adversary aspects, and
the considerable differences between the systems of individual civil
law countries, Europeans and comparativists generally object to the
"inquisitory" label and tend to describe Continental systems as
"mixed."" Indeed, it would be more accurate to describe the,

41 Id.at 2210 n.2. The Court recognized that our system has always been inquisitorial at the investigation stage. Id.
42 To Anglo-Americans, adversary and inquisitory concepts are suffused with value
judgments. "[Tihe adversary system provides tropes of a rhetoric extolling the virtues of
liberal administration of justice in contrast to an antipodal authoritarian process-such as
the system of criminal prosecutions on the Continent prior to its transformation in the
wake of the French Revolution." DAMASKA, supra note 1, at 4.
43 See Volknann-Schluck, supra note 4, at 3 (citing and adopting Damaska's suggestion).
44

See Damaska, supra note 12, at 558-60; Abraham S. Goldstein, Reflections of Two

Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1016
(1974); Volkmann-Schluck, supra note 4, at 9-10; Wolfgang Zeidler, Evaluation of the Adver-

sary System. As Comparison, Some Remarks on the Investigatory System of Procedure 55 AusTL. L.
J. 390, 391, 400 (1981).
According to Damaska, "Continental lawyers place their contemporary systems of

prosecution
somewhere
midway
between
'inquisitorial'
(pre-revolutionary)
and
'accusatorial' (reformed) forms. In contrast, common lawyers often refer even to contem-
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45
Continental approach as "less adversary" than as "nonadversary."
However, if the former term were used for the Continental system,
one could argue that "more adversary" or "super adversary" would
better describe our system, with both terms referring to some
undefined and unknown "neutral" standard. To avoid this
problem, and to be consistent with the language of most current
comparative literature, the term "nonadversary" will be used here
to describe the Continental system, and "adversary" will be used to
describe our system, while recognizing that they each contain
elements of both the "inquisitory" and the "adversary" models.4 6
We should also rid ourselves of inaccurate assumptions about
the fundamental nature of adversary and nonadversary systems.
American courts have suggested that our adversary system contrasts
with inquisitory ones because we offer the privilege against self47
incrimination, due process, and the presumption of innocence.
However, these guarantees, though often in different form, also
are found in most modern nonadversary systems. 4 The essence
of the modern nonadversary (Continental) system lies not in the
presence of these guarantees, but in its nature as a judicial inquiry
in which the primary responsibility for presenting the evidence
and conducting the trial rests with the judge rather than with
opposing parties. 49 The nonadversary system is characterized by

porary Continental systems as 'inquisitorial': from their standpoint both pre- and postrevolutionary Continental forms easily seem like branches of a common parent stem."
DAMASKA, supra note 1, at 4 n.4.
45 I owe this suggestion to my colleague, Professor Rudolf Schlesinger.
46 There are other possibilities. Professor Zeidler prefers "investigatory." Wolfgang
Zeidler, Court Practice and Procedure Under Strain: A Comparison, 8 ADEL L. REv. 150, 151
(1982). On the other hand, one may wish to emphasize the dominant position of the
judge by referring to Continental systems as "judicial."
47 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1985); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 459-60 (1966); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
48 Lidstone & Early, supra note 4, at 508-09. As far as the pretrial stage is concerned, "there is no real distinction between inquisitorial and accusatorial systems," and
the assumption that the right of silence is a central element of an accusatorial system
should be recognized as "yet another myth." Id. at 511.
49 E.g., SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 29, at 475-80; Damaska, supra note 12, at
510; Mirjan H. Damaska, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L
REv. 1083, 1088-90 (1975); Zeidler, supra note 44, at 391.
Damaska notes some ambigsity in current definitions of the two systems and concludes that
[o]nly the core meaning of the opposition remains reasonably certain. The adversarial mode of proceeding takes its shape from a contest or a dispute: it
unfolds as an engagement of two adversaries before a relatively passive decision
maker whose principal duty is to reach a verdict. The nonadversary mode is
structured as an official inquiry. Under the first system, the two adversaries take
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an activist judge familiar with the facts of the case who calls and
first questions the witnesses. The other important characteristics of
the current Continental nonadversary system include a mixed
tribunal composed of professional and lay judges as the fact finder
in serious cases and the absence of formal or technical rules of
evidence.
A clear picture of the major distinctions between adversary
and nonadversary systems makes it apparent that one system is not
inherently more fair or reliable than the other; rather, each has
its own particular attributes and deficiencies. Some argue that
nonadversary prodedures show less respect for the individual"
and are apt to be less accepted by the parties.5' Damaska suggests that the greater barriers to conviction established by the
adversary system reflect "a conscious sacrifice of factfinding accuracy for the sake of other values."52 However, the fact that we may
find it easier to create obstacles to truth finding in pursuit of
these "other values" may merely indicate that we seek those values
by different means, not necessarily that we rate them higher. It is
arguable that by allowing the defendant full discovery of the
state's case, an opportunity to give unsworn narrative testimony,
and a right to written reasons supporting the fact finder's decision, the nonadversary system shows greater respect for the accused. In terms of the fundamental differences between the two
systems, surely there is nothing sinister or presumptively unfair in
a procedure which depends upon an "inquiry" into the facts" by a
neutral and informed judge rather than upon presentation of
evidence by interested "advocates" to an unprepared fact find53

er.

charge of most procedural action; under the second, officials perform most activities.
DAMASKA, supra note 1, at 3.
This judicial authority is the consequence of the principle that the court in a
nonadversary system has "independent responsibility for the accuracy and the justness of
its decision." LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 9.
50

See, e.g., STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE,

48-51 (1984).
51

See John T. Noonan, Jr., The Purposes of Advocacy and the Limits of Confidentiality, 64

MICH. L. REV. 1485, 1486 (1966).
52 Damaska, supra note 12, at 525.
53 Indeed, in one of the principal "incorporation" cases of the 1960s, the Warren
Court recognized that a criminal process using no juries could still be fair and equitable.
The Court speculated that such a system "would make use of alternative guarantees and
protection which would serve the purposes that the jury serves in the English and
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Similarly, the adversary system is not by nature more reliable.
Some contend that a contest is inherently more likely to reveal
the truth than an inquiry. By presenting their case to an impartial
judge or jury, proponents of conflicting views will be as thorough
and persuasive as possible. The fact finder will be "given the strongest case that each side can present" and will be "in a position to
make an informed, considered, and fair judgment." 4 Also, some
argue that a passive and uninformed judge is more likely to avoid
bias, because a judge who studies the case file developed by the
police and prosecutor prior to trial may tend to reach a conclusion at an early stage and be impervious to contradictory evidence
later developed at trial.5" While these arguments appear to point
out strengths of the adversary system, they fail to consider its
many weaknesses. For example, the adversary system usually involves partisan advocates, burdened by a lack of discovery and
restrictive rules of evidence, besieging an ignorant fact-finder.
Furthermore, arguments that the adversary system is a better
truth finder are based more on faith than on fact. Few researchers
have sought to compare the relative advantages of adversary versus
nonadversary modes of proof, and those that have made the attempt have not provided satisfactory answers. For example,
Thibaut, Walker, and Lind set out to determine which of the two
systems is better at counteracting the decision-maker's bias.56
However, as Damaska pointed out, their experiments did not include the essential aspect of the nonadversary model-the active
and probing decision-maker. 7 Professor Samuel Gross also ob-

American systems." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
54 Friedman, supra note 9, at 1065; see also Edward F. Barrett, The Adversary System
and the Ethics of Advocacy, 37 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 481 (1962).

55

A classic presentation of this thesis was advanced by Professor Lon L. Fuller. See

Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30, 39-40 (H. Berman ed.

1971) (quoting from the Report of the Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility of the
American Bar Association .1958) (An adversary presentation seems the only effective means
for combating the natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar
that which is not yet fully known.); Heir Kotz, The Reform of the Adversary Process, 48 U.
CHI. L REv. 478, 486 (1981) ("The European judge faces the difficult task of avoiding
the appearance of partiality while playing an active part in the proceedings."); see also
Stephan Landsman, The Adversary System, AM. ENT. INST. 49 (1984) (The inquiring judge
is more likely to act upon his biases than is his adversary counterpart.).
56

John Thibaut et al., Adversary Presentation and Bias in

Legal Decisionmaking, 86

HARV. L. REV. 386 (1972).
57 Damaska, supra note 49, at 1095-1100. According to Damaska, the results of the
research merely supplied empirical support for the proposition that "[iln close cases a bilateral summation of established facts is better suited than a unilateral one to counteract
the decision-maker's inclination to render a judgment in accordance with his expectation
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jected that the college and first-year law students who performed
the simulations could not possibly have had the professional
training of American advocates and Continental judges, and that
"[elach system justifies itself in large measure on the basis of the
performance of professionals who are experienced and skilled in
these roles, and neither can be judged on the basis of studies that
fail to take that into account.""8 In a later publication, 9 Thibaut
and Walker asserted that other studies confirmed that "the adversary procedure is superior to other classes of procedure."' However, the authors based their findings primarily on the "operating
capabilities" of the adversary system and on "subjective and normative appraisals of its performance."61
Thibaut and Walker advanced the usual arguments for the
adversary system-that it inspires the parties to uncover all evidence in their favor and moderates the biases of decision-makers.
They concluded that the adversary system was 'judged fairest and
most trustworthy both by persons subject to litigation and by those
observing the proceedings."6 2 Yet there was no attempt to determine whether in actual practice an impartial judge, unbound by
formal rules of evidence, could uncover' and present (through a
neutral inquiry of the witnesses) a broader or more realistic picture of the facts. Also, assessments by litigants and observers may
have little value in view of the pre-existing biases which most
share. Indeed, Thibaut and Walker have since taken the position
that one should distinguish between the objectives of "truth" and
'justice."' The authors now claim that although the adversary
process is most effective in seeking "distributive justice," they qualify their support with the claim that a procedure "which delegates
both process and decision control to a disinterested third party
'
seems most likely to produce a correct view of reality ......
Experimental studies of simulated adversary and nonadversary
systems have not been helpful, and, most likely, comparative rethat the defendant is probably guilty." Id. at 1100.
58 Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Ineffident Litigation, 85
MICH. L. REv. 734, 740 n.22 (1987) (emphasis in original).
59 JoHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYsts (1975)..
60 Id. at 118.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theomy of Procedure, 66 CAL. L. REV. 541
(1978).
64 Id. at 566.
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search focusing on accuracy or justice in actual cases would be
even less so. As English scholar John Jackson has argued, "it is
hard to see how it could be empirically proved that one system is
better at truth finding, for the simple reason that it is impossible
to know in any particular system how many truly guilty are convicted and how many truly innocent are acquitted."'
The individual characteristics of a particular trial system may
be more significant than its style as adversary or nonadversary.
For example, in our adversary system the strength with which each
side is able to present its case depends in large part on the freedom of the parties to ascertain and present to the trier of fact all
relevant evidence. A trial system based on a clash of adversaries
before a neutral fact-finder, which prohibits pretrial discovery and
imposes draconian exclusionary rules of evidence, would not be a
great legal engine for discovering the truth. The effectiveness of
the adversary system as a finder of historical facts is not guaranteed by its nature, but depends on many independent factors.'

65

Jackson, Theories of Truth Finding in Criminal Procedure: An Evolutionay Approach, 10

CARDOzO L. REv. 475, 485 (1988). Jackson also points out that differing epistemological
conceptions about the meaning of truth may doom any quest for the best truth-finding
system. Id. at 484.
66 Nor should we look upon our adversary system as a bequest from the common
law to be nurtured and treasured principally for its historic value. Our current adversary

style is a late-coiner, being largely a product of the late 18th and early 19th centuries
when lawyers displaced judges as the dominant forces at trial. Damaska, supra note 35, at
542 n.156; John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.

263, 272, 307-11 (1978); see also Landsman, supra note 55, at 18-23 (The adversary system
came into its own in the 18th and 19th centuries.).
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B. Summary of Continental (Nonadversay) Systems 67
1. The Pretrial Process
In most Continental countries, as in our own, the police, and
less often the prosecutor, conduct the pretrial investigation. In
France, an investigating judge or magistrate (juge dlinstruction)
supervises the investigation of serious cases. In Germany and Italy,
this office has been abolished and the prosecutor is in charge of
the investigation. However, in virtually all countries, the police
usually conduct the actual investigation in terms of interviewing
witnesses, interrogating suspects, and gathering physical evidence.' The prosecutor or magistrate develops a comprehensive

67

See generally LANGBEIN, supra note 29; SCHLSINGER ET AL., supra note 29, at 475-

80; Damaska, supra note 49, at 1088-90; Damaska, supra note 12, at 528-30; Jescheck,
supra note 28, at 240-51.
This short summary capsulizes the most significant aspects of the usual Continental
trial, but it is not meant to accurately describe an individual country. Although Continental systems provide simple models of procedure, there is no single model to which all
countries conform. See Volkmann-Schluck, supra note 4, at 10, 31. Indeed, Italy recently
engrafted many fundamental elements of the accusatory system onto its civil law procedural trunk. See infra part III.B.2.c.
American legal literature includes a number of controversies, as well as false assumptions, about the nature of the Continental system. For example, a European writer
found that the inquisitorial model implied by Professors Goldstein and Marcus "is not
only inaccurate, it simply does not exist except in their minds." Volkmann-Schluck, supra
note 4, at 9. Professor Alschuler pointed out the erroneous assumption that the West
German system depends on the pretrial work of an examining magistrate. Alschuler, supra
note 6, at 989 n.274. But he then suggested that the English had abolished the hearsay
rule in criminal cases, which they have not. Id. at 976. The lesson drawn from these missteps is that it is not easy for Americans to "get it all right" when describing foreign
legal systems.
68 Police are becoming de facto primary investigators. While the German prosecutor
theoretically manages all pre-accusatory investigations, the police, in modem practice,
initiate and develop investigations, including questioning witnesses and interrogating the
accused. In Germany and France, police usually conduct pretrial investigations. See
LANOBEIN, supra note 29, at 11-12; Volkmann-Schluck, supra note 4, at 11-12.
Even in France, direct judicial supervision of the investigation rarely occurs. In most
cases, the police operate under the supervision of the prosecutor. In those serious cases
where the juge d'instruction is in command, its investigative powers are usually delegated
to the police judiciair& The result is "an increasing police monopoly over the pretrial
criminal process, in particular the questioning of suspects." Lidstone & Early, supra note
4, at 490; see also Abraham S. Goldstein & Martin Marcus, The Myth of Judicidal Supervision
in Three "Inquisitorial"Systems: France, Italy and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 250-51 (1977)
(stating that only about 14% of all crimes and delits are sent to the juge d'instruction);
Frase, supra note 32 at 667, n.640 (in recent years, the percentage of matters referred to
examining magistrates has been falling, and proposals have been made to abolish the
practice of pretrial investigation by magistrates).
Italy recently abandoned the investigating magistrate in favor of the American-style
passive pretrial judge who plays a limited role in the investigation. For example, Italian
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case file (dossier) which, under traditional civil law practice, is
submitted to a three-judge panel to determine whether there is
reasonable cause for trial.6 9 The defendant is afforded full opportunity to inspect the case file. 7° Once the prosecutor or magistrate decides to prosecute, formal proceedings are commenced by
filing, with the court, the entire case file consisting of the charges
and supporting evidence. From this point, the court becomes the
supervisor of the case, replacing the prosecutor.7 '
The Trial Process2

2.

The Continental court usually consists of a single professional
judge in minor cases and a mixed bench, usually one professional
and two lay judges or, in more serious cases, three professional
and two to nine lay judges. 73 The court, comprised of the professional judges and lay assessors, decides questions of guilt and punishment in one proceeding. The dossier resides with the presiding
judge during the trial. The prosecutor and the defense attorney
will have reviewed the dossier, but it will not be available to the

magistrates typically issue warrants for arrest and wiretapping. See Amodio & Selvaggi,
supra note 12, at 1218; Fassler, supra note 33, at 251-52.
69 Virtually all European countries provide some form of judicial review of the
prosecutor's decision to bring criminal charges. For example, France maintains the traditional, separate three-judge screening chamber, while Germany enirusts the screening
function to the professional trial court judges. LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 12; Brouwer,
supra note 29, at 215. The new Italian Code restructured the functions of the pretrial
judge, leaving her without an active role in the investigation but giving her the responsibility for determining, at the conclusion of the investigation, whether probable cause exists for filing a criminal charge. See Amnodio & Selvaggi, supra note 12, at 1218; Fassler,
supra note 33, at 261-62.
The grand jury is unknown in civil law countries.
70

See LANGBEIN, sup-a note 29, at 12; SCHLESINGER ET AL, supra note 29, at 481;

Jescheck, supra note 28, at 246.
71' LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 8. Once the German prosecutor determines probable
cause, he loses control of the case. John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How
the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204, 209, 237 (1979).

72 A trial must take place even if the defendant confesses and seeks to waive it.
Pleas of guilty are unknown, although some countries maintain procedures with plea bargain characteristics, particularly in minor cases. See, e.g., LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 96-98
(discussing the German "penal order" procedure applicable to misdemeanors).
Italy is the exception. In 1988, Italy substantially revised its criminal procedures to
include adversary elements and now allows plea bargaining. See infra part III.B.2.c.
73 In serious cases, the German bench usually consists of three professional judges
and two lay judges, while the French bench consists of three professional and nine lay
judges. RENE DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND FRENCH LAw 68 (1980); LANGBEIN, supra note 29,

at 61-63; Brouwer, supra note 29, at 216 (describing the make-up of France's Assize
Court).
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lay judges. Furthermore, the dossier cannot be admitted into evidence or considered by the court in reaching its verdict.74
The Continental trial is conducted with less formality than its
English or American counterparts. For example, the presiding
judge sits closer to the parties and to the public, and the lawyers
address the presiding judge with greater familiarity7 5 The trial
commences with either the presiding judge or the prosecutor
reading the charges. The defendant then answers questions asked
by the presiding judge,7 6 giving an account of his personal background, including his address, family, and occupation history. The
presiding judge then turns to the accusations and advises the defendant of his right to remain silent, and asks if he wishes to say
'anything. The defendant almost always agrees to speak.77 He is
not placed under oath and may give. his side of the case in narrative form. After the defendant has spoken, the presiding judge
questions him extensively about the charges and evidence, referring often to the dossier with which she has familiarized herself in
preparation for trial. After the examination by the presiding judge,
the prosecutor and defense counsel may ask additional questions,
either directly or through the presiding judge.
When the examination of the defendant is complete, the
presiding judge calls witnesses 78 and questions them in a similar

74 SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 29, at 478. The presiding judge will have become
very familiar with the dossier, but is expected to ignore any dossier information that was
not read and admitted into evidence at the trial. Lay judges are not trusted to be able
to perform this task and are not allowed to even examine the dossier. LANGBEIN, supra
note 29, at 67. However, parts of the dossier, such as documents and statements of witnesses, may be admissible evidence. For example, if a trial witness suffers loss of memory
or contradicts his prior account of the events, his statements in the dossier may be admissible, to refresh recollection, to impeach, or even as substantive evidence. SCHLESINGER
Er AL, supra note 29, at 484.
75 See Zeidler, supra note 44, at 397.
76 Other than the rule that the court must hear first from the accused, the German
code does not limit the trial court's discretion in the sequence of its proof-taking.
Langbein, supra note 71, at 208, 220; see also LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 74 (taking evidence follows the examination of the accused).
77 LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 72 (stating that German defendants virtually always
speak); Damaska, supra note 12, at 527 (stating that almost all Continental defendants
choose to testify); Tomlinson, supra note 29, at 173 (stating that it would be most unusual for counsel to advise his client not to answer the judge's questions)
78 Since the court has independent responsibility for the accuracy and justness of its
decision, the court, rather than the parties, determines the sequence of proof and may
call witnesses on its own. However, the court must examine all witnesses nominated by
the parties unless their testimony would be inadmissible in evidence. LANGBEIN, supra
note 29, at 9, 74.
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manner. Each witness presents a narrative account and then responds to questions asked by the presiding judge and by counsel.79 Questioning is informal, with few, if any, objections by
counsel and with the opportunity for lengthy explanations and
narrative responses. s In contrast to the formal, highly structured
examinations which occur in American courtrooms, 81 the typical
Continental examination takes on the character of an informal
discussion between the presiding judge and the accused or the witness. The prosecutor and defense attorney occasionally join in this
conversation. Since the Continental system does not divide the
questioning into direct examination and cross-examination, the
questioning process is not encumbered with technical rules governing the order of proof 2 In the Continental system, most of the
information is obtained through the presiding judge's informal
inquiry." In addition, physical and other non-testimonial evidence may be produced and considered throughout the course of
the trial.
After all the evidence has been presented, counsel deliver
their closing arguments in which the prosecutor opens and the
defense counsel responds and concludes.8 4 Also, the defendant
has the opportunity to make a final statement on his own behalf. 5 Thus, unlike American practice, the prosecutor does not
have the last word. Instead, the defendant personally has the opportunity to present his side of the case both at the outset and at
the conclusion of the trial.

79 German judges generally allow counsel to pose questions directly to witnesses. In
France, counsel may direct questions through the presiding judge, but in practice, the
presiding judge usually merely signifies to the witness to respond to counsel's question.
Brouwer, supra note 29, at 218.
Lay judges may participate in the questioning. In Casper and Zeisel's study of German trials, lay judges questioned witnesses in almost one-half of all cases. Casper &
Zeisel, supra note 3, at 149.
80 In Germany, a witness is allowed to give a relatively uninterrupted narrative of his
evidence before being questioned closely by the presiding judge. LANGBEIN, supra note
29, at 74.
81 Damaska, supra note 49, at.1089; LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 74.
82 Jescheck, supra note 28, at 710.
83 Damaska, supra note 49, at 1089.
84 This is the usual procedure. See Damaska, supra note 49, at 1090. France is representative. The defense has the last word, and the presiding judge is not a'llowed to sum
up. Brouwer, supra note 29, at 218. In Germany the prosecutor may reply to the defense
summation. LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 65. But German lawyers have told me that the
prosecutor rarely exercises the privilege. In all cases, the defendant has the last reply. Id.
85 See Zeidler, supra note 44, at 399.
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After the defendant completes his statement, the court, which
includes both the professional and the lay judges, retires to deliberate. In most countries, the votes of lay and professional judges
carry the same weight, and a unanimous verdict is not required. If
the court finds the defendant guilty, the judgment will include
both the conviction and the sentence.
C.

Adversary Excesses in the American Trial

The following factors contribute most to our adversary
excesses: extreme judicial passivism coupled with lawyer domination of the trial process, contentiousness of our lawyers, emphasis
on the contest rather than on the discovery of truth, over-reliance
on the lay jury as fact-finder, and formal and technical rules of
evidence.
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1. Judicial Passivism and Lawyer Dominance: Our Extreme Approach
(a) An Historical Perspective.-The current adversary style of
English and American criminal trials is largely a product of the
latter 18th and early 19th centuries when lawyers displaced judges
as the dominant force at trial. Reviewing Old Bailey records of
ordinary criminal cases, Langbein found that English judges did
not allow counsel to appear in court and examine witnesses until
the 1730s, thus beginning the process of displacing judicial
authority over the trial process.8 6 According to Langbein, English
judges prior to 1730 performed functions resembling those of the
presiding judge of modern Continental systems. Lawyers, when
present, were "peripheral forensic figures" as they are on the
Continent today. 7 In contrast, Damaska placed the mastery of
lawyers and the advent of the modern adversary system somewhat
later: In England until the middle of the 19th century,
the pretrial phase of the process was essentially a type of judicial investigation along inquisitorial lines conducted by justices
of the peace. Nor was the trial an adversary battle of counsel.
Lawyers would seldom appear for the prosecution, and defense
counsel were not admitted in ordinary felony cases until 1837.
In this situation the judge called witnesses and examined them,
and in the century prior, had also interrogated the defendant ....
Evidentiary and procedural finesse, so characteristic of the
adversary process, could not develop in the context of a trial
without lawyers.'
Throughout the latter part of the 1700s and the first part of
the 1800s, judges in ordinary criminal cases allowed counsel to
examine witnesses. Starting in 1836, English law allowed all felony
defendants to be represented by counsel who was permitted to
address the jury. 9

86

Langbein, supra note 66, at 307.

87

Id. at 315.

88

Damaska, supra note 35, at 542 n.156; see also LANDSMAN, supra note 50, at 18-23

(It was not until the 18th and 19th centuries that the adversary system came into its
own.).
In ordinary criminal cases, neither side had counsel, but for centuries in state trials
(usually involving political crimes) the prosecution was represented by counsel and the
defense was denied it, causing great disparities. Langbein, supra note 66, at 282, 307-11.
89 See Langbein, supra note 66, at 311-13; David Wolchover, Should Judges Sum Up an
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The restrained power of American judges is rooted in our
general distrust of judicial authority which can be traced to the
revolutionary period, or earlier, when the colonists held in
contempt judges who formerly held office at the pleasure of the
Crown. In addition, judicial distrust may be related to the fact that
nearly all post-Revolution judges were laymen to whom the colonists were reluctant to entrust substantial powers.' Furthermore,
the attraction for Jeffersonian democracy lead to the desire for
elective judicial offices. 9' As a result, the judiciary had a limited
status as well as a limited role in the trial process. An English
observer noted that in the early years of the United States, judges
were "deprived of almost all the powers which together constitute
judicial status as we know it."92
(b) The Inferior Status of American Judges.-The status of state

trial judges in America generally is inferior to that of their English
cousins. An important reason for this lower position is the fact
that most state judges must fight for their judicial positions in the
elective process. Subjecting the'judiciary to the elective process
reduces its status and contributes to its diminished authority.
English High Court judges, on the other hand, are appointed for
life and can be removed only by both Houses of Parliament."
Even English judges of lesser status, such as recorders sitting as
Crown Court judges, are appointed by senior judiciary and, are not
subject to the elective process.
.In comparison to the English and American systems, Continental judges are career civil servants, and cannot claim the same
distinguished status as English judges, or possibly even the status
of our federal and senior state judges.94 However, the Continen-

the Facs;, 1989 Crim. L. Rev. 781, 783. Furthermore, prior to 1898, the defendant was
incompetent as a witness but was allowed to address the court with unswom narratives.
90 See PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BYJURY 119 (1966).
91 J.C. Smith, The Personnel of tleCriminal Law in England and thlUnited States, 1955
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 80, 85.
92 Id.at 86.
93 Id. at 85.
94 Nearly a decade ago, Professor Zeidler remarked that becoming a judge in Germany is the beginning of a career, rather than a reward for a long and successful legal
practice. Zeidler, supra note 44, at 397. He also compared the judge's legal education
and status to public prosecutors and described German judges as "career persons of good
but not exalted, social prestige," whose professional status "is clearly lower than that of
his common law brethren." Id See also id. at 154. However, recent conversations with
young German lawyers lead me to believe that, due to intense competition for judgeships
in the last few years, both the quality and the status of German judges may be rising.
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tal system generally focuses on merit, rather than on an elective
process when choosing its judges, and Continental judges are
promoted using a hierarchical system which rewards meritorious
performance. 5 After a probationary period, Continental judges
ordinarily gain tenure which they hold until retirement. 96
Nearly all states require some form of election for judicial
office.9 7 The requirement of election leads to diminished independence and authority. Justice Brennan has remarked that because state judges often are elected, or, at least, must succeed in
retention elections, as opposed to federal judges who are guaranteed a salary and lifetime tenure, they "are often more immediately 'subject to majoritarian pressures than federal courts, and are
correspondingly less independent than their federal counterparts."'98 Thus, federal district court judges, not surprisingly, command greater respect from trial lawyers and have better control of
their courtrooms than state trial judges. 9
The pressures associated with re-election also affect the trial
arena. The politics of the elective process often involve lobbying
bar associations and other lawyer interest groups. Thus, judges
subject to re-election may feel indebted to lawyers and lawyer
interest groups and may hesitate to risk incurring the displeasure
of prominent trial lawyers who appear before them. The weakness
of American judges, when compared with their English brethren,
to control the press in publishing material on criminal cases, in-

95 See David S. Clark, The Selection and Accountability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a "Redtsstaat", 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1795, 1801, 1839 (1988); Zeidler, supra

note 44, at 397 (By limiting the role of politics in Germany's judicial selection and promotion process, Germans believe that they can accomplish the goal of finding and advancing the best legal talent.); see also DA"KA, supra note 1, at 232.

96 After a three-to-five-year probationary period, West German judges attain lifetime
tenure (until mandatory retirement age), except for Constitutional Court judges who are
appointed for a single term of 12 years. Clark, supra note 95, at 1816-27; see also Zeidler,
supra note 44, at 397.
97 In 1980, only seven states had a system of choice by executive appointment which
did not include resorting to the electorate. LARRY BERKSON, ET AL, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN
THE UNITED STATES: A COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS (1980). For the great majority of state

trial judges the method of initial selection and retention is by either partisan or nonpartisan election. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 111314 (1988).
98 William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 551 (1986).

99

Damaska's examples of American judges deviating from the passive style only con-

cern federal judges. Damaska, supra note 35, at 524-25 nn.113-14.
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cluding speculations
and criticisms of the participants, exacerbate
1
these pressures. 00
The status of judges directly affects the quality of advocacy.
.The English scholar C.P. Harvey suspected
that much of the crudity of American advocacy derives from
the inferior position occupied by American judges. So far from
being irreproachable and unreproached, they are elected...
instead of being appointed, and have to 'run for re-election'
from time to time if they wish to remain in office. This inevitably results in a depreciation of their status. The equivalent in
England to the judge in an American court seems not to be
the judge in an English court but the referee on a football
field.' 01
(c) Contrasting Roles of Judges and Latyers in American and
Continental Systems.-American judges generally act as passive
umpires of the trial process. While in many ways they are more
autonomous than Continental judges and exert considerable
authority in pretrial and sentencing phases of the criminal process,
during the trial they usually are limited to overseeing and
regulating the battle between the parties. The responsibilities of
the Continental presiding judge-to study the case file, to decide
the order of witnesses, and to call and question witnesses and
present evidence-belong to the lawyers in Anglo-American
procedure."0 2 While our trial judges technically retain the power
to call and question witnesses,"3 it is used sparingly and often
discouraged by reversals. Despite the Supreme Court's description
of the federal judge as "not a mere moderator, but . .. the gover-

nor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and
determining questions of law,"'
ahd the Court's admonition
100 See Smith, supra note 91, at 83-84.
101 C.P. HARVEY, THE ADvOcATE's DEVIL 160 (1958).
102 &e LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 62; cf. Damaska, supra note 35, at 524-25
(Damaska also points out that at certain junctures in the trial process, i.e. pretrial hearings, sentencing, in camera examinations, Anglo-American judges have inquisitorial powers
beyond those of Continental judges).
103 The Federal Rules of Evidence continue the well-established authority of judges to
question witnesses called by the parties and to call and question witnesses not called by
the parties. FED. R. EVID. 614. The Advisory Committee recognized, however, that the
judge's authority to question witnesses "is, of course, abused when the judge abandons
his proper role and assumes that of advocate." The Committee noted that its failure to
define the manner or extent of such authority "in no sense precludes courts of review
from continuing to reverse for abuse." FED. R. EVID. 614(b) advisory committee's note.
104 Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 469 (1933) (citing Herron v. South Pac.
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that "[i]t is the judge, not counsel, who has the ultimate
responsibility for the conduct of a fair and lawful trial, '10 5
appellate courts often find
error in direct or extensive judicial
10 6
questioning of witnesses.
Furthermore, appellate courts restrict judicial authority by
prohibiting lower court judges from interfering with lawyer
advocacy through exercise of the courts' summary or comment
powers. Since the Revolution, states have curbed the authority of
judges to summarize and comment on the evidence,10 7 and currently in most states, judges in a criminal trial are prohibited from
expressing an opinion on the weight or credibility of the testimony of witnesses or on the merits of the case.108 Even in federal
courts where there is no direct prohibition on judicial summary or
comment, judges use their common law discretionary powers very
sparingly in view of the lack of explicit statutory authority, as well
as the controversial nature and unclear boundaries of such author-

Co., 283 U.S. 91, 95 (1931)).
105 Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1978). See also Geders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80, 87 (1976), where the Court stated, "If truth and fairness are not to
be sacrificed, the judge must exert substantial control over the proceedings." Nevertheless,
the court held that the judge violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
by prohibiting him from consulting his lawyer during an overnight recess between his
direct and cross-examination. Id. at 81.
106 See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Sound and accepted doctrine teaches that the trial judge should avoid extensive questioning of the
witness and should rely on counsel to develop testimony for the jury's consideration. Id.
at 440 (footnote omitted)), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911 (1975); Blumberg v. United States,
222 F.2d 496, 501 (5th Cir. 1955) (It "is far better for the trial judge to err on the side
of obstention [sic] from intervention in the case rather than on the side of active participation in it.").
Professor Merryman wonders why our judges are so docile when coming from the
ranks of advocates, and points to their close connection to the practicing bar.
One would suppose that judges who are former practicing lawyers, often with
trial experience, would be quick to detect and deal appropriately with unjustified
delay, expense, and the variety of other abusive practices to which we have become accustomed. But in practice, our judiciary is often complaisant, indolent,
or timid and interposes its authority only in extreme cases. Is solidarity with
practicing lawyers the problem?
John Henry Merryman, How Others Do It: The French and German Judiciaries, 61 S. CAL. L.

REV. 1865, 1875 (1988).
While such relationships contribute to our judicial passivity, so do appellate court
admonitions and reversals when trial judges venture outside their role as umpire.
107 See Johnson, Province of the Judge in Jury Trials, 12 AM. JUD. Soc'Y 76, "78-81
(1928); Jack B. Weinstein, The Power and Duty of FederalJudges to Marshall and Comment on
the Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on ChargingJuries, 118 F.R.D. 161, 163-65

(1988).
108 Wolchover, supra note 89, at 784.
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ity. Judge Marvin Frankel accurately described the current approach when he noted that "[i]t is not a regular thing for the trial judge ... meaningfully to 'comment upon' the evidence. " "9
As approved by the Supreme Court in 1972, the Federal Rules
of Evidence allowed the judge to "fairly and impartially sum up
the evidence and comment to the jury upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses,""' but Congress
struck the rule after the House Committee on the Judiciary recommended its deletion. The Committee noted that the authority of
the judge to comment on the weight of evidence and credibility of
witnesses was "highly controversial" and was "not granted to judges
in most State courts."'
Furthermore, the limits of the comment
powers of federal judges are not precisely defined, but are less
than those of English judges. As noted by the Supreme Court's
Advisory Committee, the federal judge's comment powers also are
limited in that the judge "cannot convey to the jury his purely
personal reaction to credibility or to the merits of the case; he
can be neither argumentative nor an advocate."1 2 In summary,
although both the House and Senate Committees indicated that
the proposed rule was consistent with the common law and with
current practice in the federal courts, it is apparent that our federal judges do not approach the practice of English judges in
summing up and commenting on the evidence." 3 Yet an important effect of judicial comment on such matters is that "it affords
the opportunity of 'rescuing the case from the false glosses of
powerful advocates.""' 4 With few "rescue" powers, judges are often powerless to control adversary abuses.
Lawyers in the United States produce, direct and dominate
the trial process. A central difference between the adversary and
nonadversary systems is that in the latter the judge controls the
process rather than the lawyers." Lawyers control the adversary
system. They are the "competing directors" of the "play" that is
109 Marvin E. Frankel, TIte Seardt for Truth: An Umpireal rierv, 123 U. PA. L REV.
1031, 1042; Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility 65 HARV. L.

REV. 1281, 1283 (1952) (a federal judge can be viewed as "governor of the trial" with
the right to comment upon the evidence).
110 FED. R. EVD. 105.
111 H.R REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 5 (1973) (report of the House Committee on the Judiciary concerning superseded FED. R. EVID. 105).
112 FED R. EVID. 105 (superseded) advisory committee's note.
113 This is apparent to English observers. See, e.g., Smith, supra note .91, at 87-88.
114 Wolchover, supra note 89, at 788.
115 LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 8-9, 65 (the German system is de-lawyered).
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put on before the trier of fact in which they are also "super-actors" who not only perform, but create their own part as the play
progresses. I t6 Not surprisingly, American lawyers often refer to
"trying a case," since they, in large part, put on the case themselves. The judicial position was clearly described by Judge Frankel:
"Our courts wait passively for what the parties will present, almost
not suspecting-what the parties have chonever knowing--often
11 7
sen not to present."
As a result, the lawyers in the adversary trial process not only
preempt the judge but also the principal subject of the proceedings-the accused. In the Continental model, the judge directs the
proceedings and focuses attention on the accused. In our system
the lawyers direct the proceedings and divert attention away from
the accused. The prosecutor puts on the first act. The defense
attorney then may present evidence, but always stands as a shield
between the defendant and the prosecutor, the judge, and the
jury. The physical courtroom arrangements and rules of courtroom
conduct reflect this distinction. In an American courtroom the
lawyers sit "center-stage" with the accused next to defense counsel.
Many jurisdictions allow the lawyers to move freely about, approaching witnesses during their examination and hovering over
the jury during argument. In contrast, the accused is usually
placed in the center of the Continental courtroom while the lawyers are located off to the side and are restricted in their movements. These differences contribute to the focus and tone of the
trial, and may even affect the outcome of the proceedings. It is
not unusual in trial advocacy courses for experienced American
lawyers to teach the importance of controlling or. directing the
trial process as much as possible through their physical presence
and their movements throughout the courtroom.
The Continental system gives the judge control over the trial
and relegates lawyers to a secondary position from which the heat
of advocacy is moderated." 8 Prior to trial, each lawyer usually

116 We are not alone in this characterization of trial lawyers. English judges have
pointed out that every great advocate is a special kind of actor: "[H]e is an actor who
creates the part he plays.-He must select the words that make his lines . . . . He must
be ready in a moment to alter, to cut and to re-create, to suit the sudden and unforeseeable events of the day's hearing, and these changes of front he must make without
their being apparent to anyone." HARVEY, supra note 101, at 47 (quoting from Mr. Justice
Hilbery).
117 Frankel, supra note 109, at 1038.
118 The leading figure in a German trial is the presiding judge. He has the primary
forensic role at trial that belongs to the opposing lawyers in American courts. LANGBEIN,
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presents a brief to the court and to the opponent outlining 'the
issues and arguments to assure that all participants will be pre11 9
pared on the important points and to avoid -"trial by surprise."
During trial, witnesses are usually allowed to present their testimony in narrative form, and cross-examination is much less .aggressive
since the judge first questions witnesses extensively and only then
asks counsel if they have any questions to add. Professional judges
in Continental systems are part of the jury and often summarize
the evidence at the commencement of deliberations. While German law does not require a judicial summation, and while it is
sometimes criticized as an undue influence upon the lay judges,
in two-thirds of
Casper and Zeisel found that summaries are given
20
cases.
serious
in
always
almost
minor cases and
Continental pretrial rules also restrict lawyer discretion to a
greater extent than in this country. For example, in Germany a
rule of compulsory prosecution applicable to serious offenses commands the prosecution of "all prosecutable offenses, to the extent
that there is a sufficient factual basis, "121 and plea bargaining,
the device which so empowers our prosecutors, is generally forbidden by Continental systems in serious cases.12 2 Also, while German prosecutors make sentence recommendations, they are fol-.
lowed far less often than are prosecutorial sentence recommendations in the United States." 3 As a result of these restrictions, the
Continental prosecutor has far less discretion than his American
counterpart.
The English judge does not exercise the same degree of control over the trial process as the Continental trial judge, but does
command more than her American counterpart. For example, fol-

supra note 29, at 62.

119 In Germany, subpoenaed witnesses are known to both parties, but the defense
may surprise the prosecution with a witness who voluntarily appears to testify.
120 Casper & Zeisel, supra note 3, at 150-52.
121 Langbein, supra note 71, at 210; See also, Jescheck, supra note 28. The compulsory
prosecution rule is not unqualified, but it .does not compare with the "essentially unfettered charging discretion" of American prosecutors. Alschuler, supra note 6, at 983. See
generally Joachim Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsoiy Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial

Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 468 (1974); John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 439 (1974).

122 See Langbein, supra note 71, at 210; see also Alschuler, supra note 6, at 983;
Hermnann, supra note 121; Jescheck, supra note 28; Langbein, supra note 121.
123 Alschuler, supra note 6, at 980 n.243 (contrasting German and American studies);
Thomas Weigend, Sentencing in West Germany, 42 MD. L. REV. 37, 55 (1983)

("The Ger-

man prosecutor's influence on sentences imposed at trial is much less than that of his
American counterpart." (footnote omitted)).
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lowing the presentation of the evidence and arguments of counsel,
both English and American judges will instruct the jury on general
principles, such as burden of proof, as well as on the specific law
applicable to the case. The American judge usually will stop at this
point and give the case to the jury, avoiding any comment on the
credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence. 2 4 English
judges, on the other hand, not only are empowered, but are obligated, to provide the jury with "a succinct but accurate summary
of the issues of fact as to which a decision is required, a correct
but concise summary of the evidence and arguments on both
sides, and a correct statement of the inferences which the jurors
are entitled to draw from their particular conclusions about the
primary facts."125 Particularly in a complicated and lengthy case,
the judge is required to assist the jury by dealing with "salient
features of the evidence,"126 and a defendant in a serious case is
entitled to have the defense "laid before the jury in a form that
they can appreciate. 1 2 7 The considerable time spent by the English judge in summing up at the close of trial acts as a counterbalance to arguments of counsel for the parties.
Although the English judge's summary and comment powers
have been criticized, an important argument in favor of these
powers is that they afford the opportunity of "rescuing the case
from the false glosses of powerful advocates."128 Furthermore,
since the English prosecutor is generally not allowed to answer
defense counsel's final argument as in our system, the judicial
summary takes the place of the prosecutor's closing argument.
Since our trial system was largely derived from the English, it
would be more accurate to say that we have replaced the balanced
judicial summary and evaluation of the evidence with the
prosecutor's closing argument-a partisan presentation which is
probably the most powerful tool in the prosecutor's trial arsenal.
Lawyer power has replaced judicial power. Balance has been sacrificed for partisan advocacy.

124 In fact, the summary and comment powers of American judges are severely limited. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
125 Regina v. Lawrence, 73 Grim. App. 1, 5 (1981) (Lord Hailsham).
126 Regina v. Attfield, 45 Crim. App. 309 (1961).
127 Regina v. Hamilton, 1972 Crim. L. R. 266. cf. Regina v. Mills, 25 Crim. App. 138,
140 (1936) (Judge did not sum up evidence satisfactorily); see generally, JOHN F.
ARCHBOLD, PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 4-423 (Stephen Mitch-

ell ed., 41st ed. 1982).
128 Wolchover, supra note 89, at 788.
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As for English barristers, their authority is more restricted in
other aspects. Ethical rules prevent the barrister from interviewing
witnesses, thereby guarding against the danger of counsel drilling
or coaching his witnesses. 129 Barristers are severely limited in voir
dire of jurors, as well as in approaching witnesses during questioning and other movements about the courtroom. Finally, while
considerable prosecutorial discretion exists in the decision to
charge and in plea bargaining, the incidence of plea bargaining is
less in England than in the United States. Bargaining occurs only
with respect to the charge, because prosecutors
are not permitted
1 30
to make recommendations as to sentence.
2. Excessive Lawyer Advocacy
American criminal trial lawyers are more aggressive and contentious than either Continental or English advocates. Our court131
room lawyers often regard the trial as "ritualized aggression"
and themselves as prize fighters, gladiators, or, more accurately,
semantic warriors in a verbal battle. This is true of both prosecution and defense lawyers who generally consider themselves aggressive advocates in pursuit of that most important goal-winning the
case.1 32 For.-defense attorneys, courtroom victory usually translates into obtaining an acquittal, and they often regard discovery

129 Except for parties or experts, "gingering up the witness" by counsel is looked
upon with great disfavor in England. While the solicitor may interview and-prepare the
witness, a barrister may not. Thus, if the witness is called, "his appearance in the witness
box will be essentially unrehearsed." HARVEY, supra note 101, at 66.
130 Alschuler, supra note 6, at 973-76.
131 Seymour Wishman describes the lawyer as prize fighter:.
[T]he trial was a battle between adversaries in which all trial lawyers were competitors. Winning the case meant beating the other guy, beating your brother,
just as it sometimes meant beating your fither, the judge. The verdict was clear
and unequivocal, and it was announced in front of all those who had been
observering you. A victory could provide an exhilaration like no other.
Seymour Wishman, CONFESSIONS OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER 201 (1981).

Wishman further described a trial as "less a search for the truth than a battle to be
won, and in court rules and legal principles merely ritualized the aggression," id. at 223,
in which "[aIll emotions and skills . . . were supposed to be deployed for one purpose-winning." Id. at 233.
132 Prosecutors, theoretically committed to justice in the form of conviction or acquittal, are proud of the notches on their guns. Defense counsel equally enjoy winning.
In short, the rewards of personal aggrandizement and self-satisfaction are powerful incentives in the combat zone of criminal trials. See Thomas L. Steffen, Truth as Second Fiddle..
Reevaluating the Place of Truth in the Adversary Tiial Ensemble, UTAH L. REV. 799, 820-21
(1988); see also Frankel, supra note 109, at 1037-38.
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of the truth as incidental or even irrelevant to this pursuit.'

In

most criminal trials, discovery of truth is the last thing a defense
lawyer desires." 4 Pursuing acquittal of the guilty while avoiding
presentation of clearly perjured testimony is admired as one of the
greatest achievements of the advocate's art.
Excessive aggression of American lawyers is not limited to the
courtroom. As an example of extreme acrimony between prosecutors and defense attorneys, one need only look to the current
battle between the United States Department of Justice and the
American Bar Association's House of Delegates (alleged to by
dominated by the defense bar) over attorney subpoenas, forfeiture
of attorneys' fees, and ethical rules restricting prosecutors from
having ex parte contacts with persons represented by counsel.
Former Assistant Attorney General Edward Dennis recently remarked that the ethical rule controversy is 'just one of a number
of areas .

.

. where there is a war going on between the private

133 The defense attorney is regarded as a gladiator battling for victory in which guilt
or innocence is irrelevant. The following view is typical:
A client is entitled to my advocacy, not my judgment. As a prosecutor, I always
had my own opinion as my guide. I could dismiss a case, if I felt a defendant
was innocent. As a defense attorney, I have tried many cases and never even
formed a- personal opinion as to the guilt or innocence of my client. That is
not my job; that is not my function; that is irrelevant to my responsibility.
William B. Enright, The Muck Maligned Criminal Lauyer and/or the Stake of the Profession in

CiminalJustice, 46 J. ST. B. CAL. 720, 723 (1971).
This general view is shared by Justice Byron White:
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the guilty and to
make sure they do not convict the innocent. They must be dedicated to making
the criminal trial a procedure for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of the crime. To this extent, our so-called adversary system
is not adversary at all; nor should it be. But defense counsel has no comparable
obligation to ascertain or present the truth. Our system assigns him a different
mission. He must be and is interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent, but, absent a voluntary* plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend his
client whether he is innocent or guilty. The State has the obligation to present
the evidence. Defense counsel need present nothing, even if he knows what the
truth is . . . . If he can confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him

appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-57 (1967) (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
134 The point is not discussed by many scholars, but is apparent to most lawyers and
judges with criminal trial experience. Fifteen years ago Judge Marvin Frankel dared to
state that "if one may speak the unspeakable, most defendants who go to trial in criminal cases are not desirous that the whole truth about the matters in controversy be exposed to scrutiny." Frankel, supra note 109, at 1037. I would add that even this statement
is a bit mild and does not fully reflect the realities of the vast majority of criminal trials.
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bar and the prosecutors," and that no longer are they merely adversaries on evidentiary and credibility issues. They are "now at the
point of questioning the ethics of each side and the professionalism of'each side." l 5' He lamented that both sides are "losing
that sense of professional unity."136

Continental and English advocates also like to win, but they
do not place as much importance on victory, and they do not
pursue it as aggressively. Consider, for example, the Continental
trial with the paternalistic judge who dominates the proceedings,
holding the lawyers to a secondary role, and the English courtroom where lawyers rarely object to questions'3 7 and where one's
adversary is referred to as "my learned friend."
This greater contentiousness of American trial lawyers finds its
roots in a number- of factors, including the passive role of our
judges and the correlative control of lawyers in criminal trials.
we
Both the rules of professional conduct and the high value
8
place on courtroom victory encourage this contentiousness.3
Rules of professional conduct are vague on the question of
proper limits of courtroom aggression, but the emphasis is clearly
placed on zealous advocacy. The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct'39 provide that "[a] lawyer
should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf," but
caution that "a lawyer is not bound to press for every advantage
that might be realized for a client."'140 The' Model Rules leave
135 Remarks during the Fifth Annual National Institute of White Collar Crime, sponsored by the ABA's Criminal Justice Section, San Francisco, California, March 7-8, 1991,
reported at 48 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 1548 (March 27, 1991).
136 rd. Former United States Attorney Earl Silbert remarked that he has "never seen
such antipathy and hostility between the Department and the private bar as within the
last year." Id.
In a recent poll of California lawyers, 81 percent of those responding agreed with
the statement that the use of hardball tactics and uncivil behavior among lawyers is growing. Fax Poll, CAL. LAW. 96 (March 1992).
137 American lawyers observing English trials are often puzzled by the lack of objections to questions of opposing counsel. HARVEY, supra note 101, at 116-17.
138 There are other reasons, among them our rules allowing attacks on trial lawyers
for failing to object to evidence or for failing to assert all procedural rights on behalf of
the accused. As noted by former Chief Justice Burger, "[l]awyers are competitive creatures
and the adversary system encourages contention and often rewards delay- no lawyer wants
to be called upon to defend the client's charge of incompetence for having failed to
exploit all the procedural techniques which we have deliberately made available." Warren
Burger, The State of the Judiciary-1970,56 A.B.A. J. 929, 931 (1970).
139 The Model Rules were adopted in 1983 and have provided a guide to state legislatures in setting ethical and disciplinary standards for members of the bar.
140 MODEL RULES OF PROP_.SIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. (1984) [hereinafter MOD-
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the "means by which a matter should be pursued" to the lawyer's
"professional discretion." 41 The ABA's Model Code of Professional Responsibility42 is likewise vague on the question of aggressive conduct, but again, the emphasis is on zealous advocacy.
According to the Code, the lawyer must "represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law"14' and, with certain exceptions, the lawyer must not intentionally "[flail to seek the lawful
objectives
of his
client
through
reasonably
available
means .

. . . "14

So dominant is the demand for zealous advocacy

that the Code's drafters found it necessary to include the caveat
that lawyers are not subject to discipline for "avoiding offensive
tactics" or for treating others "with courtesy and consider'
ation." 145
With such forceful exhortations, it is not surprising
that American lawyers seek to satisfy their client's 'expectation of
aggressive advocacy and victory.
The pressure on criminal defense lawyers to win their cases
comes from a variety of sources, but chief among them is the
close proximity of lawyers to their clients and often to their
clients' "causes,"146 together with a system of ethical rules and

EL RULES].
141 Id.
142 The ABA's Code was largely superseded by the adoption of the Model Rules in
1983, but many states in setting ethical standards for lawyers have adopted parts of either
the Code or the Rules or both.
143 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1984) [hereinafter MODEL

CODE].
144 Id. at DR 7-101(A)(1).
145 Id.
146 See Harris B. Steinberg, A Comparative Examination of the Role of the Criminal Lawyer
in Our Present-Day Society, 15 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 479, 485-86 (1964); see also PETER COLLIER & DAVID HOROWITZ, DESTRUCTIVE GENERATION: SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THE 60s
64 (1981) (discussing the life and work of Fay Stender); THE TRUE BELIEVER (Columbia
Pictures 1989) (glorifying the life of a San Francisco lawyer devoted to the defense of
those in whom he "believes"); LLOYD P. STRYKER, THE ART OF ADVOCACY 58-59 (1954)
("Your sympathy for your client must be such that you step into his shoes, you become
him .... Let the jury feel that you are not just a paid spokesman brought on to say a
piece. You embody the defendant, you are the defendant.") Woollcott writes in an appendix to Stryker's book: "Stryker always does believe in the innocence of his clients." Id. at
290. Of course, a lawyer's personal beliefs or opinions technically are not evidence, nor
should they even be expressed to the jury. But in practice lawyers often become so identified with the justice of their client's case that the trial reminds one of the English
period when arguments of counsel were treated as the equivalent of testimony given
under oath. See LANDSMAN, supra note 50, at 12.

Public admiration of the lawyer devoted to the client's cause was probably highest
during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1968, Herbert Packer felt that "the media was making
the defender of the accused into a folk hero." HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION 242 (1968).
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professional understandings which justifies-indeed praises-nearly
every course of conduct in pursuit of the interests (desires) of the
client. 147 American public opinion reinforces the identification of
lawyers with their clients, often ascribing the same moral standards
to both.' This is so despite the ABA's Model Rules, which provide that representation of a client "does not constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views
or activities,"149 and occasionally warn lawyers against losing
"proper professional detachment." 5 '
Prosecutorial zeal is somewhat tempered by the ethical duty
not to prosecute without probable cause,"'1 but once a prosecutor decides there is. sufficient evidence to convict, that goal is
pursued with fervor close to, and on occasion even exceeding, that
of the defense attorney.1 52 Gases of prosecutorial over-reaching
in the effort to obtain a conviction, often amounting to prejudicial

147 The unquestioned devotion of the defense lawyer to the cause of his or her client was described in terms'of admiration by Alan Dershowitz:
"There are a lot of people out there whose job is to figure out what's best
for society," he says softly. 'They're called senators, they're called citizens, they're
called governors and mayors. And there are a lot of people who are concerned
with the victim. They're called family, they're called clergy, they're called friends.
But there is only one person whose responsibility it is to think unquestioningly
about the client, and that's the defense attorney. There's a lot of pain involved,
and no criminal lawyer's ever going to win the Nobel Prize, but if you can't do
it, and you can't do it unequivocally, then you better the hell find yourself another kind of job."
Stephen Bello, How Can You Sleep at Night?, ESQUIRE, Feb. 1983, at 76 (interview with
Alan Dershowitz).
148 The greater distance between the English barrister and his client has been cited
as contributing to the higher regard in which the barrister is held by the British public.
James D. Cameron, TIe English Banister System and the American Criminal Law: A Proposal
for Experimentation, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 991, 993 (1981).
149 MODEL RULES, supra note 140, Rule 1.2(b).
150 I ABA STUDY COMM. ON ASS'N STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUSTICE, ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-1.1 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
151 Both the Model Rules and the Model Code provide that the prosecutor must not
institute criminal charges "when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause." MODEL RULES, supra note 140, at Rule 3.8(a); MODEL CODE,
supra note 143, at DR 7-103(A).
152 See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98
(1975) (an empirical study finding a "conviction psychology" among prosecutors).
Judge Frankel stated that "most criminal defense counsel are not at all bent upon
full disclosure of the truth" and suggested that "[t]o a lesser degree" neither are prosecutors. Frankel, supra note 109, at 1038. Recognizing the mixed enthusiasm of prosecutors
for the principle that they must seek justice, not merely convictions, Frankel concluded
that "it is the rare case in which either side yearns to have the witnesses, or anyone, give
the whole truth." Id.
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misconduct, abound in the United States.15 Furthermore, the
prosecutor occasionally pursues the conviction of one whose guilt
is highly questionable. After having studied the case file, having
convinced reluctant witnesses to testify, and having developed a
trial strategy, the prosecutor often has a considerable investment
in a case and may feel a powerful commitment to try the case and
obtain a conviction. In this context, the aim of achieving justice
can easily translate into a desire to convict regardless of the facts,
particularly if the prosecutor rationalizes that the defendant is a
"bad guy" who deserves imprisonment for having committed other
crimes for which he was never convicted.
What accounts for this lack of balance on the part of prosecutors? I submit that it can be traced to our over-reliance on the
adversary trial process. First, our permissive ethical standards allow
for highly aggressive prosecutorial advocacy at the trial stage. The
general obligation to pursue justice imposed on prosecutors by the
Model Rules and the Model Code154 imposes few limits on, aggressive trial advocacy once the prosecutor believes the evidence
warrants a conviction. The prosecutor must be assured that the
155
defendant has an opportunity to exercise procedural rights,
and the prosecutor also must disclose material evidence which may
exonerate the defendant.15 6 Ethical rules, however, do not limit
the prosecutor in pursuing a conviction with vigor equal to that of
the defense attorney. In fact, adversary systems of competitive factfinding might well be incompatible with a system of ethical rules
57
that outlaws aggressive prosecution advocacy.
The widely-accepted primary duty of prosecutors to seek justice rather than to convict 58 does little to moderate prosecutorial advocacy once the prosecutor decides that justice in a particular

153 See, e.g., Brown v. Borg, No. 91-55148, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 28490 (9th Cir. Oct.
7, 1991); United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 535 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S.
942 (1981); United States v. Vargas, 583 F.2d 380, 388 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Corona, 551 F.2d 1386, 1391 (5th Cir. 1977).
154 MODEL RULES supra note 140, Rule 3.8 cnt. 1 (government lawyers are "minister[s] of justice"); MODEL CODE, supra note 143, EC 7-13 (government lawyers must "seek

justice").
155 MODEL RULES, supra note 140, Rule 3.8(b) and (c).
156 Id. at Rule 3.8(d) and MODEL CODE, supra note 143, at DR 7-103(B).
157 See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can
Prosecutors do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 52-53 (1991) (Interpreting the "do justice"
requirement as a denunciation of aggressive trial advocacy would create an internal contradiction in view of our adversary view of justice.).
158 The prosecutor is regarded as both an administrator of justice and an advocate,
having a duty to seek justice, not merely to convict. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 150.
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case demands a conviction. In pointing out the prosecutor's duty

to seek justice, the Supreme Court has recognized that prosecutorial zeal is a necessary part of our adversary system. In Berger v.
United States" 9 [the famous case on prosecution misconduct usually quoted by defense lawyers to appellate courts for the proposition that the prosecutor's interest "is not that it shall win a case,
but, that justice shall be done""6], the Court noted the
prosecutor's twofold aim-"that guilt shall not escape or innoexhorted the prosecutor to pursue justice agcence suffer,"-and
1 61
gressively
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should
do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from impropas it is
er methQds calculated to produce a wrongful conviction
162
to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
In today's world of criminal practice, prosecutors are not in
the business of trying to convince a jury to convict someone whom
they believe to be innocent. Our courts are crammed with enough
guilty defendants and our prosecutors armed with enough weapons to pressure plea bargains from the "marginally guilty." Even
the unprincipled prosecutor wishing to enhance his conviction record rarely is able to convince a jury to convict one whom he
believes to be innocent. By the time a prosecutor brings a serious
criminal case before a jury, it is exceedingly rare that the prosecutor has not become convinced of the defendant's guilt. In the vast
bulk of criminal trials, prosecutors reasonably believe that justice
means a conviction, and take to heart the Court's reminder in
Berger that the prosecutor is obligated "to use every -legitimate
means to bring about a just [conviction]" and can strike "hard
blows" in the course of prosecuting with "earnestness and vigor."
Thus, in the reality of the courtroom, the Court's admonitions
may be regarded as an encouragement to do battle as much as a
warning against "foul" tactics.'63

159 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
160 Id. at 88.
161 Id.
162 Id. (emphasis added).
163 Lower courts occasionally recognize the right of both sides to aggressively participate in the heat of trial combat. See, eg., United States v. Kravitz, 281 F.2d 581, 586 (3d
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 941 (1961) (the court criticized the prosecutor's words,
but recognized that "some latitude must be given to lawyers' language in a hard fought
case.").
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Second, our prosecutors are under considerable pressure to
win cases. Lawyers and judges expect that prosecutors, unlike defense lawyers, will be successful in the great majority of their cases,
and win-loss records can become an important mark of performance."6 This expectation stems in part from the greater discretion of American prosecutors in the decision to charge and try
cases. In contrast, the German system demands that the prosecutor
charge to the extent that there is a sufficient factual basis and
therefore "in the strongest and most inclusive form that the evidence will support."165 But American prosecutors have broad discretion limited only by the ethical duty not to bring a case to trial
which is not supported by sufficient evidence.' 66 Placing their
stamp of approval on the case by filing the charges and pursuing
a conviction at trial imposes considerable pressures on prosecutors
to be successful. Furthermore, the prosecution's inability to appeal
may encourage the prosecutor to reach beyond the bounds of
legal or ethical rules of advocacy to avoid an acquittal.
Finally, prosecutors often find it extremely difficult to stand
apart from the overall contentiousness of the adversary trial process. With an aggressive opponent and a passive judge, prosecutors
are likely to believe that justice will not be achieved unless they
pursue their goals with devotion equal to that of the defense.
From this author's experience as a trial attorney for both the
prosecution and the defense, there seems to be little difference in
the degree of advocacy once a case comes to trial.
Continental trial lawyers generally are not as aggressive, nor
do they share the same commitment to winning their cases. In
large part, the tempered advocacy of Continental lawyers is a natural result of the fact that, in view of the dominance of the presiding Judge, the cases are not regarded as the lawyer's to win in the
first place. First, Continental lawyers do not have as close a relationship with their witnesses as do American lawyers, since witnesses technically do not belong to the parties, but are called by the

164 Elected state prosecutors often face bitter contests in which their win-loss record
becomes a campaign issue. Our media reflects the public perception that good lawyers,
particularly good prosecutors, always win their cases. In the movie thriller THE JAGGED
EDGE (Columbia Pictures 1986), the defense lawyer (played by Glenn Close) had the
reputation as a formidable trial attorney for having never lost a case when she had been
a prosecutor. In the trial of Randall Adams, depicted in THE THIN BLUE LINE (Miramax
Films 1988), the prosecutor is shown as proud of his long record of convictions.
165 Langbein, supra note 27, at 199.
166

See supra note 144; WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CON-

STITUTION (Student ed. 1989).
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court. In contrast to our pretrial practice, the parties in a Continental system generally are not allowed to "prepare" witnesses for
trial. 7 Second, with, the judge calling and questioning the witnesses, counsel naturally tend to be less contentious, and liberal
rules relating to examination of witnesses and admission of evidence leave little room for objections, requests for side bar conferences, or other interjections by counsel that characterize the
American trial."~ Another reason for these differences lies in the
fact that the trier of fact is a mixed bench rather than a lay jury.
Continental lawyers seeking to convince professional judges (regarded as highly influential in the court's deliberations) are more
likely to reject aggressive, passionate, or emotional presentations in
favor of appeals to reason. Even in this country, lawyers adopt a
more restrained and rational approach when appearing before a
judge rather than a jury.169
Given these differences, it is not surprising that Continental
lawyers have been described as "advocates of somewhat muted
adversary zeal." 170 This restrained advocacy is not a one-sided aspect necessarily favoring the prosecution, but may protect the
accused against an aggressive, emotional prosecutor. For example,
the French prosecutor's summation has been described as "probably more restrained and- judicious than its American counterpart.

" 17 1

English barristers 'also are not as uncompromisingly committed to the fray of trial combat as are Am'erican lawyers. English
barristers work in an adversary system from which ours was derived
and with which we still have much in common. Despite our same
roots, English barristers are more restrained in their advocacy,

167

See Damaska, supra note 49, at 1088.

168

For example, terms such as objection, sustained, and overruled are never heard

in German courtrooms. See Zeidler, supra note 46, at 156.
169 An experienced American trial lawyer recently drew sharp distinctions between
performance before a judge and a trial jury.

Deferential, prepared, principled, dispassionate, courteous-these are the adjectives that should describe you in law and motion court. Before a jury, a little
passion may be a useful thing. Before a jury, you may want to decry your

opponent's tactics, perhaps even his character and his ancestry. But in law and
motion, cool is the tool.
John Koslov, Courtly Behavior, CAL. LAW., July 1990, at 54, 56.
170 Hein Kotz, Tie Reform of the Adversary Process, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 478, 481 (1981);
see also Zeidler, supra note 44, at 394-95 (To the English, German lawyers "will appear to
act with somewhat subdued adversary zeal.").

171

Pugh, suprc note 29, at 26.
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often appealing more to reason than to emotion.'7 2 Barristers
also want to win, but generally they do not feel as responsible for
the result of the case as do American lawyers and are more willing
to settle for a fair and just result than to press every advantage,
object whenever possible, and demand enforcement of each and
every rule in the hope of frustrating the opponent.
How does one account for these differences? One explanation
centers on the fact that the English barrister generally does not
become as close to the client and is much less likely than the
American lawyer to "identify with" the client. Ironically, the greater independence of the barrister from his client stems from rules
restricting the authority and ethical responsibilities of the barrister.
First, rules associated with the division of the English legal profession prevent barristers from dealing directly with their clients. A
client cannot hire a barrister directly, but must first see a solicitor
who will then "instruct" a barrister for the client. Usually, it is the
solicitor who chooses and pays the barrister, and ethical rules
require that the solicitor be present whenever the barrister interviews the client. In essence, the English trial lawyer has two clients, the instructing solicitor and the litigant, and often it is the
former who is more significant to the barrister for the prospect of
future business. Satisfying a solicitor or the solicitor's clerk often is
more important that pleasing the client who may never again
become involved in litigation. Captivating the solicitor or his clerk
by putting up a stubborn fight is often more important for the
barrister than winning for his client.1 73 Though the American
lawyer may criticize a system in which the interest of the lawyer is
not solely directed toward pleasing the client, greater separation
between the American lawyer and the client may reduce the pressures to win at any cost. Of course, one may argue that since most
criminal defendants are represented by a public defender or other
government-paid lawyer, the distance between the American lawyer
and the client can be great indeed. But even a public defender
usually maintains a closer relationship with the client than does a
barrister. In a well-operated public defender office, the trial attorney will have seen the client a number of times prior to trial,
whereas a barrister usually sees the client for the first time on the

172 GRAHAM, supra note 5, at 235-40 (1983); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 10512; see generally 1 JAMEs F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 451-53
(London, MacMillan 1883) (historical explanations for the "calmer" advocacy of barristers).
173 HARVEY, supra note 101, at 69-71.
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day of trial. Also, the barrister is never alone with the client, because ethical rules require the solicitor's presence anytime the
barrister interviews the client. The courtroom arrangement, placing the accused in the dock during the trial (whether on bail or
not) and placing the solicitor between the barrister and the accused, reinforces this distance.
Ethical rules preventing rejection of client representation and
preventing direct involvement in the commencement and investigation of cases also contribute to the barrister's greater independence and reduced commitment to victory. It is the ethical duty of
a barrister, if offered a brief with a proper fee in his line of.work,
to accept the brief, whoever may be the client. 74 Therefore, by
selecting the particular client, the barrister does not implicitly
vouch for the validity of the client's cause. Contrast the American
private attorney who in most cases has the right to decline employment. 175
The difference between English and American prosecutors can
be explained by a number of factors. First, ethical rules regard
English prosecutors as administers of justice rather than as advocates. 171 More important, since the prosecuting barrister can
have no direct involvement in either the commencement, of a
prosecution or the investigation or preparation of cases, the barrister does not feel as responsible for the performance of his or her
witnesses. The English system separates investigative and trial functions, with the solicitor charged with the former and the barrister
prevented from interviewirg witnesses though he often interviews
his client in the presence of the solicitor. 77 The English barrister Harvey noted the American practice of preparing witnesses and

174 See Smith, supra note 91, at 97 ("[lI]t is a convention that a barrister should not
refuse a brief for the defence if he can possibly take it . . . ").
175 The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility urges lawyers to "not lightly decline
proffered employment" but provides that "[a] lawyer is under no obligation to act as
adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client . . . ." MODEL

CODE, supra note 143, at EC 2-26. This freedom is qualified by the duty to accept court
appointments, which would apply to indigent defendants in criminal cases, but good
cause exceptions allow the lawyer to reject clients in a number of situations, such as
when "the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the
client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client" MODEL RULES,

supra note 140, at Rule 6.2(c). In any event, the hired attorney retains complete freedom
to refuse to represent any client.

176

"Prosecuting counsel should regard themselves as ministers of justice assisting in

its administration rather than advocates." Rex v. Banks 2 K.B. 621 (1916) (citing and
approving language from Regina v. Puddick 4 F.& F. 497, 499 (1865).
177 Cameron, supra note 148, at 992.
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the assumption that if one's witness fell short on the stand, it was
the lawyer's fault. He contrasted the English practice where the
solicitor may interview witnesses, but the barrister cannot. As a result, the lawyer trying a case is not considered responsible for the
performance of his or her witness, thus reducing the pressure to
178
win cases.
The effect of distancing the barrister from the investigative
function perhaps is most beneficial when applied to the prosecution. The independence of the prosecuting barrister from the dayto-day operation of the prosecutor's office, his noninvolvement in
the decision to prosecute, and his lack of responsibility for the
investigation makes it less likely that he will become emotionally
involved, overly committed to obtaining a conviction, or even
imbalanced in the sense of being "prosecution-minded."
Finally, the fact that most (though not all) barristers represent
both the prosecution and the defense in criminal cases moderates
any tendency toward excesses in advocacy. Although many barristers prefer a particular side, and a few refuse to prosecute
(Rumpole only defends), the practice of most barristers includes
both prosecution and defense work. On a given day, a barrister
may go to court for a prosecuting solicitor in some cases and a
defense solicitor in others. The result is a certain balance. Winning is not everything when the solicitor who hired your opponent
may hire you for a future case. As a result of these differences,
"the philosophy of the American advocate [to win a victory or
bear the blame] is far removed from that of his English equivalent .... "179 The barrister can more easily maintain a restrained
and purer form of the art of advocacy, and the English criminal
trial becomes less aggressive and less confrontational. Some might
argue that nearly total commitment to the client furthers the interests of justice. However, particularly during a criminal trial,
most observers would agree that justice is not promoted by ex-

HARVEY, supra note 101, at 63-65.
Continental countries generally impose similar restrictions on witness interviews by
counsel. For example, German Bar Association Rules advise against questioning witnesses
out of court except in special circumstances, and Zeidler has noted that "a German attorney will be highly reluctant to talk with prospective witnesses" since "a German judge
would take a rather dim view of the reliability of a witness who had previously discussed
178

the case with counsel." Zeidler, supra note 44, at 396.

179 HARVEY, supra note 101, at 65-66; see also Cameron, supra note 148, at 992 ("Because of his role in the system, the English barrister is an independent, able, and ethical
advocate, bringing to the trial a detached, unemotional dedication to justice that is the

hallmark of a professional.").
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treme aggression or partisanship which values victory at any cost.
Also, a more independent bar together with more restrained advocacy may enhance the standing of lawyers in the community. One
of the principle criticisms of lawyers voiced by lay persons is that
the advocate is paid to say things and take positions in which he
or she does not believe. This problem was answered long ago by a
portion of the Johnson-Boswell debates:
Boswell: But, Sir, does not affecting a warmth when you
have no warmth, and appearing to be clearly of one opinion
when you are in reality of another opinion, does not such
dissimulation impair one's honesty? Is there not some danger
that a lawyer may put on the same mask in conimon life in the
intercourse with his friends?
.Johnson: Why, no, Sir. Everybody knows you are paid for affecting warmth for your client, and it is therefore properly no
dissimulation: the moment you come from the Bar you resume
your usual behavior. Sir, a man will no more carry the artifice
of the Bar into the common intercourse of society than a man
who is paid for tumbling upon his hands will continue to tumble upon his hands when he should walk upon his feet.'
Lord Macmillan elaborated on Doctor Johnson's point:
In advocacy what the advocate says is not presumed to be, and
ought not to be, the expression of his own mind at all, and
those whom he addresses are not entitled to believe, and do
not believe, anything of the sort. In pleading a case an advocate is not stating his own opinions. It is no part of his business, and he has no right to do so. What it is his business to
do is to present to the court all that can be said on behalf of
his client's case, all that his client would have said for himself
if he had possessed the requisite skill and knowledge. His personal opinion either of his client or of his client's case is of no
8
consequence.' 1
An American trial lawyer, however, while not allowed to state
it expressly in court, often is giving his own opinion of his client
and his client's case. More importantly, those whom he addresses
frequently assume that the lawyer personally believes in his client's
position. Out of court, lawyers (particularly defense lawyers) have
attempted to try their cases on the courthouse steps. Doctor Johnson notwithstanding, in America the artifice of the bar is often

180
181

THE R. T. HON. LORD MAcMILLAN, LAW AND OTHER THINGS 184 (1937).
Id.at 181.
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carried into the common intercourse of society and the tumbling
lawyer "will continue to tumble upon his hands when he should
walk upon his feet."
Emphasis on the Battle Rather than on the Truth

3.

Because of our strong attraction to the courtroom battle and
our uncompromising worship of the adversary model, we have
accepted the "Sport-Game Theory" of adjudication despite occasional judicial protestations to the contrary.182 The love of a
good fight is an integral aspect of our national character, and we
often value the adversary contest more for itself than for what it
produces. The courtroom attracts us. A spirited battle between
semantic warriors dedicated to opposing objectives is far more
exciting and entertaining than a neutral inquiry by a dispassionate
judge. Thus, trial lawyers recognize that jurors from today's TV
generation demand stimulation and entertainment, and that to
persuade them requires lawyers to "target the dominant emotion
of the case" with "a simple slogan" or "a few vivid words that will
stick in the jurors' minds."183 While we demand that the fight be
a fair one, this demand, though arising in part from empathy for
the disadvantaged, in large measure is founded on the reality that
a one-sided fight lacks interest.
The lawyer as actor also provides entertainment value. The
American public has a love-hate attitude toward lawyers. While in
recent years the public esteem of lawyers has suffered considerably, lawyers who are regarded as great performers in the trial

arena often enjoy considerable respect and admiration. Even in
England, the advocate who can spin a tale, inject a humorous
note, or otherwise entertain is "positively treasured by laymen. "184

182

See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.

183

Roger J.

Dodd, Innovative Techniques: Parlor Tricks for the Courtroom, TRIAL, Apr.

1990, at 38. The author emphasizes "how important it is to stimulate, impress, and sometimes entertain during the trial of a case. This is the TV generation, and mere words
from the winless may no longer be enough to persuade or convince." Id.
184 HARVEY, supra note 101, at 13. The author notes that fairly often he has been
regaled by retired military men with anecdotes like the following:
Marvelous chaps, some of you lawyers-I don't know how you do it. I remember
there was a fellow in my regiment, quite a decent chap really-pretty useful
polo player actually-but always getting himself into some sort of a mess. He
was one of those chaps, you know-however much money they have they can always do with a bit more, what? Well, of course, when they made him Mess Secretary he just started helping himself out of the till. Didn't mean any harm I
suppose-always thought he'd back a winner or something and put the money
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Long ago Roscoe Pound traced what he called the sporting theory
of justice to "the Anglo-Saxon bent for contentious procedure and
love of a fair fight, and the desire of the pioneer American to see
a forensic game of skill in backwoods court houses."' 5 He found
the sporting theory of justice "so rooted in the profession in
America that most of us take it for a fundamental legal tenet.' ' . 6
Yet Pound strongly criticized the sporting theory on the ground
that it leads to deciding cases "according to the rules of the
game" rather than in accordance with a "search independently for
truth and justice."'' 7 It leads to focusing on procedure rather
than on substantive law-on the means as opposed to the ends:
Legal procedure is a means, not an end; it must be made subsidiary to the substantive law as a means of making that law
effective in action. That procedure is best which most completely realizes the substantive law in the actual administration
of justice .... Nothing is so subversive of the real purposes of
legal procedure as individual vested rights in procedural er-

back again. But of course it didn't work out that way-ended with his being
court-martialled. Well, it was an awful knock for his people-they had a place
up in Shropshire-jolly good sort of family and all that, don't you know-his
father commanded the 77th just before I went to Sandhurst. Well, in those days
they had a bit of money-this was a decent time ago, mind you-so they got
hold of Sir Edward Silvertongue to defend him. I shall never forget that courtmartial. Of course, everyone knew the fellow was as guilty as Cain. But you
should have heard old Silvertongue. He put up some story about the poor
young fellow expecting a legacy from his uncle, or someone, and thinking he
had got money in his bank when he hadn't-or thinking he was going to have
it anyway-and then about how his future had all gone cock-eyed when he didn't get it; and then of course he started punting and drinking a bit and all that
sort of thing, you know; and then how. his girl chucked him over when she
found out about the mess he was in; and heaven knows what else. By the time
he had finished the tears were rolling down everybody's cheeks-seriously, the
President was blubbing-never seen anything like it-and they were all thinking
'Poor tlevil, he never had a chance' and all that sort of rot; and of course this
young fellow got off. Marvelous showl (Absolute scandal really of course.) After
that he got a transfer to the 15th/54th but it didn't do any good-couldn't stay
the course, you know-no one ever expected he would. In a few years he was
nailed again-just the same thing. But the family coffers were getting a bit low
by then; they couldn't afford Silvertongue again. I've forgotten who they got
hold of but, anyhow, he was potted that time-cashiered, he was. But, my word,
you ought to have heard old Silvertongue at that court-martial-miraculous show
it wasl
Id. at 11-12.
185 Roscoe Pound, Tlw Canons of ProceduralReform, 12 A.B.A. J. 541, 543 (1926).
186 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice
40 Am. L. REv. 729, 738 (1906).
187 Id.
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188

Many others have echoed Pound's objection to the sporting
approach.1 89 My former colleague Professor Rollin Perkins pointed out that the sporting theory looks at every step in the criminal
process as if it were a game to be played according to technical
rules, and which decides cases based on whether the "technicalities
in criminal procedure" have been observed. 90
At times, however, critics of the sport or game theory of justice are vague as to which practices offend them. They provide us
no clear answer whether the fault lies in the nature of the adversary system itself or in absurdly technical rules which could be
changed without altering the fundamental nature of the system of
justice. For example, Professor Perkins pointed to convictions
which were reversed because of some technical error in the
pleadings or minor error at trial. His principal objection is not
with the adversary system itself, but with undue insistence on compliance with legal technicalities and on the failure to apply harmless error standards on appeal. 9 ' On the other hand, -he saw the
need for "a whole-hearted effort to get at the real truth of the
matter " "' and for "the most sweeping changes both in the machinery to be used and in the mental attitude of lawyers and judges in regard 'to the use of this machinery."' The existing machinery, he observed, allows clever lawyers on both sides to play
the game by using "all kinds of tricks and schemes and surprises
and concealments"' 94 with the assumption that "the result of this
combat of wits will be that right will prevail, provided only the

188
189

Pound, supra note 185, at 543.
See e.g., JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYrH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUs-

TICE 80-102 (1949); ALBERT GUERARD, TESTAMENT OF A LIBERAL 114-15 (1956). In 1926
Professor Perkins cited numerous critics of our sporting theory of justice and suggested
that we have lost our focus on the real objective of our system of justice:

We have been so deeply engrossed for so long a period of time in the effort to
see that all of the rules of the game are duly observed under our "sporting
theory of justice," that we have to an alarming degree lost sight of the real purpose of the investigation, which should be to determine whether the defendant
is innocent or guilty.
Rollin M. Perkins, Absurdities in Criminal Procedure, 11 IOWA L. REV. 297, 324-25 (1926).
190 Rollin M. Perkins, The Great American Game, HARPER'S MONTHLY, November 1927,
at 750,
191
192
193
194

754.
Perkins, supra note 189, at 300-22.
Id. at 333.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 332-33.
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rules of the game are carefully observed."' It is difficult to determine whether Professor Perkins is merely pleading for theabolition of formal, technical rules that frustrate truth-seeking or is
calling for a drastic overhaul of the adversary system into one
which is not adversary at all, but one in which all participants are
devoted to the inquiry for truth. In any event, as a result of our
attachment to the game or contest, reliable fact-finding often
becomes a secondary objective.
Our strong attraction to the courtroom battle goes hand-inhand with our diminished respect for the discovery of the truth.
Once the unquestioned primary objective of the criminal trial,
truth-finding over the past few decades has been subordinated to a
number of other values, often in situations where the reasons for
sacrificing truth appear more speculative than compelling. Our
significant reliance on exclusionary rules implies the value we
place on discovery of truth. For the most part, our constitutional
exclusionary rules are an American peculiarity. Our extensive use
of rules which exclude relevant evidence in order to further extrinsic objectives reflects the lesser importance we place on accurate fact-finding. We are not the only country to exclude reliable
evidence in order to further collateral objectives, yet the scope,
complexity, and stringent operation of our exclusionary rules suggests that no other country has so little regard for the accuracy of
its criminal tHal results. 196
Illegally obtained evidence is generally admitted not only in
Continental legal systems, but also in England and the Commonwealth countries. 9 7 For example, while England excludes confessions obtained by coercion, it rejects application of the fruit of the

195 Id.at 332.
196 Professor Damaska found that "exclusionary rules are more numerous and surely
much more elaborate in America than they are in any civilian jurisdiction." Damaska,
supra note 12, at 521. Furthermore, "[tihe volume of American constitutional law on
exclusionary rules is clearly without precedent anywhere . . . [and the rules have] . . . a

much greater practical significance than in any civil law country." Id. at 523. While some
rules may be explained by a desire to improve factfinding reliability, he concluded that
others clearly reflect "a conscious sacrifice of fact[-]finding accuracy for the sake of other
values." Id. at 525.
Continental countries in particular place great importance on discovering the truth
as the principal aim of the trial. Weigend, supra note 123, at 63 ("[T]he German system . . . looks in a less inhibited fashion to the desired end result: the emergence of
the truth."). In part, this enhanced respect for the truth may be attributed to the fhct
that the court itself is charged with the responsibility of discovering it.
197 LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 69. Langbein believes that our exclusionary rules are
not an integral feature of adversary criminal procedure.
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poisonous tree doctrine to knowledge of facts obtained as a result
of extorted confessions. 9 8 Furthermore, English law does not require suppression of physical evidence on the ground that it was
the fruit of an unlawful search, detention, or arrest.'9 9 In England and on the Continent, exclusionary rules are used primarily
to protect against unreliable evidence and to enhance the integrity
of the verdict. While most systems would suppress evidence ohtamined by extreme forms of police misconduct or by means that
taint the reliability of the evidence, police illegality alone generally
will not result in suppression, particularly of reliable fruits or products later discovered.2 °°
Our Supreme Court has taken an ambivalent approach to the
question of the importance of accurate verdicts. On the one hand,
it has announced that "[t]he basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth,"2 01 and has cautioned that "a criminal trial is
not a game."20 2 However, the Court has not clarified the admonition nor explained its relevance to those numerous cases in

198 See Rex v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263, 264 (1783); Police and Criminal Evidence
Act, 1984, ch. 60, § 76(4) (Eng.).
199 Regina v. Sang, 1980 App. Cas. 402, 436 (1978) (appeal taken from C.A.); Police
and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60, § 67(8)(10) (Eng.); Fox v. Chief Constable, 3
All E.R. 392, 396-97 (1985) (H.L.). See generally, Gordon Van Kessel, The Suspect as a
Source of Testimonial Evidence: A Comparison of the English and American Approaches, 38 HASr.

LJ. 1, 32-33 (1986).
200 Jescheck, supra note 28, at 245-46. The exclusionary rules of Germany and other
Continental countries generally are narrower and more flexible than ours. For example,
the German and American systems converge in their treatment of coerced confessions
obtained through brutality or deceit, but the failure to give Miranda-type warnings to
suspects generally will not result in exclusion. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in Germany,
96 HARV. L. REv. 1032, 1064 (1983). German search and seizure rules are less stringent,
and courts do not automatically suppress evidence that the police discover through violation of the rules. Id. at 1035-39. Rather, the court will attempt to strike a balance between protection of the defendant's rights and the interest in effective law enforcement,
which will take into account the seriousness of the offense as well as the strength of suspicion. Id. at 1035, 1041. Even when evidence is suppressed, it nevertheless is known to
the presiding judge who participates in determining guilt and sentence. Id. at 1063-64.
With respect to the French system, see Frase, supra note 32 at 586 n.254. (The
Procedure Code contains only a few explicit exclusionary rules, and most violations give
rise to exclusion only if they are found to have violated substantial provisions of the
Code and to have resulted in prejudice to defendant's interests. Even then, evidentiary
fruits are not necessarily excluded. Though the French exclusionary rules are narrow,
Frase contends that ours are as well in light of the numerous limitations and exceptions
adopted by the Supreme Court.)
201 Tehan v. United States ex rel.
Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
202 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1,
15 (1983); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 82 (1969) ("The adversary system of
trial is hardly an end in itself; it is not yet a poker game in which players enjoy an
absolute right always to conceal their cards until played.").
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which it has established strict and often highly technical rules of
procedure for the conduct of investigations and trials. Rather, the
Court has placed great reliance on the Fourth and Fifth Amendment exclusionary rules, at the same time recognizing that they
are not adjuncts to the ascertainment of truth. The Court said
these exclusionary rules "derogate rather than improve the chances for accurate decisions."0 3 Currently,' a Roberson extension of
the Edwards extension of the Miranda rules bars the police from
initiating interrogation concerning a separate investigation once
the suspect requests a lawyer.2"' The Court recently conceded
that a violation of the Roberson rule "would not seriously diminish
the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination [of the
facts] ...

indeed, it may increase it."" 5 Yet it later expanded Ed-

wards in another direction on the ground that the gain in clarity
and specificity of a absolute rule outweighs the adverse effects2 of
"the suppression of trustworthy and highly probative evidence." 06
The Supreme Court is not alone in its inconsistent approach
toward the importance of truth-discovery. State courts and legislatures have also traditionally resisted free and open discovery in
criminal cases, which often results in trials by surprise.0 7 Our
aversion to full discovery for the defense stems in large part from
constitutional barriers protecting the defendant from disclosure of
evidence to the prosecution. Nevertheless, implicit in this insistence in mutuality of discovery is the assumption that a criminal
trial is essentially a sporting contest between opposing counsel
and, thus, no greater disclosure burden should be imposed on the
208
prosecution than is imposed on the defense.

203 See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 319 (1975).
204 Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
205 Butler v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1218 (1990).
206 Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990) (When, a suspect requests a lawyer,
interrogation must cease, and police may not re-initiate interrogation without counsel
present, even if the suspect has consulted with his lawyer.).
207 No American jurisdiction gives the accused the right to unlimited, Continentalstyle discovery. See Damaska, supra note 12, at 534. In California, discovery for the defendant was pervasive and discovery for the prosecution non-existent, but an voters initiative enacted two years ago placed new limits on defense discovery while expanding discovery for the prosecution. Section 23 of Proposition 115, effective June 6, 1990, adding
Chapter 10 of the California Penal Code. 1990 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 264. For California's
previous "one-way street" approach, see Roger J. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 228 (1964); Gordon Van Kessel, ProsecutorialDiscovery and
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: Accommodation or Capitulation, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
855 (1977).
208 SCHLESINGER ET AL, supra note 29, at 485 n.28.
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Continental systems uniformly reject this assumption. Even the
recent Italian Criminal Code revision adopting many accusatorial
characteristics retained mandatory full pretrial discovery for the
defense. The rationale for retaining open discovery while moving
toward an adversary style was explained by an Italian professor and
a judge: "Such an expansive defense discovery reflects the purpose
of rejecting the sporting theory of justice. To Italian lawyers, a
trial by surprise would be an unbearable violation of the constitutional provision on due process of law. "2 "9
Our adversary system's absolutist approach toward jury independence reflects the low respect we hold for the accuracy of
verdicts. In contrast to Continental systems, our courts reject any
requirement that the fact-finder explain or otherwise provide the
basis for its decision. We prohibit both special verdicts and interrogatories to the jury on the ground that their use would allow
the judge to intrude upon the independence of the jury."' The
judge must not be allowed to carefully guide the jury through the
use of interrogatories,' and the jury must be left "unfettered,
directly or indirectly."" 2
Our legal profession, as well, has not been entirely forthright
in its attitude toward accurate fact-finding. Judge Frankel, a strong
advocate of modifying the adversary ideal to enhance the importance of truth-discovery, recognized that "our profession has practiced some self-deception."21 On the one hand, we proclaim
that our adversary system is the best means for arriving at the
truth, while on the other hand, we know "that many of the rules
and devices of adversary litigation as we coriduct it are not geared
for, but are often aptly suited to defeat, the development of the
truth." 14 Perhaps an honest assessment of our adversary system
would lead one to Professor Saltzburg's conclusion that its goal is
simply "to apply the substantive legal principles so that those who
have rights may claim them and those who have liabilities must
face them."2 15 Professor Saltzburg contends that once the "search

209 Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note 12, at 1223.
210 United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969); Gray v. United States,
174 F.2d 919, 923-24 (8th Cir. 1949).
211 Spock, 416 F.2d at 180-82.
212 Id. at 182.
213 Frankel, supra note 109, at 1036.
214 Id.
215 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients, and the Adversmy System, 37 MERCER L. REv.
647, 654 (1986).

19921

ADVERSARY EXCESSES

for truth" is viewed as a poor description of the system, one
should have no problem with the fact that litigarits pursue victory
rather than truth and that the system's rules often operate to
frustrate truth-discovery. However, this approach of regarding the
criminal process simply as a method of asserting established rights
and liabilities without any higher goals begs the question of the
importance of truth-finding relative to other values.,'
All will agree that there are times when "[t]ruth like all other
good things may be loved unwisely, may be pursued too keenly,
may cost too much."21 6 Even Jeremy Bentham, an ardent opponent of exclusionary rules that frustrate truth-finding, recognized
that "evidence, even justice itself, like gold, may be bought too
dear. It always is bought too dear, if bought at the expense of
preponderant injustice." 217 Judge Frankel also did not have a
simplistic, rigid respect for truth, but acknowledged that "a simplistic preference for the truth may not comport with more funda218
mental ideals" which include "individual freedom and dignity."
Indeed, most debates over other fundamental values concern the
relative weight rather than the existence of such values. Judge
21 9
Frankel argues that "our adversary system rates truth too low"

when compared with these other values; whereas, Professor Milton
Friedman objects that Judge Frankel gives these other values "substantially less than their due .... 22' Nevertheless, it is apparent
that, when compared with nearly all, other countries, we overrate
the importance of the trial contest and considerably undervalue
accurate fact-finding. In justifying the position that in our system
"constitutional rights ... serve independent values that may well

outweigh the truth-seeking value,"221 Professor Friedman contrasted our free society with totalitarian states. But he failed to mention the numerous democracies of Western Europe that maintain
protection for the accused yet place much greater importance
than we do on discovery of truth.
We might consider the California Supreme Court's language
justifying discovery for the defendant and apply it to the general

216 Pearce v. Pearce, 63 Eng. Rep. 950, 957 (1846), cited in West Virginia
Douglass, 20 W. Va. 770, 783 (1882) (discussing the attorney-client privilege).

v.

217 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 482 (John Stuart Mill ed.
1827).
218
219

Frankel, supra note 109, at 1056.
Id. at 1032.

220
221

Friedman, supra note 9, at 1065.
Id. at 1063.
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principal that, with few exceptions, the discovery of truth prevails
even over the adversary ideal:
Although our system of administering criminal justice is adversary in nature, a trial is not a game. Its ultimate goal is the
ascertainment of truth, and where furtherance of the adversary
system comes in conflict with the ultimate goal, the adversary
system must give
way to reasonable restraints designed to fur222
ther that goal.
Leaving aside the question of the proper weight to be accorded truth relative to other values served by the criminal justice
system, some have attacked the notion that objective truth can
ever be the primary goal of the criminal trial. 3
Criticizing
those who describe truth-discovery as the primary function of criminal procedure, Professor Peter Arnella contends that equating
truth with historical fact erroneously assumes a "pure guilt or
innocence model of criminal procedure." 24 The nature of the
inquiry in criminal cases, he argues, is directed not merely toward
the discovery of objective historical facts, but toward a mental
element which involves value judgments regarding the defendant's
moral culpability, something he distinguishes from truth-discov-

ery.

22 5

Our substantive criminal law requires a moral evaluation of the
actor's conduct by including some mental element (e.g., purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence) in its definition
of most offenses and by its recognition of affirmative defenses
that either justify the defendant's conduct or excuse it. Since
substantive guilt includes both facts and value judgments about
the actor's moral culpability, criminal procedure must provide
a procedural mechanism that reliably reconstructs historical
facts and morally evaluates their significance. The combination
of these two procedural functions-reliable historical fact reconstruction and226moral evaluation-cannot be equated with
"truth discovery."

222

In re Ferguson, 487 P.2d 1234, 1238 (Cal. 1971).

223 Peter Arnelta, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
Court's Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L. J. 185 (1983); see also, John D. Jackson, Theories of
Truth Finding in Crimninal Procedure: An Evolutionay Approach, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 475, 484

(1988) (There may be differing epistemological conceptions about the meaning of truth
and the kinds of truths that are most important.)
224 Arnella, supra note 223, at 196-97, 208.
225 Id. at 197.
226 Id. at 197-98.
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Arnella further argues that even when the issue is solely one
of historical fact, as with an alibi or mistaken identity defense, the
process of factual reconstruction "expresses an error deflection
preference" by requiring a high standard of proof of guilt "Which
prefers

erroneous

acquittals over erroneous

this way, the process requires a
defendant's conduct; consequently,

moral

convictions." 22 7

evaluation

In

of the

when commentators describe the primary function of criminal
procedure as "truth-discovery," they provide an oversimplified
and misleading account of how our system is designed to determine guilt. The "truth-discovery" label ignores the moral content and force of-substantive guilt and the resulting need for a
process that evaluates the moral quality of the defendant's ac228
tions.

Though moral culpability certainly plays a critical role in the
substantive law. and is itself an ultimate goal of criminal procedure, Professor Arnella fails in attempting to separate truth from
moral culpability. Few would contend that truth is always an objective which, like a scientific principle or an ancient ruin, is waiting
to be discovered and verified. But most judges and lawyers would
agree that the central issues in the great bulk of criminal cases
involve the determination of historical facts. Examples include the
identity defense (alibi and mistaken identification), self-defense
(who was the first attacker), denial of criminal acts (consent of
alleged rape victims, denial of assault against an officer, claim that
the officer planted a gun or drugs on the defendant). Even when
the ultimate issue concerns a mental element, it often can be
regarded as a question of historical fact involving an identifiable
state of mind. Examples include the existence of intent (such as
an intent to assault, kill, or steal upon entering a building) and
the existence of knowledge (such as an awareness of the presence
or quality of a narcotic drug.).
In some cases (insanity, premeditation and deliberation, or
honest but mistaken belief in the need for self defense), -the state
of mind element will not be simple or clearly defined and fixing
boundaries of liability may involve what Arnella describes as moral
evaluations of defendants' actions. Nevertheless, in all cases involving a mental element, a defendant's past state of mind still is an

227
228

Id. at 198.
Id.

458
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historical fact. In any event, states of mind usually must be proven
by circumstantial evidence which often involves resolution of historical fact disputes. For example, to determine whether a defendant intended to kill, the jury might be asked to decide whether
the defendant had a business or personal dispute with the victim,
or if the defendant had threatened the victim. The question of
whether a defendant premeditated or deliberated prior to the killing might involve factual disputes concerning the time of the
victim's death or the time between the first and final shot.
Without foundation is Arnella's further argument that our
high standard of proof of guilt which "prefers erroneous acquittals
over erroneous convictions" also leads to the conclusion that truth
discovery cannot be the primary function of the criminal trial.
The fact that our system, in accord with those of other civilized
countries, demands that convictions be supported by strong proof
of guilt certainly reflects a moral preference to favor the accused
in cases in which guilt is not free from reasonable doubt, but this
does not show a lack of respect for the truth-finding function.
Our high standards for conviction do not demonstrate that truth
discovery cannot be the primary function of the criminal trial, but
merely reflect a greater aversion to convicting innocent people
than to acquitting guilty ones and an acceptance of the fact that
coming to an accurate result in most cases is not as important as
avoiding erroneous convictions. We can regard the search. for
historical truth as the primary goal of the criminal trial while, at
the same time, require that findings of guilt be avoided unless
based on reasonable certainty. We take a similar careful approach
to scientific research when offered to support new drugs or medical procedures, yet few would contend that such research is not
aimed at discovering historical or objective truth merely because of
stringent demands for proof of effectiveness and safety.
In conclusion, to contend that truth-discovery should be the
primary function of the criminal trial is not to assert that our
criminal trial reflects a pure guilt or innocence model in the sense
that truth-discovery is its sole function or that truth-discovery always must prevail over other interests. Also, the jury's search for
the existence of a mental element can be equated with a search
for truth. In the vast bulk of criminal trials, defendant's legal
responsibility is determined by the process of historical fact-finding, whether with respect to conduct, state of mind, or both. To
describe the primary function of the criminal trial as truth-discovery in terms of the quest for an accurate result is not to oversim-
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plify or to mislead, but to place collateral concerns in perspective
and to focus on the main object of the criminal trial.
4.

Over-Reliance on the Lay Jury

We are unique both in the extent to which we utilize the alllay jury system and in the manner of its use. The vast majority of
civilized countries have rejected the all-lay jury. Although it existed
on the Continent for some time after the French Revolution, it
was abandoned by Germany, France, Italy, and other countries
during the first part of this century in favor of a mixed tribunal.2" At present, there appears to be a consensus on the Continent against the all-lay jury, and the open question is whether this
negative view will lead to abolition of lay participation in the
mixed court. Although the benefits of the lay jury are discussed
on the Continent, the disadvantages are more often stressed and
can be summed up by the following comment by Professor Graven
of Geneva: "Le jugement par jury c'est, indiscutablement, le triomphe de
Vincompetence."23 Currently, the lay jury remains mainly in Britain, the British Commonwealth, and the United States. Of the
three, we are by far the most enthusiastic user of the system. More
than ninety percent of the world's criminal jury trials, and nearly
all of its civil jury trials, take place in the United States."'
The way we use our jury system is also excessive. Federal, California, and many other state courts maintain the traditional twelveperson and unanimity requirements, though the Supreme Court
has allowed some flexibility in this area. However, the Supreme
court is unlikely to extend this flexibility with approval of a Continental-style mixed court in which professional judges sit alongside
232
lay jurors and participate with an equal vote in deliberations.
On the contrary, the Court has continued to heap praise upon
our criminal jury trial as providing ordinary citizens the "honor
and privilege" of participating in the democratic process through
jury service and acting "as a vital check against wrongful exercise
233
of power by the State and its prosecutors."
229 In Germany the lay jury was introduced in the mid-nineteenth century, but was
abolished in 1924. Other countries soon followed Portugal in 1927, Italy in 1931, Spain
in 1936, and France in 1941. Jescheck, supra note 28, at 240-51.
230 Jescheck, supra note 28, at 244 (quoting P. QRAVEN, REVUE PINALE SWlSSE 154a
(1938)).
231 Casper & Zeisel, supra note 3, at 135-36.
232 See infra part IIIA.1.
233 Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1371 (1991) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
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Extensive use of voir dire and peremptory challenges distinguishes our jury selection procedure from the process of selecting
the Continental mixed court or the English lay jury. Historically,
Continental systems have not recognized peremptory challenges to
either professional or lay judges. In Germany, for example, the
grounds for challenging professional. and lay judges are the same
and are limited to what we categorize as "for cause" challenges.2"4 Lay members of the German mixed court are not selected
for each case, but are assigned to particular courts randomly for
fixed periods of time, and voir dire is unknown.2 35 English law
23 6
also prohibits the litigants from questioning prospective jurors,
and in 1988, England abolished all peremptory challenges.2 37
In this country, voir dire and the exercise of peremptory
challenges often compose a significant part of the trial of criminal
cases. In a serious case, our jury selection process can occupy a
substantial portion of the guilt trial. For example, jury selection in
capital cases in California has taken months. 233 Occasionally, the
selection process has lasted longer than the trial itself. In one
capital murder case in Oakland which involved three defendants
and seven lawyers (two for each defendant and the prosecutor),
jury selection lasted over eleven months though the trial lasted
less than two months.

23 9

Yet voir dire time often is wasted. A content analysis of voir
dire conducted for the University of Chicago Jury Project revealed
that the bulk of voir dire time was spent preparing the jurors for
the case rather than the actual selection process. 24 0 Even without
lengthy attorney voir dire, our jury selection process may take
substantial time in particular cases because of the extensive use of
peremptory challenges and the prosecutor's perceived need to

79, 86 (1986)).
234 LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 142 n.1.
235 Id.
236 Graham Hughes, English Criminal Justice: Is It Better than Ours?, 26 ARIz. L. REv.
507, 592 (1984).
237 See Samuel J. Cohen, The Regulation of Peremptoly Challenges in the United States and
England, 6 B.U. INT'L LJ. 287, 306-08 (1988). The prosecution retains jury vetting author-

ity (the power to ask a juror to "stand by"), but such authority is restricted by Attorney
General Guidelines. See also The Exercise by the Croon of its Right of Stand By, 88 Crim.
App. 123, 125 (Attorney-General's Guidelines on Juries, January 5, 1989); ARCHBOLD,
supra note 127, at § 4-139.
238
239
240

See infra part III.D.1.
'People v. McDonald, Robinson, and Evin, Docket (Alameda Super. Ct. 1991).
HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT, 103 n.9 (2d ed. 1978) (citing study by

Professor Saul Mendlovitz).
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exclude those who would never convict, particularly in jurisdictions
requiring unanimous verdicts. Also, the Supreme Court's recent
well-intentioned but misguided effort to tame the use of racially
motivated peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky 41 has produced, in the words of Professor Alschuler, "cumbersome procedures that will generate burdensome litigation for years to
come."242 Indeed, "[i]f one wanted to understand how the American trial system for criminal cases came to be the most expensive
and time-consuming in the world, it would be difficult to find a
better starting point than Batson."24 The Court has expanded
Batson and allowed a defendant to object to a prosecutor's racebased peremptory challenge regardless of whether the defendant
and the excluded juror are of the same race.2" However it has
left unanswered such questions as whether its rules apply to peremptory challenges exercised by the defendant or to peremptory
challenges based on sex, religion, age, economic status or "any
other personal characteristic unrelated to the capacity for responsible jury service. " '245 Only further experience with Batson and its
progeny will reveal its full impact on the jury selection process.
Eventually, it may lead to the requirement that both the prosecution and the defense justify all peremptory challenges on narrow
benign grounds; yet, even those challenges would have to be fully
articulated, which would then make them similar to a challenge
for cause.
Modification of our approach to the all-lay jury would not
undermine the adversary system since the twelve-person jury, unanimity, and extensive voir dire are not among its essential ingredients. England maintains an adversary trial, yet has no significant
voir dire246 and allows a ten-to-two verdict after two hours of deliberations.24 7 The denigration of our voir dire process has been

241

476 U.S. 79 (1986).

242

Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges,

and the Review ofjury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 156-57 (1989) (arguing that Batson
creates seven areas of litigation and that peremptory challenges are not compatible with
the Equal Protection Clause).
243 William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing the Disease bInt
Killing the Patient, 1987
Sup. Cr. REv. 97, 155.
244 Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
245 Id. at 1381 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court recently agreed to decide whether
the Consitituion prevents criminal defendants from exercising peremptory challenges in a
racially discriminatory manner. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Cr. 931 (1992).
246 See Hughes, supra note 236.
247 See Regina v. Thornton, 89 Crim. App. 54 (1988); ARCHBOLD, supra note 127, at
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attributed to our "addiction to all-out adversariness,"248 but the
elimination of extensive voir dire would not change the basic adversary character of our criminal trial. There is nothing inherent
in the adversary system that necessitates the American-style extended voir dire.
Finally, we should temper our worship of the traditional all-lay
jury in view of the lack of evidence to support its reliability. Studies of the operation of the jury system generally conclude that
defendants fare better than they would with a single judge, but do
not show that overall jury verdicts are more accurate than bench
verdicts.249 In fact, a principal argument made in support of the
jury is that it may disregard the duty of accurate fact-finding and
consequently, moderate the harshness of the written law. The jury,
it is said, insures that the fact-finder can "dilute logic with mercy" 250 such that we are governed by the spirit, rather than merely the letter, of the law. Even strong defenders of the jury recognize that, to a considerable extent, the jury forsakes both law and
reason. Patrick Devlin described the English jury as follows:
In most systems the just decision is tied pretty closely to the
law; the law may be made as flexible as possible, but the justice
of the case cannot go beyond the furthest point to which the
law can be stretched. Trial by jury is a unique institution, devised . .. to enable justice to go beyond that point. The essentials of the device are that the tribunal consists of a comparatively large body of men who have to do justice in only a few
cases once or twice in their lives, to whom the law means
something but not everything, who are anonymous and who
25
give their decision in a word and without a reason. '
This flexibility has its desirable qualities and is praised by the
jury's defenders as much as it is criticized by its detractors.
Referring to attitudes toward the jury trial, Kalven and Zeisel remarked, "[o]ne is tempted to say that what is one man's equity is
another man's anarchy."252 However, it shows our willingness to

4-444 (discussing Juries Act, 1974 s.17 (Eng.)).
248 Hein K6tz, The Reform of the Adversary Proces, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 478, 480 (1981)
(book review).
249 For example, the well-known jury study by Kalven and Zeisel found that when
compared with bench trials, jury verdicts favor criminal defendants 16% more often.
KALvEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 59.
250

HARVEY, supra note 101, at 4.

251
252

DEvL!N, supra note 90, at 154.
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 9.
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sacrifice accuracy for other values, and it shows that we realize
accuracy of jury verdicts may not be its principal strength. Indeed,
many trial lawyers believe that trying a case to a jury is often a
crap shoot. 3 The public generally assumes that jury trials are
preferable to plea bargains and that many more cases should be
tried if we could afford it. However, many criminal lawyers believe
that the negotiating process does a better job of achieving justice
than contested jury trials, and this view is shared by many judges.
Though lawyers with an interest in disposing of cases through plea
bargaining may tend to exaggerate its merits, the fact that many
of those closest to the bargaining and trial processes believe that
justice more often will be achieved through bargaining should tell
us something about the integrity of our jury trial system.
5.

Formal and Complex Rules of Evidence and Procedure

Lawyer domination of the trial and the excessive value placed
on both the contest and the lay jury has contributed to the greatly
increased formality and complexity of the rules of evidence and
procedure over the past thirty to forty years. It is not surprising
that Europeans, with their liberal rules of admissibility,
generally
25 4
bewilderment.
with
system
complex
our
upon
look
Many of our formal and technical rules of evidence flow directly from the adversary character of our trial and, though designed to guarantee a fair contest and a just result, actually tend
to delay and disrupt the presentation of evidence and to distract
the jury from the discovery of the facts.255 For example, our formal rules of evidence prohibit narrative responses and encourage
stilted direct examination, broken by objections, arguments of
counsel, court rulings, and admonitions to witnesses and jurors.
Our rules against hearsay and character evidence provide ample
opportunity for objections to relevant evidence which might be

253

Alschuler also has noted the observations of practitioners that sending a case to a

jury is "very much like rolling dice" or "a plunge from an unknown height." Alschuler,
supra note 242, at 153.
254 See, K6tz, supra note 248, at 480-81 ([T]he development of arsenals of procedural
swords and shields with advanced complexity and technicality has resulted in the ordinary
criminal trial ceasing to be a workable institution.); Volkmann-Schluck, supra note 4, at
25 ("the jury trial has become too costly in time, labor, and money and too overloaded
with complex rules and procedural safeguards ...
.
255 Moreover, evidence rules allowing liberal cross-examination by attorneys invite
overly aggressive, sometimes vicious, attacks on witnesses which may dissuade victims from

reporting crime and witnesses from testifying.
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misused by the lay jury. Highly aggressive and contentious counsel
who readily assert all possible objections and arguments make the
trial process a long battle between semantic warriors which,
though often entertaining, does little to further the trial's main
objectives. Contentious trials tend to have fewer stipulations and,
therefore, counsel spend more time proving collateral facts or
foundations for the admission of evidence. Also, there are usually
more objections to the questioning of witnesses, as well as arguments between counsel designed to impress the jury.
Contrast the Continental approach. There are no hearsay,
character evidence, or other rules designed to protect the lay jury.
Witnesses are called and initially questioned by the court, rather
than by the parties, and therefore tend to be less identified with a
particular party. There is no implicit understanding or commitment with respect to their testimony by reason of how they arrive
in court. These procedures, together with rules prohibiting the
pretrial preparation of witnesses by the parties, tend to make' witness testimony less contrived as well as less partisan. This is particularly beneficial when it comes to expert testimony. The use of
judicial experts could largely avoid our current battle of experts
who are paid by the parties and who in many cases are merely
hired guns totally committed to their party-employer.256 Zeidler
remarked that in German courts experts "do not come into the
proceedings with a partisan perspective, but as neutral assistants to
the court, supplying it with technical knowledge not otherwise
available to the judges themselves."2"'
The Continental-style witness examination is similarly less
distorted by adversary excesses. The lack of strict rules of evidence,
such as the prohibition of leading questions on direct examination, allows witnesses to give narrative and explanatory answers.
The entire examination becomes more informal and more natural.
It also tends to avoid turning the examination into a hostile confrontation between the lawyers, diverting the jury's attention away
from the facts to the lawyer-contest and delaying the elicitation of
testimony. Langbein described the German examination of witnesses by the presiding judge as follows: "The tone of the examination
is crisp and business-like, but not hostile. Witnesses seldom emerge
256 LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 75.
257 Zeidler, supra note 46, at 156. Zeidler noted, however, that special dangers do
exist when judges overestimate the authority of court-appointed experts who regularly
appear before them, but one may find ways to avoid such problems and may ask whether even greater dangers lie in our current forensic battles of partisan experts.
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from a trial feeling mishandled,
as is so often the case in the
25 8
procedure."
adversary
Another factor contributing to the complexity of our adjudication process has been the development, beginning in the 1960s, of
exclusionary rules of evidence. These rules are designed to serve
collateral purposes, such as policing the police, which hide reliable
evidence from the jury and undercut reliable fact-finding.
Exclusionary rules are not a simple product of our adversary system; rather, they are the result of an active judiciary seeking to
control the activities of law enforcement officials at the expense of
achieving a reliable result in the judicial proceeding. Exclusionary
rules are a police control mechanism rather than an integral part
of the adversary system. They result, in part, from the perceived
failure of other means to limit police authority. Yet adversary excesses such as over-lawyering, which emphasize the contest rather
than the truth, contribute to these exclusionary rules. The motivation of our lawyers to win at all costs, together with the diminished value we place on the integrity of the result of the process,
naturally lead to acceptance of complex and technical exclusionary
rules.
D.
1.

The Price We Pay for Our Excesses

Lengthy Trials and Plea Bargaining

(a) Our Monster Trial Process.-The giant American criminal
trial is a modern invention. Until very recently, criminal trials were
short and efficient, with few technical rules of evidence and less
reliance on lawyers. 259 It was not until nearly the 19th century

LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 74-75.
259 Although this Article focuses on the length of trial, excessive delay in overall case
processing time also presents a serious problem in many jurisdictions. See KATHLEEN B.
BROSI, A CRoss-CrrY COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESSING (1979); THOMAS CHURCH
258

Ex AL, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978); NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, MANAGING THE PACE OF JUSTICE (1981); NATIONAL INST. OF JUS-

TICE, THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS 1979, at 21-23 (1983).
It should be noted, however, that the length and complexity of trials and the collateral proceedings accompanying them greatly extend case .processing time. A 1986 report on felony case processing time in 12 jurisdictions found that the average time Trom
arrest to disposition was about twice as long (somewhat less than 8 months) for cases
that went to trial as opposed to cases disposed by guilty pleas or dismissals. U.S. DEP'T.
OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE DATA REPORT 32 (1986).
The fact that a case involves a capital offence also significantly extends case processing time. Delays in' the imposition of the penalty of death are well known. The average time from sentence to execution for those executed in this country from 1986 to
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that English trials developed any length or complexity. In late
17th century England there were few guilty pleas and virtually no
plea bargains, and twelve to twenty full jury trials were conducted
in the Old Bailey each day. 2" This trial rate continued well into
the 18th century, and it was not until 1794 that a trial ever lasted
for more than one day."' Frequently, the jury was asked to hear
evidence in two or three cases before retiring to deliberate.26 2
These rapid jury trials occurred when trials were informal affairs.
There were no lawyers, no jury voir dire, the rules of evidence
were entirely undeveloped, and the accused participated actively.
Judges discouraged guilty pleas. 3
(b) Trials Versus Guilty Pleas in America.-Turning to America,
we find some disagreement as to when guilty pleas began to increase and the number of trials began to decline. Most likely, the
shift occurred sometime during the 19th century.2 r A study of
convictions in the state of New York found that in 1839, 22% were
the result of guilty pleas. By 1869, this had increased to 70%, and
by 1920, it was 88%.265 By the late 19th century, guilty pleas
were a common method of case disposition in the United States.
Nevertheless, most surveys demonstrate that during the early part
of this century, more convictions were based on trials and fewer
on guilty pleas than at present. An American Law Institute study
found that in 1908, and for several years thereafter, only about
50% of all convictions in the federal courts were by plea as opposed to trial.2 6 Several 1920 studies of felony case dispositions
disclosed trial rates (trials as a percent of convictions) in the 20%

1988 was over 80 months. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1988, 10 (1989).
260 Langbein, supra note 66, at 277-78.

261
262

Langbein, supra note 27, at 216-17.
Landsman, supra note 55, at 17.

263 An exploration of the characteristics of ordinary criminal trials conducted at the
Old Bailey between the id-1670s and the mid-1730s can be found in Langbein, supra
note 66, at 267-84; see also Alschuler, sup-a-note 6, at 971. For accounts of a well-known

political trial, see STEPHEN, supra note 172, at 324 (describing the trial of Sir Nicholas
Throcknorton).
A description of a mid-16th century trial can be found in THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM, 94-104 (Leonard Alston ed., 1906.)
264 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS 12 (1979); see
also Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its His"oy, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1979)

(guilty pleas accounted for only a small minority of criminal convictions during the colonial period and through the first part of the 19th century).
265

RAYMOND MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 164 (1929).

266

Alschuler, supra note 264, at 27.
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to 25% range. Pound and Frankfurter in their 1922 Cleveland
Survey found that approximately 75.% of the convictions in
Cleveland's felony court in 1919 were by guilty pleas and about
25% were by trial. 267 Looking at over ten thousand felony cases
in the state of Missouri, the 1926 Missouri Crime Survey found that
about 20% of felony convictions were from trials and 80% from
guilty pleas. 26s The 1931 Wickersham Commission Report cited
case disposition figures from four jurisdictions during the 1920s
which revealed that, as is the case today, dismissal was the most
common disposition of criminal arrests and most convictions resulted from guilty pleas.269 However, the report disclosed trial
rates averaging 26%. These rates are very close to the results of
the 1922 Cleveland survey, and are considerably greater than what
generally prevails in the United States today.
A study of court dispositions in Connecticut Superior Courts
from 1880 to 1954 disclosed lower trial rates. It concluded that
the ratio of trials to total dispositions did not change appreciably
over this 7 5-year period-the mean being 8.7%.271 However, the
study's disposition tables disclose a slow, though uneven, downward trend in the percentage of trials to total dispositions: from
1880 through the early part of this century, trials amounted to'
about 10% of total dispositions, whereas .by272the 1970s, the number
of trials had dropped to around 4 percent.
In California since at least 1970, there has been a clear shift
away from trials and toward convictions by plea. In 1970, 72% of
felony convictions in California were. from pleas of guilty, but by

267

RAYMOND

FOSDICK ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 96, 236-37 (Roscoe

Pound & Felix Frankfurter eds., 1922).
THE MISSOURI CRIME SURVEY 269, 298-301 (Missouri Ass'n for Crim. Justice ed.,

268

1926).
269 WICKERSHAM COMM., REPORT ON CRIMINAL STATISTICS (1931), cited in KATHLEEN
B. BRosI, A CROSS-CITY COMPARISON OF FELONY CASE PROCESSING 4 (1979).
270 The percent of felony convictions from trials as opposed to pleas in the four
jurisdictions were 14%, 50%, 24%, and 17%, for an average of 26%. Brosi, supra note
259, at 4.

Brosi's study of thirteen jurisdictions in 1977 based on the Prosecutor's Management
Information System (PROMIS) data found "a striking similarity" between Wickersham and
PROMIS figures for the same year, but a close look reveals that while there were similari-

ties-dismissal and guilty pleas were the most common dispositions-the percent of convictions by trial was even less in 1977 (15% compared with 26%). Id. at 4, 7, 35.
271 MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 28 (1978). Figures for 1966 to 1973 showed
similar ratios. Id. at 27.
272 Id.Note that these figures are based on total dispositions which include dismissals, and that trial rates would be'a bit higher if based on convictions alone.
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1972, plea-based convictions amounted to 82% of total felony convictions.17 ' The increase in plea-based convictions continued into
the 1980s despite public opposition to plea bargaining.2 74 In
1982, the voters restricted plea bargaining in serious felony cases
through a state-wide initiative. Plea-based felony convictions, however, continued to increase and by 1983-84, only 10.1% of total
felony convictions were from trials.2175 Currently, trials are extremely rare for most crimes. Figures for the third quarter of 1989
show that 9.4% of robbery convictions were from trials but only
2.4% of second degree burglary convictions were from trials. All
223 convictions for passing fictitious or NSF checks were by plea,
none were by trial. 76
(c) Length of Trials in Ameica.-While guilty pleas were a common method of case disposition in the United States from the late
19th century, as recently as the 1890s, one felony court could conduct a half dozen jury trials in a single day.277 In their study of
criminal justice in Cleveland in 1922, Pound and Frankfurter
found that several cases could be tried to the same jury in a single
day. 278 They described the operation of the prosecutor's office of
Cuyahoga County (encompassing Cleveland) as follows:
The trial of two cases a day by the same prosecutor before
the same court is habitual, the trial of three cases a day very
frequent, of four cases not exceptional. In addition to the
trials, there are generally each day several arraignments of
accused "for receipt of the plea," and also the pleas of guilty
with sentence thereon. The course of most trials is interrupted
by these miscellaneous matters and by the receipt of the jury
verdict in a previously tried case.2 79

With trials of such rapidity, the prosecutor often was unprepared and at some disadvantage. For example, the prosecutor did
"not seem to exercise particular care in selection of the ju-
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RALPH ANDERSEN

& Assoc.,

JUDICIAL

COUNCIL OF

CALIFORNIA,

GUIDELINES

FOR

DETERMINING THE IMPACr OF LEGISLATION ON TttE COURTS D-4 (1974).
CANDICE McCoy & ROBERT TILLMAN, CONTROLLING PLEA BARGAINING IN CALIFOR3 (1985).
275 Id.
276 CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SENTENCING PRACTICES QUARTERLY, Sept. 30, 1989,
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NIA

at tbl. 7.
277 Lawrence M. Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspectives, 13 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 247, 257 n.16 (1979).
278 FOSDICK, supra note 267, at 161.
279 Id. at 161,
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ry .... "280 He would not investigate the jurors and would ask
only two or three general questions. The prosecution's opening
statement was "only a very scanty, vague, and uninteresting story. "281
(d) Modern Tria/s.-Rough estimates of current trial lengths
suggest substantial increases in recent years. 8 However, there
are few detailed, reliable studies of the length of trials in the
United States today. A study of metropolitan trial courts in the
Los Angeles area in 1953-54 calculated that felony jury trials
averaged three days and misdemeanor jury trials took about onehalf as long. 2 3 A report prepared for the California Judicial
Council concerning a proposed bill eliminating plea bargaining
estimated that the average felony jury trial in Los Angeles County
in 1971 lasted 24 hours and 12 minutes (4.84 court days), and
elsewhere in California, 21 hours and 5 minutes (4.22 court
days) 284
The National Center for State Courts conducted the most
recent detailed published study focusing directly on trial
length.2 5 This study marked the beginning of serious efforts to
reliably determine the length of American trials and the causes of
trial delay. It was based primarily on information gathered during
1986 from more than fifteen hundred civil and criminal felony
trials, both jury and nonjury, in three general jurisdiction courts
in each of three states: California (superior courts in Oakland,

280 Id. at 162.
281 Id.
282 See LANGBEIN, supra note 23, at 3, 9 & n.11 for figures collected from various
sources. In 1987, Eugene Thomas, President'of the American Bar Association, observed
that "it should not be necessary for cases that 15 years ago could 'be tried in two days to
require now two months . . . ." RECORDER, Aug. 12, 1987, at Z

283

JAMES G. HOLBROOK, A SURVEY OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS 120-22 (1956).

These figures probably over-state trial length since the study counted as "jury days" each
day "for which an individual jury panel is used on any case." Id. at 120 n.131. Thus, they'
most likely include partial days as well as jury deliberation days.
284 ANDERSEN, supra note 273, at D-10, tbl. II. Misdemeanor jury trials took about
one-fourth as long, and non-jury trials in felony cases took even less time-about one to
two and one-half hours. Id. at D-11, tbls. III & IV. However, these figures may be open
to some question since they were derived from weighted caseload data rather than measurement of actual trial time. Furthermore, the study did not explain its basis for conversion of trial time to court days.
285

NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, ON TRIAL- THE LENGTH OF CIL AND

CRIMINAL TRIALS 3 (1988) [hereinafter ON TRIAL]. (Except those devoted to single issues
such as jury selection, the study found almost no pertinent literature regarding trials and

trial time.).
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Monterey, and Matin County); Colorado (district courts in Denver,
Colorado Springs, and Golden); and New Jersey (superior courts
in Jersey City, Patterson, and Elizabeth).286 Trial times were measured from commencement of jury selection through submission
of the case to the judge or jury.2 87 The study of criminal trials
focused on a wide variety of felony cases ranging from theft to
homicide.2 11 Figures for capital cases were given separately and
were not included in the general results. While some findings
were not surprising, 289 others were unanticipated and disclosed
the complexity, of the trial time question. For example, the study
found a dramatic difference in trial lengths from state to state and
even among courts in the same state. The median time for a criminal jury trial varied from 6 hours and 20 minutes in Elizabeth,
New Jersey, to 23 hours and 16 minutes in Oakland, California.290
Further, the length of trial time per day was much less than
estimated by either judges or attorneys. 1 For example, although
judges and lawyers had given estimates ranging from five to six
hours, the actual average trial day in Elizabeth was 3 hours and 1
minute and in Oakland 3 hours and 10 minutes.29 2 Converting

286
287

Id.
The study omitted jury deliberation time.

288 ON TRIAL, supra note 285, at 29 tbl. 10.
289 The length of criminal trials greatly depended upon the seriousness of the offense. For example, homicide trials were the longest while theft trials were the shortest.
Further, civil trials lasted longer than criminal trials and jury trials longer than nonjury
trials. Id. at 6.
Nonjury trials were short, averaging between I and 8 1/2 hours, but the number of
nonjury trials was exceedingly small. Out of over 1500 felony cases, only 46 nonjury trials
were reported. These occurred mainly in Monterey, Colorado Springs, and Oakland. In
the remaining 6 jurisdictions, nonjury trials were virtually nonexistent. Id. at 30 fig. 4.
Explanations for the choice between jury and nonjury trials centered on defense
attorneys' assessment of many factors, including the nature of the case and the "reasonableness" of the judge. The general view, however, was that the defendant would have a
better chance before a jury than before a judge. Id. at 20-21.
290 Id. at 19 thl. 7. Earlier studies of civil jury trials also demonstrated remarkable
differences in trial time. A delay study in the New York and New Jersey civil courts during the 1950s demonstrated that the New York courts require almost 80% more time to
try a case than New Jersey courts. ZEISEL ET AL., supra note 240, at 96. A second study
by the Chicago Law School Jury Project found that jury trials in New York City took
nearly twice as long as those in the New Jersey Metropolitan areas. Id. at 96 tbl. 35.
291 ON TRIAL, supra note 285, at 82 fig. 7.
292 Id. at 79 tbl. 25. The short hourly trial day figures are consistent with a later
study of civil jury trials in selected California cities from 1987 to 1989, which found trial
days to involve 3.1 hours of trial activity. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE COURTS, A COMPARISON OF THE PERFORMANCE OF EIGHT- AND TWELVE-PERSON JURIES
83 (April 1990) [hereinafter JURY COMPARISON].
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trial time into trial days for comparison purposes yields 2.1 days
for Elizabeth and 7.3 days for Oakland. Taking into account the
possibility of an understatement of actual daily trial time,29 and
assuming a four-hour trial day, results in 1.6 days for Elizabeth
and 5.8 for Oakland. Thus, a rough estimate indicates that the average felony jury trial in Elizabeth takes one and one-half to two
days whereas the average felony jury trial in Oakland lasts a week
to a week and one-half.
In addition, there was a startling increase in trial times for
the top quarter of cases in some jurisdictions. Between the 75th
and 95th percentiles, trial time increased 400% in Main County
and 550% in Patterson. 4 Of course, trial time is substantially
greater in serious -cases. For example, the length of a noncapital
homicide trial in Oakland was 44 hours and 35 minutes or 14.8
trial days (about three weeks). 29 Capital homicide cases took
much longer. The study included eight such cases, including five
in California which has a bifurcated trial process for capital offenses." 6 The average trial time for the guilt phase of the California
capital cases was sixty-seven hours and thirty-five minutes or approximately 22.4 days.297 In the two California capital cases
where a penalty phase was documented, a separate jury panel was
used. Trial time for these cases was as follows:

293 The study suggested an' understatement of actual trial times, because the first and
last days of trial (which in reality often are less than a full day) were counted as full
days. ON TRIAL, supra note 285, at 78-79 tbl. 25. Hdwever, the average length of a trial
day was not altogether different from the results of Zeisel's study of civil jury trials in
the'1950s, which found the average to be 4.1 hours in New York and 4.5 in New Jersey.
ZEISEL ET AL., supra note 240, at 181-86. The shorter trial days in the recent study may
be due to differences in study methods and standards. For example, jury deliberation
time was not counted in the On Trial study (ON TRIAL, supra note 285, at 78); whereas,
it was included in some of the calculations in the Zeisel study (ZEISEL Er AL, supra note
240, at 186-87 n.3). Also, the hourly estimates were likely to be more accurate in the On
Trial study since they were made by data collectors who would "watch the clock" (ON
TRIAL, supra note 285, at 90), rather than, being made solely by judges and their clerks
(ZEISEL ET AL., supra note 240, at 181). Nevertheless, it is rather startling to note the
wide differences of the length of trial days between the New Jersey courts in the
1950s-4.5 hours per day-and the courts in the three New Jersey cities in the mid
1980s-less than 3 hours.
294 ON TRIAL, supra note 285, at 19.
295 Id. 30 tbl. 11. Trial days calculated at 3 hours and 10 minutes for Oakland. Id. at
79 tbl. 25. Trial days would be 11.1 if calculated at 4 hours per day. Id.
296 Id. at 32 tbl. 12.
297 See id at 179 tbl. 25 (using 3 hour and 10 minute trial days).
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Case

Guilt Phase
(minutes)

Penalty Phase
(minutes)

Total Time
(minutes)

Monterey

31:83

45:30

77:53

98:05

118:25

216:30

County

Oakland

This translates into approximately twenty-one days (one
month) for the Monterey case and seventy-two
days (three and
8
one half months) for the Oakland case.2
Wide variations can occur in the trial 6f the same case depending on factors such as the extent of judicial control, the assertiveness of the attorneys, and the nature of the defense. For
example, after a change of venue from one California rural county
to another, a 1979 capital murder case was tried in two months.
Following reversal for erroneous jury instructions, the case was
retried in San Francisco in 1989. This trial lasted five months, with
jury selection alone taking as long as the entire first trial. In addition to a different judge, both the defense attorney and the nature of the defense had changed. At the first trial, defendant had
claimed diminished capacity. By contrast, at the second, his new
lawyer asserted self-defense, charged police with aggressive conduct, and introduced expert testimony on racial and cultural prejudice.299
Figures for the length of federal jury trials are scarce, but the
available figures indicate that they fall somewhere between the
state court extremes. Annual Reports of the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts provide sketchy outlines of trial days for various
criminal cases completed in the U.S. District Courts in the years
ending June 30, 1987 and June 30, 1988.3"' Consistent with the
On Trial study of state courts, nonjury trials were very short. Over

80% were completed in one day and over 93% in two days.301
However, unlike the state courts, the number of nonjury trials was
considerable (43% of total criminal trials in the federal sys-

298 See Id. at 79 tbl. 25.
299 Martin Halstuk, SF Retrail Indian in '78 Cop Death, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., May 2,
1990, at 1. The new defense was successful and defendant was acquitted of all charges.
300 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 539 tbl. 5.12
(1988) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK-1988]; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS 487 tbl. 5.14 (1989) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK-1989].
301 Id.
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tern),3°2 The Reports disclose that the median felony jury trial in

the Federal District Courts in the years
ending June 30, 1987 and
303
June 30, 1988 lasted about three days.
In some highly publicized or notorious cases in the, United
States, trial length has reached absurd proportions. The 1976 bank
robbery trial of Patricia Hearst, for example, lasted forty days." 4
In another example, during the 1970-71 New Haven trial of Black
Panther Party member Bobby Seale, the voir dire alone took four
months."0 5 On January 18, 1990, the longest trial in history ended in Los Angeles with no convictions. There were mistrials (hung
jury) on some counts and acquittals on most. This Los Angeles
felony child molestation trial had lasted over two and one-half
years from the commencement of jury selection to the beginning
of jury deliberations.0 6 On May 7, 1990, opening statements began in the retrial of one defendant on some of the mistrialed
counts which were expected to last six months.0 7 While these

302 The greater proportion of nonjury trials in federal as compared to state courts is
reflected to a lesser degree in civil trials. Wlhile figures for state trials varied widely, in
most jurisdictions a substantial majority. of civil trials were given to the jury. ON TRIAL,
supra note 285, at 14-17. However, in the federal courts 52% to 58% of civil trials were
nonjury. SOURCEBOOK-1988, supra note 300, at 538 tbl. 5.12; SOURCEBOOK-1989, supra note
300, at 486 tbl. 5.14.
303 Figures for jury trials (with percentages calculated):
Length of trial in days as a percent of total trials that year
1-day
trial

2 days

3 days

4-9
days

10-19
days

20+ days

Year-end
6-30-87
Total =
3911

468 or
12% of
total
trials

942 or
24%

819 or
21%

1331
or
34%

237 or
6%

114 or
3%

Year-end
6-30-88
Total 4150

468 or
12% of
total
trials

1046 or
25%

924 or
22%

1381
or
33%

224 or
5%

96 or
2%

Id.
304 Langbein, supra note 27, at 217.
305 Id.
306 Robert Reinhold, Acquitted of Child Molestation in Nation's Longest Criminal Tia4
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1990, at Al. The inclusion of jury deliberations would extend the
trial length to nearly three years. Id.
307 Second Trial Opens in Presdtool Molestation Cas4 N.Y. TiMEs, May 8, 1990, at 13. On
July 27, 1990, the retrial of this defendant ended in a second mistrial when the jury
announced it was "hopelessly and irreversibly deadlocked." Seth Mydans, Seven Years Later,
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trial lengths are not typical of the usual felony case, they do reflect the process of the notorious or highly publicized criminal
case in many jurisdictions. They further illustrate the extent to
which even one full scale criminal jury trial can become an albatross on the neck of a local criminal court.
(e)
The Length of Continental Trials: The French Trial.-The French
trial (audience) is usually quite short. In large part, this is because
in the vast majority of French criminal proceedings, the defendant
has already fully confessed several times, and does not contest the
validity of his confessions."0 ' Accordingly, the trial is abbreviated
and its major function is the investigation of the character of the
accused and the circumstances of the case in order to determine
the proper punishment.3" Describing the French courtroom
where in one morning "[a] single tribunal, acting without undue
haste, often disposes of 20 or more cases," Professor Schlesinger
explains that defendants in the vast majority of cases have confessed prior to trial so the trial can be devoted almost exclusively
to exploration of factors affecting punishment.3 10

(J)The Length of Continental Trials: The German Trial.-In 1972,
Casper and Zeisel published a report on the participation of lay
judges in the German criminal courts. The study covered 570
criminal trials in various courts, measuring the length of deliberations and the overall trial." In these cases, mixed panels of professional and lay judges conducted the trials of serious cases and
determined both guilt and sentence. In the lower felony court
(Schoeffengericht), composed of one professional and two lay judges,
the median time for trials of serious offenses was two hours. In
the higher felony court (Grosse Strajkammer), composed of three
professional and two lay judges, the median time for trials of serious offenses was one day. 12 In the court hearing homicide and
a few other grave offenses (Schwurgericht) the median trial took
two days. 3 In both courts, deliberations lasted in hours what
the trial lasted in days-one hour for the ordinary felony and two

McMartin Ends in a
308 Pugh, supra
309 Id. at 18-19;
310 Schlesinger,

311

Mistria4 N.Y. TIMEs, July 28, 1990, at Al.
note 29, at 22-23.
see also Mendelson, supra note 29, at 44-45.
supra note 26, at 382.

Casper & Zeisel, supra note 3, at 143. The conclusions are discussed in Langbein,

supra note 27, at 201.
312 CASPER & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 150 tbl. 17.
313 Id.
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hours for the most serious." 4 The trials, of course, dealt with
both issues of guilt and punishment; however, the study did not
break trial time down into that allotted for the determination of
guilt and the time allotted for considering the appropriate sentence. However, figures were given on the median length of trials
with and without full confessions which indicate that trials of those
who have confessed took about half as long as trials of those who
did not: for the ordinary felony, three-fourths of a day versus oneand-a-half days, for the gravest offenses, one-and-one-half days
versus two-and-a-quarter days.315 Because nearly all defendants
who confess admit the charges at trial,3 16 we may presume that
trial time is nearly doubled by an accused contesting guilt. Although not conclusive, this suggests that trial time expended solely
on' the question of guilt is much less than the median trial time,
probably in the neighborhood of three-quarters of a day for the
ordinary felony and about one day for the gravest offence.
(g) Causes of Lengthy Trials in America.-Our lengthy trials can
be traced both to the adversary system itself and to the excesses
which we have engrafted onto it. A process that relies on opposing
parties using complicated rules of evidence and procedure to present facts to a lay jury is bound to be less efficient than an inquiry
by a strong judge aided by extensive pretrial investigation and
uninhibited by technical rules of evidence. Thus, it is not
mixed jury is generally viewed as a
surprising that the Continental
17
more efficient trial vehicle.
However, history has demonstrated that the adversary process
can be used in a reasonably efficient manner. For example, a few
decades ago, trials in serious criminal cdses lasted only one or two
days; yet, they clearly were adversary contests. Though the adversary process results in some delay when compared to the
nonadversary approach, the primary source of our current intracta-

314
315

Id. at 151 tbl. 20.
Id.

316 Id. at 147.
317 Langbein concluded that "the Anglo-American jury system has grown ever more
cumbersome, while the Continental mixed court injects lay participation in a fashion that
greatly accelerates trial procedure by dispensing with the trappings of jury control."
Langbein, supra note 27, at 196.
While a defender of the adversary system asserted that "there is little evidence that
adversary procedures cause more delay than nonadversary alternatives," he conceded that
the adversary system "relies on mechanisms that appreciably slow litigation." LANDSMAN,
supra note 50, at 35.
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ble delay can be traced to our adversary excesses, including extreme lawyer dominance and aggressiveness and exceedingly complex rules of evidence and procedure."' i
Zeisel's study of New York and New Jersey civil trials in the
1950s suggests that the amount of judicial control and the degree
of contentiousness of counsel profoundly affect the length of the
trial. 19 Comparing New York and New Jersey trials with the
same number of witnesses, Zeisel found that New York courts
required almost 80% more time to try a case than New Jersey
courts. 2 ° A detailed comparison of trial transcripts in similar
personal injury cases revealed that the number of transcript lines
321
per witness was from 35% to 41% shorter in New Jersey.
Zeisel attributed New Jersey's more rapid trial time in part to its
successful pretrial practice of limiting issues and exacting stipulations from counsel. Nevertheless, other comparisons led Zeisel to
conclude that part of the difference was due to the manner in
which the trials were conducted. Looking at cases within the same
jurisdiction with the same number of witnesses, Zeisel found extraordinary differences in witness examination and, consequently,
in trial lengths which were largely due to the degree of contentiousness of the trial. Comparing two similar New York cases, one
was found to have fourteen times more objections and rulings per
witness than the other. Similarly, when comparing two analogous
New Jersey cases, one had about 4.8 times as many transcript lines
per witness than the other. Zeisel found a striking contrast between these two New Jersey cases.
Although both were contested with vigor, the second was
fought with a bitterness between counsel absent from the first.
The trial of the second case, unlike the first, was punctuated by
repeated outbursts of counsel. Colloquy between counsel and
court consumed a larger proportion of the total trial. Repetitive
examination of witnesses, particularly on cross-examination, was
322
much more noticeable.

318 England's enactnent of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and its implementation of the Codes of Practice governing search and seizure, police interrogation,
and identification practices, with their considerable protection for the accused, also suggest that efficiency is not inconsistent with fairness. For information on police questioning under the new codes, see Van Kessel, supra note 5.
319 ZEISEL ET AL., supra note 240, at 181-86.
320 Id. at 96.
321 Id. at 98.
322 Id. at 101.
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These findings suggest that the aggressiveness and contentiousness of lawyers greatly affects the trials process. The question
remains whether such excesses can be eliminated merely by activating the judiciary, or whether more fundamental reforms are
required which focus either on the ethical duties of lawyers or on
the expectations of all trial participants. Zeisel speculated that in
the contentious case, trial length could have been reduced by
firmer judicial control, though he doubted that the differential
between 3 the two cases could have been .eliminated entirely by this
means.

32

(h)
The Downside to Delay.-Excessive trial time diminishes
both the quantity and the quality of trials. Long, complex trials
lead to fewer trials and increased plea bargaining. The generally
accepted view is that caseload pressure is the most important
explanation for plea bargaining,32 4 and that to a great extent
our burdensome jury trial process creates the caseload pressures
25
which lead to the avoidance of trials through plea bargaining.

323 Id He did speculate that the consistent increase in the length of trials during the
1950s "may reflect a certain loosening of the reins on the part of the trial judge." Id. at
102.
324 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50 (1968); authorities cited in MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 24-25 (1978);
PRESIDENr's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENr AND ADMIN. OF JUsTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 135 (1967).
The Supreme Court has largely accepted this view: "Properly administered, it
[plea
bargaining] is to be encouraged. If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale
trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the
number of judges and court facilities." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
Trial judges also take this position: "[Ihf in one year, 248 judges are to deal with
35,517 defendants, the district courts must encourage pleas of guilty." United States v.
Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, 685 (N.D. Ill. 1960).
325 THOMAS CHURCH, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL
extensive resources in time
COURTS 31 (National Center for State Courts, 1978) (''he
and money consumed by the typical jury trial provide considerable impetus for programs
to encourage pretrial settlement of civil cases and negotiated pleas in criminal cases.");
HANS ZEISEL, LiMrs OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 137 (1982) (The workload of a criminal court
is primarily determined by the number of cases it must try. Time spent on cases that are
pleaded guilty is measured in hours, often in fractions of an hour;, trials are measured in
days or weeks, even in months. For the prosecutor who must also count the time needed
for preparation of the trial, the contrast is even greater.); Alschuler, supra note 6, at 97071 (the American jury trial now has become so complex that our society usually refuses
to provide it); Langbein, supra note 27, at 195, 218 (Procedural and evidentiary reforms
"ultimately made jury trial so complicated and time-consuming that it became unworkable
as a routine dispositive procedure."); Langbein, supra note 66, at 279 (in our own era
jury trial is such a time-consuming process that, especially in the great cities, we have
had to develop incentives to induce most accused to waive their right to jury trial); Volk-
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While some dispute the effect of caseload pressures and argue that
plea bargaining would naturally occur for other reasons,3 26
certainly lengthy, burdensome trials add to the pressures for plea
3 27
bargaining and other alternatives to the formal trial process.
The need for plea bargaining requires that greater, and often
unconscionable, pressures be brought to bear on the accused to
waive the right to jury trial. Langbein has convincingly argued that
granting overbroad procedural rights to the accused can lead to
pressures which effectively withdraw trial rights by coercing defendants to waive them. He points out that torture on the Continent
was used to overcome unrealistically strict evidentiary rules and
standards of proof.3 28 "Pressing" 29 the accused into pleading
guilty appears to be the modern form of judicially sanctioned
torture in America.
Excessive trial length has numerous other costs, including
adverse effects on the quality of the trial itself. Exceedingly

mann-Schluck, supra note 4, at 25.
Caseload pressures on the prosecutor have also been cited as a cause of plea bargaining. NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 97 (1931).
326 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION OF FELONY ARRESTS 1979, 12
(1983) (case-load explanation for plea bargaining seriously questioned); see also MALCOLM
FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT (1979) (a study of the disposition of minor
cases in the lower courts in New Haven); MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE ExPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATrORNEYS 156 (1978).
327 Case overload problems are strangling many state courts. Speaking of both civil
and criminal litigation, Justice Marcus Kaufman, recently retired from the California Supreme Court, provided a frightening view of current caseload pressures at all levels of
California's judicial system:
Clearly the most serious problem facing the California justice system is
overload, which is adversely affecting the delivery of justice at all levels. In both
the trial and appellate courts, the primary goal appears no longer to be justice
for the litigants, but simply disposing of the crush of cases as fast as possible.
In the trial courts we are seeing an atmosphere close to coercive in settlement conferences, dismissals for nonprosecution with little regard for the reason
for delay, and inflexible fast-track rules and time limitations that make the outcome of litigation dependent on the resources of litigants and their attorney.
Marcus M. Kaufinan, Crisis in the Courts, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1990, at 28.
328 LANGBEIN, supra note 23, at 184 (1977).
329 The current method of inducing guilty pleas might be likened to the peine forte el
dure, a form of physical coercion-laying on weights and "pressing" the accused into submission-which the English in the 13th century used to force a defendant to enter a
plea of guilty or not guilty. A legal technicality made it necessary that defendant enter a
plea of not guilty before he could be tried, and he had to be convicted before his estate
could be forfeited to the Crown. It was done slowly to be as painful as possible, because
the defendant might prefer to die without entering a plea to avoid forfeiture, so his
estate could go to his heirs. See LANGBEIN, supra note 23, at 74-77.
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lengthy trials lead to reduced concentration and recollection of
events on the part of all participants, particularly witnesses and
jurors. In very long cases, exhaustion may diminish everyone's
performance. The quality and representative -nature of the jury
may be reduced by the fact that many citizens-often the most
competent-are unable or unwilling to take the time to sit for
cases lasting weeks or months. Public knowledge of such lengthy
trials may result in an unwillingness of victims to report crime and
of witnesses to testify, as well as a diminished public respect for
the criminal justice system and the government in general.
The economic and social costs of trial delay should not be
discounted. Citizens called for jury service often sit in jury rooms
or courtrooms for days or weeks, yet never serve. A study of the
actual pattern of one week's juror usage in a typical nine-judge
city court found that less than 40% of jurors' time was used productively in voir dire and trial.33 ° Victims and witnesses are often
forced to sit for hours or days waiting to testify, only to have to
return again when the case is continued. Also noteworthy, but not
subject to easy assessment, is the cost of crime committed by
bailed defendants during lengthy trials.
While defenders of the adversary process usually admit that it
moves slowly, they argue that a deliberate pace is needed to assure
party control and the careful consideration of their claims.33 ' We
should recognize, however, that trials can be too long, as well as.
too swift, and that we are currently paying considerable costs associated with the excessive length of our criminal trials.
2.

Perversion of the Trial's Focus and Purpose

Excessive advocacy tends to focus the trial on the lawyers
rather than on the accused and the search for truth. At times, the
accused may appear set apart or even isolated from the trial process. How did we come to separate and often disregard the most
important individual in the trial?
The greater power of our lawyers, it appears, provides one
explanation. In England, the increasing power of lawyers developed side-by-side with the distancing of the accused from the trial
process. These changes occurred rapidly between the early 1700s

330 BIRD ENGINEERING-RESEARCH Assoc.,
USAGE 2-4 (1974).
331 LANDSMAN, supra note 55, at 34.

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, A GUIDE TO JUROR

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:403

and the early 1800s. By 1820, a Frenchman inspecting the English
criminal justice process on behalf of his government observed that
the judge "remains almost a stranger to what is going on" and the
accused does so little in his defense that "his hat stuck on a pole
might without inconvenience be his substitute at the trial."1 2 Today, the defendant is even more isolated due to rules of evidence
and procedure which equip lawyers with greater powers. This
serves to both shield the accused from the proceedings and discourage him from participating in his defense.
The Continental trial focuses on the accused and emphasizes
his side of the case. The defendant is called upon to speak first
and is given the opportunity to speak last. The presiding judge focuses the inquiry on the accused, continuously involving him in
the case. For example, the presiding judge will ask the accused if
he wishes to respond to the testimony of witnesses throughout the
trial. 3 3
Focusing the trial on the accused usually helps the innocent
but hurts the guilty. An innocent defendant has a good chance to
present his case forcefully and continuously. It is obvious, however,
that with a weak case the accused is more vulnerable. He cannot
easily sit back and rely on his lawyer to attack the prosecution's
case. His lawyer is given that opportunity, but the Continental trial
expects that the accused will be an active participant and will assist
in the presentation of his case.
In addition to the active, probing judge who focuses on the
accused, Continental rules of evidence by not placing impediments
in the way of the accused's testimony, add to the expectation that
he will answer questions and participate personally in his trial.
Because the Continental defendant is not sworn as a witness, he is
not subject to prosecution for perjury. Further, admission of his
prior convictions does not turn on whether or not he takes the
stand. Finally, the Continental trial process usually strongly encourages the defendant to respond to questions by exacting a heavy
price for remaining silent. In some countries, such as France,
adverse inferences can be drawn from a defendant's refusal to
respond to questioning.3 4 In others, such as Germany, no such
inference can be drawn, but the practical effect of his unmasked

332 Langbein,
333 Alschuler,
334 Brouwer,
supra note 29, at

supra note 66, at 307.
supra note 6, at 1006 n.344.
supra note 29, at 219; Mendelson, supra note 29, at 46; Tomlinson,
174..
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refusal is so damaging that "German defendants virtually always
speak."335 It is not surprising that nearly all Continental defendants choose to speak at trial. 3 6
The English trial focuses less on the accused than does the
Continental trial, but a good deal more than our own. The arrangement of the courtroom and the relationship between the
accused and his attorney reflect this difference. Unlike the usual
Continental procedure, the English defendant does not sit in the
center of the courtroom speaking for himself while being subject
to judicial inquiry throughout the trial. He is more protected by
his lawyer who makes an opening statement and examines witnesses, and he may not be questioned by the judge or the prosecutor
without his consent. Nevertheless, the defendant is not separated
from the proceedings and protected by his lawyer to the same
extent as in our system. First, he must always sit in the dock,
which usually is in an elevated and prominent position in back of
the courtroom and, even if on bail, he must always remain in the
custody of nearby bailiffs when in the dock. Also, -as noted previously, English custom places limits on the defendant's relationship
with his trial lawyer. Usually not having seen his barrister until on
or near the day of trial, and then only in the presence of his
solicitor, he is likely, to have a purely professional and rather distant relationship with his counsel. This distance is emphasized in
the courtroom, where he must sit in the dock typically near to his
solicitor but separated from his barrister by several rows of seats.
Though the principal actors of the English trial are the lawyers,
the fact that the English judge wields more authority than her
American counterpart means that the English lawyers possess less
authority, thereby rendering the powers of the lawyers and the
judge more balanced than in our system.
Most important, the English follow the Continental approach
of using rules of evidence and procedure which encourage the
defendant to take the stand and testify, and which create an expectation that the accused will participate personally in his trial.
First, by merely testifying in his own behalf the defendant is not
automatically subject to impeachment with prior felony convictions. Second, if the defendant fails to testify, the judge, though
not the prosecutor, usually may comment to the jury on this fact.

335 LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 72-73.
336 Damaska, supra note 12, at 527 (almost all Continental defendants choose to
testify).
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Our rules often operate to strongly discourage the defendant
from taking the stand by saying to him, "If you testify, the jury will
become aware of your felonious history and if you remain silent,
neither your past nor your silence will be mentioned by the judge
or prosecutor. If you wish, the jury will be cautioned against drawing adverse inferences." The threat of felony conviction impeachment can be a powerful deterrent to taking the witness stand. A
study of American jury trials found that a defendant was almost
three times more likely to refuse to testify if he had a criminal
record than if not.3 37 As a consequence of this shielding of the
accused from the proceedings and dissuading him from testifying,
as well as the greater authority we give our lawyers, our trials focus
on the contest between counsel rather than on the accused and
the search for truth.
3.

Loss of Evidence From the Most Important Witness

Often the result of this perverse focus is loss of evidence from
the most important witness in the case. As Professor Langbein has
remarked in contrasting ours with the Continental approach:
In general the accused will virtually always be the most efficient
possible witness at a criminal trial. Even when he has a solid
defense, the accused has usually been close to the events in
question, close enough to get himself prosecuted. It is one of
the great peculiarities of modern Anglo-American procedure,
on which Continental observers often remark, that we have
so
33
largely eliminated the accused as a testimonial resource. 1
Others in this country protest our failure to focus more closely on
the accused as a source of testimonial evidence, 339 but thus far
they are no more than voices crying in the wilderness.

337 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3, at 146.
338 Langbein, supra note 66, at 283-84.
339 See, e.g., THE MISSOURi CRIME SURVEY, supra note 268, at 362. The rule granting
the accused immunity from testifying as well as from comment on his failure to do so
was at its inception deemed a
protest against torture . . . of the most effective methods for the protection of
the guilty. What could be more logical and sensible than to ask the defendant,
who knows more about the question of his guilt than any one else, what he has
to say, and if he will not tell what he knows why should not the state have the
right to comment upon his failure to do so.
Id.; see also WALTER V. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY 71 (1967); LLOYD L.
WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 147-48 (1977); R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and
Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15 (1981).
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Little is known concerning the extent of the loss-the number and types of cases in which the defendant failed to testify, and
the value that would have been gained in the pursuit of truth by
hearing from the defendant. While a defendant's willingness to
testify depends on the particular charge, the nature of the evidence and the defense, and the defendant's criminal record,
inquiries with trial lawyers and judges lead me to believe that the
extent of defendant refusals to testify is considerable-from onethird to well over one-half in some jurisdictions. The contrast with
English and Continental trials is striking. On the Continent, nearly
all defendants choose to testify,"0 and in England the accused
invariably gives evidence. As Graham Hughes has remarked, in
England the case in which the defendant fails to testify is "exceptional," whereas the defendant's silence "is becoming the common
practice in trials in the United States."' 1
The failure of American defendants to testify has become so
common that even the public rarely notices when in notorious
cases the defendant does not take the witness stand. For example,
of those who have seen the movie Reversal of Fortune,3 2 how
many were aware, much less thought it unusual, that Claus von
Bulow failed to tell his story to the jury in either trial?343 It

seems that we have accepted the view that because we have reason
to believe someone committed a crime, we should not expect to
learn anything from him. Of course, we can take this approach,
but we should realize that it is not without substantial cost.
4. Trial by Surprise
Ironically, part of the price for failure to use the defendant as
a source of evidence is paid by the defendant himself. As pointed
out previously, full and open pretrial discovery of the prosection's
case is a hallmark of Continental systems.1 4 Even the harsh justice system of the former Soviet Union provided to the advocate
for the accused full access to the dossier which included full state-

340

See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
Graham Hughes, English Criminal Justice: Is It Better than Ours?, 26 ARIZ. L. REV.
507, 591 (1984).
341

342
343

Warner Home Video 1991.
Even the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in reversing his convictions for attempted

murder, failed to mention the fact that he never took the stand at the trial. See State v.
von Bulow, 475 A.2d 995 (R.I. 1984).
344 See supra part III.B.1.
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ments of all witnesses."5 However, complete open discovery is at
odds with the adversary model and is found in few if any American jurisdictions. 4 6 In this country, the prosecutor's constitutional duty of disclosure is limited to material, exculpatory evidence 34 7 and, in federal trials, is subject to the Jencks Act which
forbids pretrial discovery of impeachment material that is not
directly exculpatory in. nature.3 48 Revisions to the Federal Rules
of Evidence, recently adopted by the Supreme Court, would slightly expand the prosecution's duty to disclose defendant's oral statements and would require disclosure to defendant of the "general
nature" of other crimes or bad acts intended to be used as similar
acts under FRE 404?" However, the Supreme Court's Advisory
Committee cautioned that it did not intend that the revisions supersede current restrictions on disclosure, such as the Jencks Act,
or require the prosecution to disclose directly or indirectly the
35 0
names and addresses of its witnesses.
Our system's rules that hinder the prosecution from using the
accused as a source of testimonial evidence stand in the way of
open discovery for the benefit of the accused. These restrictive
rules support the argument that one-way-street discovery for the

345 See DINA KAMINSKAYA, FINAL JUDGMENT 52 (Michael Glenny trans., 1982) (Upon
completion of the investigation, "the investigator must present to the accused . . . all the
materials in the case for him to study, including the exact written records of the testimony given by all witnesses."); SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 29, at 482 (defense counsel's
basic right to timely inspection of the entire dossier has become an article of faith
throughout the civil law world-and, indeed, in the socialist orbit as well).
346 So far, not even the most liberal discovery states have been willing to adopt the
A.B.A.'s 1980 standard proposing "open file" discovery. See YALE KAMISAR Er AL., MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1130 (7th ed. 1990).
347 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Court has narrowly defined material evidence: 'The evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); see also
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987). For examples of the narrow reach 'of this
constitutional duty, see United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1991) and United
States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 1275, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988).
348 One court has held that any Brady material covered by the Jencks Act, even if directly exculpatory, need not be disclosed until after the witness whose statements are
sought has completed direct examination. United States v. Hart, 760 F. Supp. 653 (E.D.
Mich. 1991).
349 Amendments to Federal Rules of Evidene and Criminal Procedure, 49 Crim. L. Rep.
(BNA) 2093-98 (transmitted to Congress by the Supreme Court on April 30, 1991,
amending FED. R. El/ID. 404 and FED. R. CRIM. P. 16).
350 Id. at 2094 (Advisory Committee note to Proposed Amendment to FED. R. ENID.
404).
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accused would give him an unfair advantage. 351 Fortunately,
many jurisdictions now appear to be moving toward broader and
more mutual discovery in criminal cases and away from rigid restrictions on the use of prior statements of unavailable witnesses.352 This shift bodes well for eventually abandoning the sur-.
prise witness as one of the aspects of the American criminal trial.
Meanwhile, we continue to condone the unfairness of trial by surprise that results from restrictive discovery rules, a practice which
harms the innocent along with the guilty.
5.

Undue Enhancement of Prosecution Powers

The Continental prosecutor enjoys less discretion than his
American counterpart, both in the decision to prosecute and in
the decision to reduce or drop charges. Continental systems mandate prosecution when there is sufficient evidence of a crime and
outlaw plea bargaining in serious cases, thereby eliminating the devices which so empower our prosecutors.. Also, sentence recommendations of prosecutors are followed far less often than are
prosecutorial sentence recommendations in the United States. As a
result of these restrictions, the powers of the Continental prosecutor in the most significant nontrial areas-bringing charges, plea
bargaining and sentencing-are severely limited.
At trial, American prosecutorial power, rather than more
neutral judicial authority, is enhanced and stands as a counterweight to aggressive defense advocacy. This occurs both in the
examination of witnesses and in the final arguments. To balance
aggressive defense cross-examination, the American prosecutor is
afforded great control over the presentation and examination of
witnesses. It is the prosecutor, rather than the judge, who decides
whom to call and in what order. Also, in restrictive discovery jurisdictions, the defense is not provided the names of the witnesses
before trial nor the statements of witnesses until after they have
testified on direct. The prosecutor can control the elicitation of

351 See infra at.
352 See KAMISAR Er AL, supra note 346, at 1130. For a recent list of states requiring
pretrial disclosure of prosecution witnesses, see Cary Clennon, PretrialDiscovery of Witness
Lists: A Modest Proposal to Improve the Administration of CriminalJustice in the Superior Court of
the District of Columbia, 38 CATH. U. L. REV'. 641, 659 (1989).

Greater use of prior statements of unavailable witnesses was authorized in California
by 1985 revisions to CAL. EVID. CODE § 1350 (Deering 1991) and CAL. PENAL CODE §

1335 (Deering 1991).
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testimony and present a one-sided account of the facts through
"guiding," though generally not "leading," questions. Finally, in
jurisdictions following the common law, the defense may use inconsistent statements only for the purpose of impeaching or contradicting the witness. Contrast the Continental method, in which
the judge calls and questions the witnesses, who may first respond
in narrative, and in which there is no limit on the use of inconsistent statements. Of course, our defense lawyers have similar control over their witnesses. Nonetheless, as a practical matter, our
prosecutors have the advantage of proceeding first, and in virtually
all cases it is the prosecutor who calls the greatest number of
witnesses.
The American prosecutor enjoys even greater advantages at
the end of a trial. All American criminal trial lawyers are fully
aware of the great significance of the prosecutor's opportunity
both to open and to close argument to the jury, but few are
aware that on the Continent, as well as in England, the prosecutor
generally does not have the final word. In most nonadversary systems, the final argument is made by the defense lawyer, and then
the defendant personally is allowed to address the court.35 In
England the prosecutor cannot answer the final argument of a
defendant's barrister,354 and if a defendant represented by counsel rests without presenting any evidence, the prosecutor's argument powers are further restricted.3 55
While both on the Continent and in England the defense has
the last word, judicial intervention provides a counterweight to
defense advocacy in the form of summation and comment on the
evidence. In Continental systems, professional judges are part of

353 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
354 The power of the prosecutor's closing argument was demonstrated in the notorious case in which the traditional procedure was not followed-the trial of Oscar Wilde.
After Wilde's first trial on morals charges ended in a hung jury, lie was put on trial a
second time, but on this occasion the prosecutor became more aggressive, insisted on
having "the precious last word to the jury," and was successful. See STANLEY'JAcKSON, THE
LIFE AND CASES OF MR. JUSTICE HUMPHRIES 40-41 (1952). Legislation later restricted the
prosecutor's closing speech to the point after the close of the defense evidence and
before the closing speech by or on behalf of the accused. Criminal Evidence Act 1898 61
& 62 vict., ch. 36, § l(b) (Eng.); ARCHBOLD, supra note 127, at § 4-420 (1982) (Criminal
Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36, § 1(b)(Eng.)).
355 See Regina v. Bryant 2 All E. R. 689 (1978); 67 Cr. Ap. R. 157, C.A. (When a
defendant represented by counsel does not testify and calls no witnesses, the
prosecution's right to make a closing speech should be spartinly exercised, and on rare
occasions when the right is exercised, should be brief.); see also Regina v. Francis, Crim.
L. R. 150 (1988).
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the jury and the presiding judge often summarizes the evidence at
the commencement of deliberations."' 6 The strong comment and
summation powers of English judges are used to balance the defense barrister's opportunity to give the closing argument to which
the prosecution cannot respond. In this country, with our toleration of unrestrained advocacy on the part of the lawyers, the accused has little protection against the aggressive ,and emotional
prosecutor during the final and unanswerable argument.
III. THE ROAD

TO REFORM

A. Barriers to Reform
Our. legislatures and other law-making governmental institutions have not been able to implement significant reforms in our
jury trial system. The paralysis of reform efforts can be traced in
large part to the following factors: (1) A legal system of fixed
rules made impervious to significant modification by Supreme
Court decisions constitutionalizing or otherwise federalizing the
rules of criminal procedure, (2) professional inertia on the part of
many lawyers and judges who believe their interests lie in maintaining, the status quo, and (3) our "national character" which
distrusts centralized authority in favor of the individual.
1.

Constitutionalized CriminalProcedure

Supreme Court constitutionalizing of the rules of criminal
procedure, which began with Warren Court decisions in the 1960s,
narrowed the scope of possible reforms at state as well as federal
levels. In the name of creating a minimum floor of federal standards to which all states must conform, the Court significantly
restricted states in experimenting with different procedural models. With respect to the trial process, the Court's imposition of
rather inflexible constitutional boundaries, when it has encountered attempts to alter an aspect of what it views as the traditional
adversary process, has prevented any significant experimentation
with Continental-style trial procedures. Indeed, instead of speaking
of a floor of constitutional protection, 5 7 the Court's procedural

356 while German law does not require a summation, and it is sometimes criticized
as an undue influence upon the lay judges, Casper and Zeisel found that summaries are
given in two-thirds of minor cases and almost always in serious cases. Casper & Zeisel,
supra note 3, at 150-51.
357 Justice Brennan recently described the Malloy-Duncan-Benton approach as "creating
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boundaries in the trial context can be more accurately viewed as
walls which prohibit any lateral movement toward procedures foreign to us, but accepted throughout most of the world.
In the midst of the depression, Justice Brandeis objected to
the Court striking down state social and economic legislation as a
violation of due process:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of
the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun58

try.3

In the criminal procedure context, flexibility at the state level
remained through the first half of this century, but by the end of
the 1960s, the high water point of the Warren Court criminal
procedure revolution, the main barriers to experimentation with
the traditional adversary trial had been erected. Objecting to the
1968 Duncan v. Louisianad5 9 mandate that states provide jury trials in all cases involving the possibility of a jail sentence over six
months, Justice Harlan remarked that "the Court has chosen to
impose upon every State one means of trying criminal cases;, it is a
good means, but it is not the only fair means, and it is not demonstrably better than the alternatives States might devise."3 6
In large part, constitutional barriers to reform stem from our
worship of the adversary process and our distaste of foreign procedures that do not share our English adversary tradition. In
Duncan,3"' the Court not only applied the "bag and baggage"
principle to selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights, it embraced "a new approach to the 'incorporation' debate,3 62 which

a federal floor of protection" allowing "diversity only above and beyond this federal constitutional floor." William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of
State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550 (1986)

(emphasis added).
358 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
ing). The majority rejected the freedom

(Brandeis, J., dissent-

to experiment argunent in words similar to

those used today against experimenting with defendant's rights: "The principle is imbedded in our constitutional system that there are certain essentials of liberty with which the

state is not entitled to dispense in the interest of experiments." Id. at 280 (emphasis added). Yet this principle does not define the "essentials of liberty" included within this
protected category.
359 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
360 Id. at 193 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
361 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
362 Id. at 149 n.14.
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to a substantial extent constitutionalized the Anglo-American adversary criminal process. In determining which procedural rights
are fundamental and bind the states through Fourteenth Amendment due process, the Court noted that in earlier cases it had
asked "[whether] a civilized system could be imagined that would
not accord the particular protection." 6 ' However, the Court
abandoned this approach in favor of inquiring whether a particular procedure is fundamental given "the commoh-law system that
has been developing contemporaneously in England and in this
country .... ."3' This entails asking whether "a procedure is necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." 6 5 Further, the Court implied that it would focus on the existing American system, rather than historical adversary or even current English structures: "[I]t might be said that the limitation in question
is not necessarily fundamental to fairness in every criminal system
that might be imagined but is fundamental in the context of the
criminal processes maintained by the American States."66 The Court
thus suggested that it would look with suspicion even on aspects
of the current English system that do not correspond with our
own, such as the extensive power of English judges to sum up and
comment on the state of the evidence.
Nevertheless, in support of his proposal for a mixed court of
the Continental style, Professor Alschuler suggests that neither
constitutional amendment nor judicial reinterpretation would be
necessary for substantial experimentation with the jury trial
process. 67 In support of this optimism, he contends that the following portion of a Duncan footnote leaves open a window of
opportunity:
A criminal process which was fair and equitable but used no
juries is easy to imagine. It would make use of alternative guarantees and protection which would serve the purposes that the
jury serves in the English and American systems. Yet no American State has undertaken to construct such a system.s6
In view of this language, he contends that "[i]t would be
strange and unfortunate if the federal [c]onstitution were read to

363 Id.
364 Id.
365 Id. at 150 n.14.
366 Id. (emphasis added).
367 Alschuler, supra note 6, at 995-98.
368 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 n.14.
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preclude states from seeking workable alternatives to our existing
'
specifically, one that "was fair and
regime of criminal justice,"3 69
37
However much I agree with Proequitable but used no juries."
fessor Alschuler that this interpretation would be unfortunate, I
am less sanguine than he as to the outcome. First, the remaining
portion of the footnote is of some relevance. It reads as follows:
Instead, every American State, including Louisiana, uses the
jury extensively, and imposes very serious punishments only
after a trial at which the defendant has a right to a jury's verdict. In every State, including Louisiana, the structure and style
of the criminal process-the supporting framework and the
subsidiary procedures-are of the sort that naturally complement jury trial, and have developed in connection with and in
reliance upon jury trial.3 7 '
The Court's emphasis on the unanimous adoption of the jury
trial suggests that it would hesitate to approve anything less than
the traditional jury system, at least in serious cases. Further, the
Court's observation that every state has a criminal process which'3 is
72
structured and styled to "naturally complement the jury trial
373
with "supporting framework and the subsidiary procedures"
suggests that the Court would not look with favor on serious modifications of the jury process without concurrent changes in the
structure and style of the criminal process as a whole. These necessary changes might be impossible given the existing restrictions
imposed by the Court based on the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
such as those limiting the use of the defendant as a source of
evidence.37 4 Further doubts concerning the possibility of significant modification of the lay jury structure arise from the Court's
continuing praise of and reverence for the adversary system model, of which the all-lay jury is considered an essential part. It seems
that even Professor Alschuler has become a bit more pessimistic.
Although he continues to contend that Duncan may not be as restrictive as it seems, he recognizes that "for the moment, the prosjury
pect of employing mixed tribunals or other alternatives to the
37 5
trial in American felony cases is 'probably a pipe dream.'

369
370
371
372
373
374
375

Alschuler, supra note 6, at 996.
Id. at 997 (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 n.14).
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 n.14.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 391-435 and accompanying text.
Alschuler, supra note 242, at 232.
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Leaving aside any alteration in size or composition of the jury,
enhancing the power of American judges vis-a-vis the jury also
would face serious impediments imposed by appellate courts. For
example, requiring that the jury provide reasons for its decision
would violate the accepted principle that criminal juries may return general verdicts and may not be required to provide the reasons behind their verdicts.3 76 Also, federal courts allow special
interrogatories to the jury in civil cases, but disfavor them in
criminal trials on the ground that their use would undercut the
defendant's right to full consideration of his case by the jury. The
First Circuit has declared that "not only must the jury be free
from direct control in its verdict, but it must be free from judicial
pressure, both contemporaneous and subsequent."3 77 The First
Circuit also condemned use of special interrogatories upon the
ground that they could be used by the judge "to carefully guide
the jury to its conclusion. 3 7' The court admonished that the
Constitution demands that the defendant be afforded "the full
protection of the jury unfettered, directly or indirectly."3 79 More
ominously, the court dashed hopes of innovations arising from the
lower federal courts by cautioning that new procedures "should be
adopted with great hesitation, " " and cited with approval a
sweeping statement by the Eighth Circuit that "[i]t is- not the
function of the courts subordinate to the Supreme Court to introduce innovations of criminal procedure."'
The Constitution also presents a number of barriers to attempts to shift authority for the conduct of trials from lawyers to
judges. Nearly one-half century ago, the Supreme Court declared
that an "honest and actual antagonistic assertiorL of rights""' to
be adjudicated is a "safeguard essential to the integrity of the
judicial process,, 383 and later described "cases and controversies"
as limiting the business of the federal courts "to questions presented in an adversary contest."384 More recently, in the course of its

376 &,e United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 181
States, 174 F.2d 919, 923-24 (8th Cir. 1949).

(1st Cir. 1969); Gray v. United

377
378
379

Spork, 416 F.2d at 181.
Id.; see also United States v. Collainore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (lst Cir. 1989).
Spori, 416 F.2d at 182.

380
381

Id.
Id. at 183 (quoting Gray v. United States, 174 F.2d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 1949)).

382

United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (emphasis added).

383
384

Id.
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968) (emphasis added).
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opinion explaining the Sixth Amendment competency of counsel
standard, the Supreme Court defined fair trial in terms of the adversary process: "[A] fair trial is one in which evidence subject to
adversarial testing is presented to an impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding."3 85 The
Court appeared to regard the Sixth Amendment as guaranteeing
that counsel play an adversary role in criminal trials: "[t]he Sixth
Amendment ... envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical
8 6
to the ability of the adversary system to produce just results.",
Few arguments could reasonably be leveled against the proposition
that, in our present adversary system, defense counsel must play
an adversary role in order for the trial to be fair. An adversary defense is required to meet and balance an adversary prosecution.
However, to the extent the Court's dicta constitutionalizes the process of "adversary testing," it erects substantial constitutional barriers against assigning to judges the powers traditionally held by
lawyers in the adversary system.
As Professor Maurice Rosenburg pointed out, the Supreme
Court's insistence on an adversary contest "does not mean that
every departure from the detailed forms of the adversary process
will be struck down as a constitutional violation, but a flagrant
deviation does run that risk." ' 7 In his view, "[]udges who become overly aggressive in managing or directing important elements of lawsuits in their courts will be reversed on appeal." ' It
is certainly true that our appellate courts tend to discourage trial
judges from engaging in any significant or extensive questioning
of witnesses, though judicial probing often is found to be harmless
error. For example, in the Watergate prosecution of Gordon
Liddy, the District of Columbia Circuit Court assumed that Judge
Sirica erred in directly questioning witnesses, though the court
found that "[t]he impact of the extensive questioning.
was
'9
muted."
The court declared,
Sound and accepted doctrine teaches that the trial judge
should avoid extensive questioning of the witness and should
rely on counsel to develop testimony for the jury's consider-

385
386
387

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (emphasis added).
Id.
Maurice Rosenberg, Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversag ' Justice?, 21

CREIGHTON L. REv. 801, 806 (1988).
388

Id.

389 United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 441 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911
(1974).
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ation ....
[I]n general the trial judge would do better to
forego direct questioning, and the possible impact on his objectivity, since he has available the alternative of suggesting to
counsel the questions he believes ought to be pursued.390

Supreme Court interpretations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in specific procedural contexts also impede restructuring
the proof-taking process to resemble the Continental approach.
Not only is the judge prohibited from calling the defendant as the
first witness, the defendant cannot be called as a witness at any
stage by either the judge or the prosecutor, and neither may comment on the defendant's failure to take the stand voluntarily.3 91
Moreover, both amendments prevent the judge from controlling
the order of proof when the defendant decides to testify by requiring that he testify before other witnesses for the defense. In
Brooks v. Tennessee,"'2 the Supreme Court found that this requirement amounts to an "impermissible restriction on defendant's
right . . . 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty . . . for

such silence,"' 9 and violates defendant's right to "the 'guiding
hand of counsel' in the timing of this critical element of his defense." 94 Brooks severely limits the judge's discretion as to the
order of proof when it comes to defendant's testimony. For example, a California court has held that the principles of Brooks were
violated by a modification as slight as deferral of cross-examination
of the defendant until after the defense psychiatrist had testified.3 95

390 Id at 440 n.31.
391 &e Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Further, the defendant is entitled
upon request to an instruction that his or her silence must be disregarded. See Carter v.
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
Even before Griffin, most states forbad the prosecution from calling the accused as
its own witness. 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2268(2) (3d ed. 1940); 3 FRANCIS
WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 1960 (11th ed.).
California courts had prohibited the prosecution from calling the defendant as its
witness on the ground that under the California Constitution and statutes "an accused
has the right to stand mute, clothed in the presumption of innocence, until the prosecution, at the trial, has made out a prima facie case against him." People v. Talle, 111 Cal.
App. 2d 650, 664 (1952). Griffin, in effect, deleted the final qualifying phrase.
392
393
394
395

406 U.S. 605 (1972).
Id. at 609 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
Id. at 612-13.
People v. McDermand, 162 Cal. App. 3d 770, 788-92 (1984).
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Nor can the judge follow the unsworn statement procedure
common to Continental courts by allowing the defendant to make
an unsworn statement while prohibiting defense counsel from
guiding his client through direct examination. A rule denying the
accused the right to be placed under oath and to have his counsel
question him to elicit his statement denies him "the guiding hand
of counsel at
every step in the proceedings,"3 96 as required by
397
due process.

Further barriers to reform of the adjudication process have
been erected by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause, which it views as embodying
the elements of an adversary contest. In particular, the Court has
held that confrontation guarantees that ordinarily the witness must
give statements under oath, subject to cross-examination, and subject to observation by the trier of fact. 98 Later, the Court found
that the clause also "guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact."399 In 1990,
the Court described the combined effect of these elements of
confrontation as ensuring that evidence is "subject to the rigorous
adversary testing that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal
proceedings."' 40 Continental-style witness examination in which
the presiding judge calls and examines witnesses and in which
there is no American-style direct or cross-examination certainly is a
far cry from the Court's description of the "norm" of Anglo-American procedure. It is very doubtful that the Court would view this
"norm" as consistent with a neutral inquiry. The Court emphasized
that the "central concern of the Confrontation Clause '4 1 was ensuring reliability by subjecting the evidence "to rigorous testing in
the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of
fact. 40 2 The Court further pointed out that "confront" means "a
clashing of forces or ideas, thus carrying with it the notion of

396

Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 572 (1961)

(quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287

U.S. 45 (1932)).
397 Id. at 596.
398 California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
399 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
400 Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. CL 3157, 3163 (1990). The Court found that "confront"
means "a clashing of forces or ideas, thus carrying with it the notion of adversariness."
that
the Sixth
Amendment
Id.
at 3163.
Furthermore,
the
Court
declared
"constitutionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as we know
it." Id. at 3164 (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975)).
401 Id. at 3163.
402 Id.
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adversariness. '4 3 Given the Court's characterization of the Confrontation Clause, any trial procedure which did not allow for a
"clash" between the parties or which otherwise departed from the
"norm" of Anglo-American presentation of evidence appears
doomed to the scrap pile.of unconstitutional alternatives.
The
Court's
use
of the
Confrontation
Clause
to
constitutionalize the hearsay rules also presents obstacles to meaningful reform of our restrictive rules of evidence and discovery in
criminal cases. In Ohio v. Roberts4 °4 the Court rejected a literal
reading of the clause which would have excluded any statement of
a declarant not present at trial, yet it tied the clause closely to the
hearsay rules. Noting that the Confrontation Clause and the
hearsay rules are "designed to protect similar values,"" 5 the
Court announced that a statement of an unavailable declarant is
admissible under the clause only if "it bears adequate 'indicia of
reliability, "'40 but concluded that "[r]eliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception. "407 In other cases the statement is inadmissible "absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."'40 Later, the Court explained that where admission
of a statement is based on a well-recognized exception to the
hearsay rules, no special showing of trustworthiness is required.4 ' However, statements not falling within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception are presumed unreliable and are inadmissible
unless marked with such truthworthiness that "there is no material
departure from the reason of the general rule."'4 10 The guarantees of trustworthiness must be demonstrated only from circumstances surrounding the making of the statement that render the
declarant particularly worthy of belief, and do not include other
41
evidence corroborating the trustworthiness of the statement. '
Justice Thomas, expressing for the first time as Supreme
Court Justice his views concerning the relationship between the

403

Id.

404 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
405
406
407

Id. at 66.
Id.
Id.

408
409

Id.
See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); United States v. Inadi, 475

U.S. 387 (1986).

410 Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987).
411 Id.
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Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules, observed that the
Court's interpretation of the clause has hobbled states that may
wish to experiment:
The court has never explained the Confrontation Clause implications of a State's decision to adopt an exception not recognized at common law or one not recognized by the majority of
the States. Our current jurisprudence suggests that, in order to
satisfy the Sixth Amendment, the State would have to establish
in each individual case that hearsay admitted pursuant to the
newly created exception bears "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness," and would have to continue doing so until the
exception became "firmly rooted" in the common law, if that is
even possible under the Court's standard.412
Justice Thomas feared that while the Court has repeatedly
disavowed an attempt to "[c]onsitutionalize the hearsay rule and
its .exceptions," its decisions "have edged even further in that direction. ' 4 1' He suggested that the Court consider unhinging the
Confrontation Clause from the hearsay rule by adopting Justice
Harlan's view, which would largely limit the clause's application to
witnesses who actually testify at trial, modified by a proviso that it
also would cover extrajudicial statements that are contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions,
prior testimony, or confessions.4 14 However, only Justice Scalia
joined his concurrence. The majority rejected Harlan's reading of
the clause, noting that such an approach would eliminate the
clause's role in restricting the admission' of hearsay testimony and
was "foreclosed by our prior cases." The suggestion to follow
Harlan came "too late in the day to warrant reexamination" of
4 15
current rules.
Constitutionalizing the hearsay rules deters, if not forecloses,
development of flexible, Continental-style admissibility rules that
might reduce the importance of technical rules of evidence. As
Professor Alschuler has pointed out, "[n]ow that common law
pleading and its specialized forms of action have been abandoned,
our law's grandest living memorial to common law refinement is
'
Casting these "refinethe hearsay rule and its exceptions."4 16
ments" in constitutional stone prevents experimentation with liber-

412

White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 748 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring).

413
414

Id.
Id.

415
416

Id. at 738.
Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1021.
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alized admissibility rules that might greatly simplify the trial process and which have been endorsed by both ancient and modern
scholars.

417

Furthermore, rigid hearsay rules impede efforts to enlarge
discovery for the accused because they limit the prosecution's
response to possible abuse of discovery by defendant's harassment,
intimidation, or elimination of witnesses. If, at the time of trial, a
prosecution witness suddenly "stonewalls" or becomes unavailable,
.Continental systems will usually allow the witness' prior statement
to be admitted as substantive evidence even though the witness
has not been previously examined by the defense.418 Under our
Sixth Amendment confrontation principles, however, the witness'
statement would not be admissible unless it was given in a trialtype context affording the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine, or the witness took the stand at trial and was subject to crossexamination concerning the statement, or the statement itself
qualified under a "firmly rooted hearsay exception "411 or demonstrated "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. '' 42 Thus, as
a general rule, the American prosecutor, unlike his Continental
counterpart, cannot rely on using even sworn statements given to
officials if the witness later is dissuaded or prevented from
testifying. 421 Facing this prospect, our prosecutors have a potent
weapon against full and open discovery for the defense.422 Judge

417 See 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 407-10 (1827); James H.
Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule--A Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 932, 936-37 (1962); George F. James, The Role of Hearsay in a Rational Scheme of Evidence, 34 U. ILL. L. REV. 788 (1940).
418 SCHLESINGER Er AL, supra note 29, at 484. The German principle of "free evaluation of the evidence," limited only by rules of privilege and of "logic," in exceptional
cases even allows admission of informants' statements given to police when the informants are available, but are fearful of reprisals. See Zeidler, supra note 46, at 156-57.
419 Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3141 (1990).
420 Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1988)).
421 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); cf Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396
(9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986) (admission in state murder trial of
videotaped witness who subsequently died did not violate confrontation clause, even
though erroneously admitted under state law, since the confrontation clause is given a
pragmatic rather than a rigidly literal construction). The Eleventh Circuit cautioned that
only in exceptional cases will a witness' sworn testimony before the grand jury be admissible if the witness is unavailable at trial. United States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976 (11th
Cir, 1990).
Some courts have found an exception where the prosecution can shoulder the often impossible burden of proving that defendant was the cause of the witness' refusal or
unavailability. See infra note 426 aid accompanying text.
422 Fear of improper witness contacts led Congress to reject a proposal for including
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Frankel described this concern as "well founded 42 3 -and "significant enough to warrant our exploring alternative arrangements
abroad where investigation 'freezes' the evidence ...
for use at

trial. "424
Some partial solutions could be implemented without major
changes in our confrontation principles, but each would have
major deficiencies. For example, states could provide for greater
availability of pretrial depositions, preliminary hearings, or other
trial-like procedures, which would provide the defendant with the
opportunity for cross-examination required for admission of the
transcript as former testimony if the witness became unavailable. 425 However, providing mini-trials in which all important
prosecution witnesses would testify and be cross-examined would
be highly inefficient and particularly burdensome to the witnesses.
It may also prove somewhat ineffective because witnesses could be
either dissuaded from cooperating or eliminated prior to the hearing. Another approach would admit past statements of prosecution
witnesses in cases where the witness' unavailability or refusal to
testify was caused by the defendant. These admissions are justified
upon the ground that, by such conduct, the defendant has waived
any confrontation or hearsay protection he may have had.426
However, in many, if not most, of these cases, the prosecution
would find it difficult or impossible to prove that the defendant

mutual exchange of witness lists is the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See the discussion of the Congressional debates over discovery of witness lists in Cary Clennon, PreTrial Discovery of Witness Lists: A Modest Proposal to Improve die Administration of Criminal
Justice in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 641, 651-55
(1989).
423 Frankel, supra note 109, at 1054.
424 Id.
425 A 1985 revision of the California Penal Code authorizes the conditional examination of a prosecution witness when there is evidence that the life of the witness is in
jeopardy. Act of Sept. 19, 1985, ch. 783, §§ 2-5, 1985 Cal. Stat. 2523 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1335-41).
426 It seems reasonable to conclude that confrontation rights would not be denied if
the witness' unavailability or refusal to testify was procured by the accused. See United
States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1353, 1358 (8th Cir. 1976) (By intimidating a prospective prosecution witness into not testifying, the defendant waived his Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation such that the court could admit the witness' prior grand jury testimony.). Without relying on waiver, Carlson found the prior testimony admissible under
the "catch-all" exception of § 804(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Cf United
States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 648-51 (6th Cir.) (prosecution's reading of a prior confession of an expected prosecution witness who refused to testify clue to pressure by the
defendant was improper, but court would not allow defendant's counsel to comnplain of
denial of confrontation since defendant caused reflsal), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975).
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was the
source of the witness' disappearance or refusal to cooper7
ate.

42

An even more formidable barrier against revealing the
prosecutor's case to the defense lies in the "lack of mutuality"
argument. This argument rests on the proposition that constitutional rules so hinder the state from using the accused as a source
of testimonial evidence that any pretrial discovery would of necessity be a "one-way-street" allowing the accused an unfair advantage.
Armed with knowledge of the prosecution's case, the defense
would be in a good position to prepare cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, shape the defense to meet the prosecution's
case, and even fabricate and present perjured testimony, while the
prosecution would face "trial by surprise." The argument is a powerful one and has convinced most American courts and legislatures. As Professor Schlesinger noted, "it does not seem likely that
unlimited discovery-the hallmark of civilized criminal procedure-will be widely and effectively introduced into our system
unless the 'one-way-street' argument can be laid to rest. "428
In one context, the Supreme Court has taken a major step in
this direction by upholding "two-way-street" pretrial discovery. In
4 29 the Court held that a state notice of alibi
Williams v. Florida,
rule requiring that the defense notify the prosecution of alibi
information and witnesses the defense intended to present at trial
did not violate the Fifth Amendment because it did not involve
compulsion, but only acceleration of the timing of disclosures.4 °
While the Court's timing rationale limits court-ordered discovery
for the prosecution to that which the defense intends to offer at
trial, its principles apply beyond the alibi rule and suggest that, in
the context of pretrial discovery, the "one-way-street" argument is
no longer viable.

427 Current hearsay exceptions of this sort are often so narrow that they are of limited use. For example, California Evidence Code § 1350(a) provides for the admission of
a statement of an unavailable declarant only in "serious felony" cases and only if the
prosecution proves by clear and convincing evidence that the declarant's unavailability was
"knowingly caused by, aided by, or solicited by the party against whom the statement is
offered for the purpose of preventing the arrest or prosecution of the party and is the
result of the death by homicide or the kidnapping of the declarant." CAL EVID. CODE §
1350(a) (West Supp. 1992). Furthermore, the statement must have been memorialized in
a tape recording or written statement signed by the declarant and notarized in an
official's presence, and must be corroborated by other evidence. Id.
428 SCHLESINGER ETrAL., supra note 29, at 485.
429 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
430 Id.
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However, in the more significant context of gathering testimonial evidence directly from the accused, both during police questioning and at trial, the Court has erected substantial barriers
which support arguments against full discovery for the defense.
The extent to which an accused can take unfair advantage of
pretrial discovery in large part depends upon whether he has
committed himself to a specific factual defense at an early stage in
the proceedings. Continental systems encourage the accused to
waive the right to silence, and nearly all defendants provide a
detailed version of the facts shortly after arrest such that "at the
time when he or his counsel inspects the dossier, his position has
assumed a sufficiently firm shape so that it can no longer be effectively improved by fabrications."4 3 ' On the other hand, our complex interrogation rules based on the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
discourage suspects from making statements to police, and, in a
substantial number of serious criminal cases, the accused never
gives his version of the events prior to trial or plea.4" Furthermore, in England, suspects are given more encouragement to talk,
and they tend to make damaging statements at a greater rate than
their American counterparts. 43 3 Thus, it is not surprising that
statements by suspects assume greater importance in English prosecutions.3 4
Certainly, cultural differences in areas such as respect for
authority and attitudes toward accepting responsibility for one's
conduct play a large role in the extent to which suspects cooperate with police efforts to obtain statements. Nevertheless, our police interrogation rules have both the purpose and effect of encouraging suspects to remain silent and to refuse to respond to
police questioning to a greater degree than do those of England
or Continental countries. A system which fails to rely on informa-

431 SCHLESINGER ET AL., supra note 29, at 484. In France, the suspect is expected to
give evidence and submit to pretrial questioning, and, nearly always, the suspect is an
important source of information about the alleged crime. Part of the reason is cultural:
"[tihe albatross of silence in the face of open accusation seems especially heavy in
French mores." Mendelson, supra note 29, at 44.
432 For a summary and comparison of American and English studies on the effect of
interrogation rules on obtaining suspect statensents, and the significance of such statements in criminal prosecutions, see Van Kessel, supra note 5, at 109-29. American studies
found that the percentage of American suspects who refused to answer any questions varied widely (from 9 to 60%), but overall, most studies found that a substantial (more
than 10% but less than 50%) percentage of suspects questioned refused to make a
statement. Id. at 117-19.
433 Id. at 126-29.
434 Id. at 127.
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tion from the accused, particularly at or near the time of arrest,
both forfeits valuable evidence and allows for a greater possibility
of defense fabrication through improper use of knowledge of the
prosecution's evidence. In this respect, "our legal system. stands
virtually alone"405 and exposed to the "one-way-street" argument
which impedes development of liberal discovery rules.
2.

Resistance to Change on the Part of Lawyers and Judges

Lawyers have a strong interest in maintaining the present
system, which allows them to be the central figures in the great
drama of the criminal trial. They will not easily yield their power
to influence the outcome of trials while often being regarded as
heroes in doing so. Furthermore, any interest they may have in
expediting the trial process, such that there could be more trials
and fewer guilty pleas, is diminished by their strong interest in
maintaining the present plea bargaining system. Lawyer dominance
over the disposition of cases through the plea bargaining process
is even greater than lawyer control of the trial process. 436 In fact,
many lawyers prefer the negotiation and plea process to the alternative of trial for the very reason that they can better control the
former, and the outcome is more predictable. 3 7
Research based upon a 1976 Georgetown University study of
plea bargaining in six jurisdictions found a process sharply in
contrast to trial combat:
The decisions of prosecutors and defense counsel regarding
whether to plea bargain a case and on what terms is not as
haphazard as it may appear. There is considerable agreement ...

as to what factors are important and how much

weight to attach to them in deciding the appropriate disposition of cases .... When presented with the same hypothetical

435
436

SCHLESINGER ET AL,

supra note 29, at 487.

Although the client ultimately controls the decision whether to settle the case by

pleading guilty, it is widely recognized that lawyers (particularly privately paid attorneys
who usually have greater "client control") play a pivotal role by advising their clients of
the strength of the case against them and the odds of acquittal and by seeking to persuade them to take a particular course. See, e.g., Defiance Didn't Help Defendants, It Seems,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1990, at C7.
437 In this sense, it has been argued that plea bargaining is the natural result of bureaucratic or organizational concerns of key court participants. See ABRAHAM S. BLUMBERG,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1979) (The desire of both prosecutors and defense attorneys to control the criminal process makes them prefer the certainty of a conviction by plea as
opposed to the uncertainty of a trial, and they are willing to cooperate to achieve this
result.).
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cases, prosecutors and defense counsel were in remarkable
agreement in their estimates of the probability of conviction in
those versions of the cases where the evidentiary strength of
the case was strong. But in the weaker version there were significant differences among and between them.4"
Although the researchers found an adversary component in the
process, they regarded4 9 it as "of such a latent quality that it can
easily be overlooked." 1
A process which relies upon common understandings between
adversaries has advantages for the participants beyond the power
that comes from the ability to predict the outcome. Avoidance of
combat often becomes a practical necessity for battle-weary soldiers. Even hardened trial lawyers have a limited capacity for the
intense conflict of a criminal jury trial and very often naturally
tend to cooperate in the disposal of cases by means other than
440
full-fledged trial combat.
Financial incentives also play a part. In the overwhelming
majority of cases, private defense attorneys, whether they are paid
by their clients or paid by the government, make more money
disposing of cases by plea bargain than by trial. In the usual situation, a given case is worth a limited amount of money, and private
lawyers make more by "volume practice," involving extensive plea
bargaining, than by days in trial. In fact, private lawyers complain
of "losing money by going to trial." Theoretically, public defenders
are not subject to these pressures, but in practice they often face
intense budgetary and administrative pressures to handle the indigent caseload, rather than declare themselves overburdened and
unable to take more cases.
The power of organized lawyers to block efforts to reform our
criminal justice system should not be underestimated. California,
for example, experienced years of public frustration with its Supreme Court, which reversed the vast majority of capital punishment sentences while extending exclusionary rules and other
rights of criminal defendants. Even widespread dissatisfaction with
the justice system could not overcome a legislative paralysis due, in
large part, to strong but opposing attorney organizations. Ultimately, prosecution lawyers and victims' organizations used the initia-

438 William McDonald, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pleas Bargaining: Critical Issues and Common Practices v (1985).
439 Id. at 91.
440 SeejAMEs EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOBS, FELONY JUSTICE (1977).

19921

ADVERSARY EXCESSES

tive process to by-pass the legislature." 1 A similar process took
place in 1990 and resulted in the enactment of another prosecution-drafted "reform."442 As a result, over the past two decades
the most significant changes in the rules of evidence and procedure in criminal cases in California have come from the initiative
process rather than from law revision commissions or the legislature. The legislative paralysis, caused at least in part by opposing
lawyer groups, is particularly stifling to any effort to grapple with
the complex and difficult questions involved in reducing adversary
excesses, yet this is precisely the type of issue that should be debated by commissions and legislative committees rather than decided by an up-or-down vote of the electorate.
Inertia, as well as active resistance of American judges, may
also pose serious obstacles to any alteration of the roles of participants in the trial process. Why, one may ask, would judges object
to their activation and empowerment? First, altering the role of
judges from umpires to active directors of the trial would require
monumental changes on their part. In addition to becoming more
active in the trial itself, trial-director judges would be required to
become familiar with the facts of the case and the available evidence prior to trial, a practice that would demand considerably
more effort as well as greater judicial competence.
The greater workload of Continental and English trial judges
becomes immediately apparent to anyone who attends foreign
trials. Clearly, the presiding judge at a Continental trial is the
busiest because she must become familiar with the case file, call
and examine the witnesses, and deliberate and render a verdict.
Although the English judge has less authority to conduct the trial
than the Continental judge, she also must work harder than her
American counterpart. The duty of the English judge to sum up
and comment on the evidence at the end of the trial requires
constant attention throughout the trial, as well as an ability to take
accurate notes rapidly, to synthesize the relevant facts, and to summarize for the jury factors relating to the credibility of witnesses.

441 1982 Cal. Stat. A-186. This initiative, commonly known as Proposition 8 and entiled 'he Victims' Bill of Rights," was adopted by the voters on June 8, 1982.
442 1990 Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. 264 (Deering). This initiative, called Proposition 115
and named the "Crime Victims' Justice Reform Act," was enacted by the voters on June
5, 1990.
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Particularly during a witness' examination in chief, the judge will
be writing almost continuously.4 4
The American trial judge, with neither the responsibility for
examining witnesses nor summing up and commenting on the
evidence, must listen to the lawyers present the evidence in order
to rule on motions and objections (which are much more common here), but, generally, the judge's attention is not as important. A referee may miss calling a foul, but the game will go on.
In fact, games may be played without referees. On occasion, one
hears of an American judge falling asleep during the trial of a
case, to be awakened only by a protective clerk or an attorney's
objection. 4" With an unconscious presiding judge, the conduct
of a Continental trial would be impossible and continuation of an
English trial unthinkable. Shifting from an umpire to a director
would require much more effort on the part of our judiciary, yet
to many judges, the secondary role of an umpire has its advantages. The lesser workload of an inactive observer may be appealing.
It is easier to sit as a tennis umpire calling balls in or out than to
become an active participant who is primarily responsible for a
44 5
reliable and a just result.
Finally, the fact that most state trial judges must stand for
election makes an inactive role more attractive. The more responsible the judge is for the result of the contest, the more likely she
will make someone unhappy and make the prospect of her reelection more difficult or uncertain.

443 HARVEY, supra note 101, at 67-68.
444 Having been degraded to mere moderators, American judges may not give their
work the attention it deserves. "Not infrequently trial judges have been reported busying
themselves with extraneous matters during testimony so that when called upon to rule on
an objection, the pertinent portion of the record must be read back to them. With such
a lack of interest in the proceedings displayed by the judge, the jury may be tempted to
assume that the outcome is of little importance." David WoIchover, Should Judges Sum up
on the Facts?, CRIM. L. REV. 781, 789-90 (1989).
As a trial lawyer, I have often witnessed judges busying themselves with extraneous
matters during the presentation of evidence and, at times, have confronted afternoon
"judicial napping."
445 California's recent implementation of judicially conducted voir dire may show that
judges should be given greater authority and responsibility in the trial process. In 1990,
California voters, through the initiative process, required judges to conduct the examination of prospective jurors, a task previously left to the attorneys. Initial reports indicate
that many judges are eagerly embracing their newly granted powers, and that judicial voir
dire is proving a success. Clyde Leland, The Ner Criminal Process, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1990, at
26. However, other reports suggest that many judges have become bored with the process
and would rather leave it with the attorneys. At this point, it is probably too early to
gauge the general judicial reaction to judges' empowennent in the jury selection process.
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Consequently, as a practical matter, depowering the lawyers
and empowering the judges in the Continental mode would be an
uphill fight, facing strong resistance by lawyers, many of whom are
powerful politicians. I suspect that many, if not most, judges also
would object.
3.

Our National Character

The basic assumptions underlying the nonadversary approach
cut against the grain of our national character." 6 The Americanstyle adversary system-with its emphasis on the contest between
the lawyers for the individual and for the state, rules designed to
shield the accused from the process, and extensive use of the lay
jury-has its roots in the individualism, populism, and pluralism
that are natural ingredients of our character and that strongly
influence our view of the proper structure and role of social and
political institutions. A fundamental aspect of our individualism
that stands in the way of reforms embracing nonadversary approaches is our antipathy toward authority: in particular, our fear
and distrust of governmental power. These attitudes lead us to
establish mechanisms-such as strong lawyers and the lay jury-that shield the individual from the authority of state institutions.
Historically, our attitudes arose near the time of our Revolution out of an aversion to English trial procedures that had been
unfair to the accused.44 7 Over the years, this individualism and
distrust of authority, particularly of governmental power, has become a part of our approach to life. It presents a formidable
obstacle to the adoption of Continental-style procedures, which
leave the accused exposed to the considerable authority of a civil
servant-the presiding judge. Also, entrusting a good part of the
powers of the lay jury to professional judges would conflict with
the value we place in social pluralism, as well as with our tendency
to place greater trust in the common person and less in professionals. Europeans, on the other hand, generally have greater
respect for professionals and less fear of authority. As a result,

446 One foreign observer of our adversary criminal process remarked that "telling
Americans to simply reduce that complexity is as fruitless as a'medical prescription which
[and the most that the European expecures symptoms instead of the disease itself ...
rienc'e can offer is] a guideline for American law reform, rather than . . . a substitute
for American procedure." Volkmann-Schluck, supra note 4, at 32.
447 FoSDICK Er AL, supra note 267, at 595.
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they are more willing to place considerable power in the hands of
professional judges. Most Europeans would stand in shocked disbelief at the argument, widely accepted here, in favor of the AngloAmerican lay jury: "Our civilization has decided, and very justly
decided, that determining the guilt or innocence448 of men is a
thing too important to be trusted to trained men."
4.

The Result: A System Impervious to Reform

The constitutionalizing of our rules of criminal procedure,
together with our general distrust of governmental authority and
the natural resistance to change on the part of lawyers and judges,
have combined to create formidable, if not insurmountable, barriers to any significant efforts to experiment with European alternatives to criminal trials. Researchers Felstener and Drew, in studying
the applicability of foreign alternatives to our system of trial, lamented the lack of "empirical data" and emphasized "the need for
experimentation with innovations in a few settings before major
reforms can prudently be undertaken."" 9 Yet, our impervious
rules of criminal procedure and other factors have stifled experimentation with nontraditional adjudication processes. In 1979,
Professor Feeley reviewed then-recent studies and evaluations of
the courts in the areas of pretrial release and diversion, adjudication, and sentencing that he considered to be innovative and
important.4 50 On the subject of adjudication, he found one
genuine experimentation and a number of studies of the plea
bargaining process, but did not discover one evaluation of or
experimentation with the trial process. 451 Even in the area of
plea bargaining, he found significant gaps in the research, but felt
it unlikely that this void would be filled in the future, noting that
"[e]ven the most ardent proponents of experimentation are not
likely to advocate experiments that would wreak havoc on the
452
constitutional rights of the accused.

448
449

GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 86 (1915).
WILLLAM L.F. FELSTINER & ANN BARTHELMES DREw, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EURO-

PEAN ALTERNATIVES To CRIMINAL TRIALS AND

THEIR APPLICABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES

41 (1978). The researchers concluded that "we will never be able to assess the systematic
value of such innovations unless we give them a trial on a small scale and under experimentally-controlled conditions." Id. at 42.
450 Malcolm Feeley, U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Impact of Innovation: Assessing the Evaluation of Courts, in HOW WELL DOES IT WORM? REVIEW OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE EVALUATION,

at 171, 174 (1979).
451 Id. at 183-90.
452 Id. at 185.
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I would venture the more sweeping conclusion that researchers, not to mention prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges,
would hesitate to go forward with any experiment or innovation
which might in the least be viewed as intruding upon constitutional protections. In fact, the designers would likely make every effort
to fit their programs within existing constitutional parameters. The
uncertainty about the validity of any "experimentation" was cited
by former Chief Justice Burger as a major reason for the lack of
any incentive for legislative development of alternatives to the
exclusionary rule."' It is safe to say that legislatures would be
even more hesitant to experiment with new trial procedures when
the Court may later decide that they encroach on fundamental
constitutional guarantees (rather than only procedural safeguards),
requiring wholesale reversals and difficult, burdensome retrials. As
a practical matter, exploration of significant modifications of our
trial process in serious cases will be limited to the ivory towers of
academia as long as many of our most important rules of evidence
and procedure stand as constitutional Berlin Walls.
Professor Mary Ann Glendon has contended that a similar
stifling of experimentation and reform in the area of abortion
resulted from the Court's leap into constitutional rule-making in
the name of individual privacy. "The judicially announced abortion
right in 1973 brought to a virtual halt the process of legislative
abortion reform that was already well on the way to producing in
the United States, as it did all over Europe, compromise statutes
that gave very substantial protection to women's interests without
completely denying protection to developing life." 41 4 However
one views the virtues of the rules pronounced by the Court in
watershed cases such as Mapp, Miranda and their progeny, it is
difficult to contend that the imposition of such rules has not hindered political efforts to experiment and to find alternative solutions to the very complex problems they sought to address. It is
telling that the recent, major restructuring of Italian criminal
procedure took place after lengthy debates and compromises within the Italian Parliament and other institutions of government,
during which time the Italian Constitutional Court avoided piece45
meal constitutionalization of the criminal process.

453 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500-01 (1976).
454 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POUTICAL DISCOURSE
58 (1991).
455 See Fassler, supra note 33, at 273.
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Greater flexibility could be gained by returning to the standards of fundamental fairness. However, there is little indication
that the Supreme Court wishes to revive the incorporation debate.
In Apodaca v. Oregon,456 one former member of the Court indicated a willingness to return to the touchstone of fundamental
fairness, and in Teague v. Lane,45 7 the Court appeared to adopt
Palko's fundamental fairness test in the retroactivity context by
describing an
exception
to the general
principle of
nonretroactivity on collateral review with respect to a new rule "if
it requires the observance of those procedures that.., are .'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "458
However, later in Butler v. McKellar,459 the Court backed
away from fundamental fairness, noting that Teague "discerned a
latent danger in relying solely on this famous language from
Palko:"46 ° "Were we to employ the Palko test without more, we
would be doing little more than importing into a very different
contest the terms of the debate over incorporation ....

Reviving

the Palko test now, in this area of law, would be unnecessarily
anachronistic." 46 ' Furthermore, the Court has stated that the basic elements of a fair trial guaranteed by due process are largely
defined by the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment, and
the Court has suggested that it is satisfied with looking to the
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights rather than creating a
second tier of constitutional rights based on due process concepts.

4 62

456 406 U.S. 404 (1978).
457 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
458 Id. at 307.
459 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
460 Id. at 1218.
461 Id. (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 312).
462 See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989) (dealing with the
right to counsel); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684-85 (1984); cf Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (in analyzing claims of excessive force by law enforcement
officers, courts must look to the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment,
rather than to substantive due process).
However, the Court is becoming more sympathetic to Harlan's views on other matters. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) and United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537
(1982), which adopt his retroactivity approach. Justices Scalia and Thomas recently ex-

pressed admiration for the views of Justice Harlan concerning the reach of-the Confrontation Clause. See White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). Justices Scalia and Thomas expressed substantial agreement with Justice Harlan's view that the
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause was not intended as a general limitation on the
admission of hearsay evidence.
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We are left, then, with the hope that the Court might become
more flexible when interpreting the individual guarantees of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. With respect to the timing and character of pretrial procedures, such as arraignments, bail, and probable cause hearings, the Court has generally allowed "flexibility and
experimentation by the states."46 Recently, the Court invited the
states to experiment with different ways to provide those arrested
without a warrant with prompt, probable cause hearings required
by the Fourth Amendment, explaining that "the Constitution does
not impose on the States a rigid procedural framework."4" Much
could be gained if the Court would apply the same constitutional
analysis to state trial procedures.
Professor Ronald Allen contends that due process jurisprudence has mirrored the national trend toward "a subtle devolution
of political authority from the central government to the states"
and predicts that as state officials become aware of their increasing autonomy, they will begin to adopt innovations. 65 It is true
that the Supreme Court has shown an increasing propensity to
limit exclusionary rules 466 as well as a growing reluctance to use
federal habeas corpus powers to overturn final state criminal convictions. 467 However, despite the Court's recent dicta that
"[u]nder our constitutional system, the primary responsibility
for ...

establishing procedures for criminal trials rests with the

States, '461 the Court has not abandoned the rigid commands of
its landmark decisions such as Duncan, Griffin, and Miranda, or of

At some point, even traditional liberals may back away from reliance on the central
government, and on the Supreme Court in particular, for solutions to our criminal justice problems. Anthony Lewis recently recognized the "benefits" of the Brandeis view (see

supra note 357 for a discussion of the Brandeis view) allowing individual states to "try
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." Anthony
Lewis, Abroad at Home: E. Pluribus Unum?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1991, § Al, at 17.
Brandeis' regard for a state's freedom to experiment, and Harlan's regard for flexibility

in Fourteenth Amendment due process jurisprudence some day could carry the day in
the legal community and, ultimately, in the Supreme Court.
463 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 123 (1975) (leaving flexible the nature and timing of probable cause hearings).
464 Riverside v. McLaughlin, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991).
465 RONALD J. ALLEN & RICHARD B. KUHNs, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
122 (2d ed. 1991) (quoting RONALD J. ALLEN, PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS OF LAW, CRiMINAL, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (Supp. 1990)).

466 See, e.g., California v. Hodari, 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991); Florida v. Bostick, 111 S.
Ct. 2382 (1991); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298
(1985); New York v. Quarels, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
467 See, e.g., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
468 Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2607 (1991).
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the lesser known rules of procedure and evidence that also lock in
elements of the traditional adversary trial structure 469 and which
stand in the way of significant experimentation with nonadversary
procedures. Given present constitutional restraints, state officials
cannot confidently experiment with Continental-style procedures,
and innovations will likely be confined within existing adversary
structures.
B.
1.

FurtherPerspectives on Altering the Adversay System

Revising
Standards
of
Attorney
Conduct:
An Unpromising Approach to Curing Adversary Excesses

We should put aside the notion that our major adversary
excesses can be eliminated, or even significantly reduced, merely
by altering the ethical rules that govern lawyer advocacy. Judge
Frankel, the most forceful and articulate spokesperson for this
approach, contended that solutions to major problems of our
adversary system could be found in modifying ethical rules that
demand that lawyers place the zeal to win above truth and justice.4 70 Frankel argued that lawyers are too committed to contentiousness and not committed enough to truth. He suggested the
following remedies: Modify the adversary ideal, make truth a paramount objective, and impose upon the parties a duty to pursue
the truth. 471 He later pointed specifically to what he saw as "excesses" in our adversary system: "the tricks, stratagems, dodges, and
ruses that wily advocates everywhere have learned and employed,
in one form or another, to win unfairly, take unfair advantage,
and achieve what detached observers would condemn, and have
always condemned, as unjust results. 4 72 He described the following "widespread practices in need of change":
[K]nowingly presenting false testimony of clients or witnesses;
trying by artful cross-examination or other techniques to block
the truth, or to make what is known to be true seem false; and
deliberately failing to reveal evidence that would help the court
or jury to achieve an accurate understanding of the facts.47

469
Brooks
470
471
472

See White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980);
v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
Frankel, supra note 109, at 1035.
Id. at 1052, 1057-58.
FRANKEL, supra note 30, at 7.

473

Id. at 79. Judge Christensen agreed with Frankel that "the moral tone of legal
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First, some conduct about which Frankel complains, such as
knowingly presenting false testimony, would subject lawyers to
discipline under existing ethical rules.4 74 Furthermore, the allegation that lawyers engage in tricks and deceptions to "take unfair
advantage" and to "win unfairly," applies to some, but I believe
not to most, prosecutors or defense attorneys, unless one defines
"unfair" to include conduct well within the current bounds of
competent advocacy. As one federal judge observed, restraints on
unfair tactics designed to win at all costs already are imposed by
many successful advocates, while ignored by -others.475 However,
Frankel's recommendation that lawyers become active pursuers of
truth and reveal evidence that would assist in arriving at an accurate result is inconsistent with the practice of virtually all criminal
defense lawyers. This recommendation strikes at the heart of our
traditional view of a defense lawyer's function in our adversary system. As Justice White observed, although prosecutors must be
dedicated to ascertaining the truth, "defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth." 476 In fact,
partisan justice is the mission of anyone who desires to be known
as a skillful defense attorney. Changing ethical standards for the
sake of accurate fact-finding by obligating defense lawyers to
breach client confidences, or to reveal the names and statements
of persons who would incriminate their client, but whom they do
not intend to call as witnesses, would run counter to our entrenched tradition of partisan defense advocacy, not to 4 mention
77
fundamental constitutional and evidentiary privilege rules.

advocacy" needed improvement. A. Sherman Christensen, Some Reflections on the Nature and

Future of the Adversary System, 30 DEF. L.J. 325, 337 (1981). Other judges have criticized
the poor quality of American advocates. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of
Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REv. 227, 238 (1973); Irving R. Kaufman, The Court Needs a Friend
in Court, 60 A.B.A. J. 175 (1974).
474 See MODEL CODE, supra note 143, at DR 7-102 (a lawyer shall not knowingly use
perjured testimony or false evidence); MODEL RULEs, supra note 140, at Rule 1.2(d) (a
lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent). See generally Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
475 Christensen, supra note 473, at 338.
476 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part).
477 Frankel's proposed rules would excuse lawyers from the duty to disclose when the
lawyer is "prevented from doing so by a privilege reasonably believed to apply." Frankel,
supra note 109, at 1057. However, Frankel noted the need for changes in evidentiary
privilege rules, suggesting that "[t]he privilege for client's confidences might come in for
reexamination and possible modification." Id. at 1056.
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Consequently, such a radical revision of lawyer ethics would
be. extremely difficult to achieve. Lawyers understandably would
strongly resist the requirement that they choose between their
client's interest and notions of truth and justice based on some
necessarily imprecise standard. For example, even traditional crossexamination would be suspect. Frankel apparently would have
lawyers cross-examine witnesses with the objective of revealing all
relevant facts, as opposed to the usual current practice of competent attorneys to conduct a tight, leading cross-examination and
avoid "the disaster of asking one question too many." 478 Furthermore, I doubt that Frankel's radical changes would be politically
acceptable despite the present negative public regard for lawyers.
It is telling that no state has adopted Judge Frankel's extreme approach as a cure for the ills of its legal system.
Moreover, even if attainable, changes in ethical rules alone
would not go far toward curing defects in our adversary system.
Given the pressures inherent in our existing adversary structures, it
is doubtful that new ethical rules would substantially alter the conduct of lawyers. Certainly, most lawyers would agree with Alschuler
that they "simply are not appropriate figures to correct the defects
of our adversary system. Their hearts will never be in it, and more
importantly, it is unfair to both their clients and themselves to re479
quire them to serve two masters."
Not only is it unfair to impose on defense attorneys a truthseeking duty that generally supersedes the obligation to serve their
clients, it is also unnecessary to achieve Judge Frankel's purpose of
revising our adversary system to place more emphasis on the
truth. 410 As I will suggest, our adversary procedures could be
modified to place greater emphasis on the goal of achieving an
accurate result. In fact, English and Continental systems demonstrate that structural components of the adjudication process, rather than ethical rules imposing conflicting obligations on lawyers,
account for the greater value those systems place on truth. Privi-

478 FRANKEL, supra note 30, at 16. Frankel would require lawyers, unless prevented by
a privilege, to "[qk]uestion witnesses with a purpose and design to elicit the whole truth,
including particularly supplementary and qualifying matters that render evidence already
given more accurate, intelligible, or fair than it otherwise would be." Frankel, supra note
109, at 1058.
479 Albert W. Alschuler, The Preservation of a Client's Confuenes: One Value Among Many
or a Categorical Imperative, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 354 (1981).
480 Frankel's primary "theme" is that our adversary system rates truth too low among
competing values. See Frankel, snpra note 109, at 1032.
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lege rules that are similar to our. own protect client confidences in
the legal systems of England and Continental countries such that,
as a general matter, defense lawyers are under no obligation to reveal, and are actually prevented from revealing, client confidences
or incriminating information except in very limited circumstances.48 1 Furthermore, in contrast to our system, the judge and
prosecutor in Continental trials are obligated not only to reveal all
evidence to the defense, but to present in court all evidence that
favors the accused. Even with this greater contrast between the
duties of the judge and prosecutor and the defense, Continental
adjudication systems place more importance48 2 than our system does
on the goal of attaining an accurate result.

Not surprisingly, Judge Frankel's reliance on altering ethical
standards to correct defects in our adversary system has received
severe criticism as unworkable, ineffective, wrongly directed, and
having too little regard for other values in our society. 48 3 I agree
with much of this criticism. Nevertheless, I share Judge Frankel's
concern over the extreme partisanship of American lawyers. As
noted previously, American criminal trial lawyers generally are
considerably more aggressive and contentious than either Continental or English advocates. Furthermore, contrary to Frankel's
critics, I believe that to some extent our rules of professional conduct contribute to lawyer contentiousness by their imprecision as
well as their near-unqualified demand for zealous advocacy in the
pursuit of the client's desires.4 8 4 However, our ethical rules are
not the only, nor even the most, significant, reason for this difference. Nor should we blame the character of our lawyers, assuming them to be on a lower moral level than advocates in other
countries. Rather, the extreme partisanship of our lawyers has its
deepest roots in and naturally flows from the unique forms of our
adversary structure, principally the prominence and control our
adversary system assigns to lawyers in contrast to judges. In a system in which lawyers direct and produce the evidence, it is perceived that trials are won or lost by the lawyer's conduct, and in
many cases the assumption is accurate. Accordingly, our lawyers

481 With respect to the lawyer-client privilege under English law, see ARCHBOLD, supra
note 127, at § 12-7.
482 See Damaska, supra note 12, at 513, 525.
483 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 479, at 354; Friedman, supra note 9, at 1060; Pizzi,
supra note 6, at 365.
484 See sipra notes 13945 and accompanying text.
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are under tremendous pressure to be victorious. In Continental
systems, in which the lawyers have secondary roles, lawyers are
under less pressure because it would not be accurate to assume
that cases are theirs to win in the first place. Even in England,
barristers are under less pressure to serve the client's desire for
48 5
courtroom victory.
As pointed out previously," 6 other factors contribute to the
strong pressures on our lawyers to be victorious, including the
close connection between American lawyers and their clients. The
discretion afforded prosecutors in deciding whether to prosecute
may make them more committed to conviction once they have
decided to go forward, and the free reign given both parties to
prepare witnesses for trial often causes lawyers to feel that they
have a personal stake in the outcome. In summary, while to some
extent the demand of our ethical rules for zealous advocacy in the
pursuit of the client's desires contributes to lawyer contentiousness, the rules are not the most important cause of the extreme
aggressiveness of American advocates in the pursuit of victory. To
a great extent, our ethical rules favoring partisan representation
are merely a natural consequence of structural aspects of our
adversary system that encourage lawyers to win at all costs.
Furthermore, if we are truly committed to enhancing the
importance of truth in our adjudication system, we should seek
modification not only of those structural aspects that encourage lawyers to seek victory above all else, but of those procedural rules
that enable lawyers to frustrate truth-finding in doing so. For example, it is hard to imagine lawyer conduct more inimical to the
correct resolution of a criminal case than advising the defendant-usually the most important witness-to remain silent, to
refuse to cooperate with the police, and to decline to testify at the
trial. Yet a competent American lawyer will nearly always advise the
client to say nothing when questioned by the police or the prosecutor48 7 and will often recommend against testifying at the trial.
English and Continental lawyers, on the other hand, very often

485 Not surprisingly, compared to our lawyers, barristers are judged more on the basis
of professional performance than on the jury verdict.
486 See supra part II.C.2.
487 Justice Jackson's well known generalization over forty years ago still states the
accepted rule for criminal defense lawyers in this country: "[Amny lawyer worth his salt
will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any

circumstances." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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will advise a suspect to tell the truth to the police and will usually
recommend that the accused tell his side of the case at trial. The
primary reasons for these distinctions lie not in contrasting ethical
standards, but in differing procedures, which in England and on
the Continent often, if not usually, make it in the best interest of
the accused to talk to the police early in the investigation and to
take the" stand at the trial.' 8 In England, for example, if after
being advised of his rights, a suspect refuses to talk to the police,
the refusal is made known to the jury; whereas, in this country,
the jury never learns of it. 89 Continental defendants nearly always give their side of the case at the trial because a refusal to
speak has clear negative consequences and choosing to speak does
not open the accused to damaging prior conviction impeachment.4 9 In advising the accused to give evidence, barristers and
Continental lawyers are merely doing what they perceive to be in
the best interest of their clients given the particular evidentiary
rules and procedural framework in which they operate.
2. Caution Signs on the Road to Nonadversary Procedures
How, then, might we modify the procedural and evidentiary
rules of our adversary system to correct its excesses? In light of
the substantial barriers to any reform of our traditional trial process, importation of major elements of the nonadversary system in
serious criminal cases appears virtually impossible. However, even
if we were free to construct the ideal adjudication procedure,
strong arguments weigh against wholesale adoption of the Continental-style system in this country. The foremost among these
relates to the weaknesses of a justice system that places so much
responsibility in the hands of professional judges without selection
and retention procedures that provide for a uniformly competent,
motivated, and impartial judiciary. Obviously, as a general matter,
the more active the judge, the greater the judge's impact on the
trial process and on the verdict. Professor Zeisel contrasted the
English judge's umpirage position with "the German judge [who]
is the director of an improvised play, the outcome of which is not
known to him at first but depends heavily on his mode of directing."49 A system which greatly empowers judges necessarily de-

488
489
490
491

See suprra part II.B.2.
See Van Kessel, supra note 5, at 10-15.
See suprra part II.D.3.
Zeidler, supra note 44, at 394.
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mands a highly competent, disciplined, efficient, and independent
judiciary and becomes vulnerable to claims of unfairness when
these characteristics are lacking.

(a) Weakness of the Nonadversary Model in Its Dependence on the
PresidingJudge.-Serious criticisms regarding the quality of fact-finding have been leveled at the nonadversary model for its heavy
reliance on the presiding judge. First, it is argued that the system
suffers from inadequate pretrial fact-gathering as well as
inadequate presentation of evidence at trial because both the
investigating magistrate and the presiding judge lack the initiative
to probe deeply enough into the facts. The pretrial aspect of this
argument can be met by eliminating the investigating magistrate,
as Germany has done, and delegating the investigative function
largely to the prosecution and to the police. However, the trial
aspect presents greater difficulty. The Continental system motivates
the trial judge to thoroughly elicit all relevant facts by placing a
legal duty on the judge to arrive at a correct result supported by
written reasons and by implementing hierarchical discipline and
evaluation by senior judges as part of a judicial form of civil
service.49 Although this motivation may work in the Continental
system, even if we decided to impose a similar duty on our trial
judges, we would find the structural factor extremely difficult to
duplicate.
The importance of assuring that the Continental judge is
highly motivated to uncover the truth is further underscored by
one possible consequence of depowering the lawyers. A super-active judge may have the effect of rendering the lawyers complacent or unmotivated by over-reliance on the judge. The highly regarded German scholar Hans Heinrich Jescheck has pointed to
unprepared lawyers deferring too much to the judge as a weakness
in the Continental approach:
The exceedingly small participation of the parties in the trial
itself leads to unfortunate consequences. The prosecutor who
had conducted the investigation often does not appear but is
represented by any colleague who happens by chance to have
the time free, and who is therefore much less familiar with the
files. Experience shows that some defense attorneys occasionally
appear without having adequately studied their own files. So
accustomed are they to the taking of evidence by the judge,

492

See supra, part II.C.1.
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that they rely completely upon him and often fail to direct the
taking of proof in the manner most favorable to their client ....
Not infrequently in 'my own experience as a judge, a
decisive point of view has been missed by both the prosecutor
and the defense attorney and therefore would never have been
4 93
raised at the trial had the judge himself not pointed it out.

A more serious objection to the Continental model is that it
often fails to provide an objective and dispassionate evaluation of
the evidence. A judge who, prior to trial, studies the case file
developed by the police and prosecutor or by an investigating
magistrate may tend to reach a conclusion at an early stage and
remain impervious to contradictory evidence later developed at
trial. Rene David noted that the French presiding judge
is supposed of course to be neutral, but in fact he is in many
cases convinced beforehand of the guilt of the accused - . . It
is an exertion for him to keep a pretence of neutrality, although in many cases he may be inclined to leniency and
eager to have his views followed by the members of the ju494

ry.

Even defenders of the Continental model recognize the danger
that the most conscientious presiding judge, in playing an active
part in the proceedings, will not be able to avoid the appearance
495
of partiality.
Thus, the Continental system relies heavily upon the skill,
motivation, discipline, and integrity of its professional judges. It
depends on a fair and efficient judicial bureaucracy buttressed by
high standards of selection, training, and performance, and pro-

493 Jescheck, supra note 28, at 249-50. Professor Langbein also pointed out the extremely passive role of the Continental lawyer during the taking of evidence, quoting an
observer of German trials as follows: "In my own experience . . . I have never seen the
legendary sleeping prosecutor, but I have seen a prosecutor reading a novel while the
court conducted the proofs." John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 448 (1974).
494 RENE DAVID, ENGLISH LAW AND FRENCH LAw 68 (1980).
495 K6tz, supra note 248, at 486 (The European judge faces the difficult task of
avoiding tie appearance of partiality while playing an active part in the proceedings.); see
also Brouwer, supra note 29, at 222 (The dominance of the Continental judge in the
elicitation of evidence can make the judge appear less partial than he is.).
The late Professor Wolfgang Zeidler, former President of Germany's Constitutional
Court, remarked that the "external image" of the active German judge "may occasionally
remind the uninformed observer of a hunter pursuing his prey," and that from this arises a misunderstanding, widespread in common law countries and stemming from ignorance of the pretrial history of the case, that the court is hostile and eager to convict
the accused who must prove his innocence. Zeidler, supra note 44, at 154.
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tected from political and public pressures by a form of judicial
tenure. In their comprehensive study of the American jury, Kalven
and Zeisel remarked that apart from what we may conclude as to
the behavior and performance of juries, "[w]hether the jury is a
desirable institution depends in no small measure on what we
think about the judge."496 Similarly, whether it is desirable to
depower our trial lawyers depends to a great extent on the confidence we have in our judiciary.
and
Retention
of
(b)
Our
System
of
Selection
Judges.-Unfortunately, our country's distrust of concentrated judicial power rests on firmer foundations than simply different philosophies of authority and government. Fundamental distinctions
between American and Continental trial judges regarding professionalism and independence, largely stemming from our diverse
and highly political systems of selection and retention, support the
argument that, absent changes in these systems, empowering our
trial judges in the Continental mode in serious criminal cases
would be unwise. Considerable evidence demonstrates that, generally, Continental trial judges are more uniformly professional
and less subject to whatever biases may result from insecurity of
employment. 497 Unlike our state trial judges, who often are
political appointees beholden either to the executive or to the
electorate, Continental trial judges hold positions either as, or
servants. 498
Generally,
their initial
akin
to,
career civil
politically
based, and
are
merit
based
rather
than
appointments
they are not subject to the political pressures of having to stand
periodically for re-election.4 99 It has been suggested that this
greater independence frees them to be more sensitive toward
procedural fairness and the rights of the accused. The public
generally regards them with considerable trust and respect.5°°
Langbein has described the fairness with which German judges
approach witnesses and his general "high regard for the skill,
thoroughness and humanity with which the German judges

496 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 499 (2d ed. 1971).
497 See su/na part II.C.l.b.
498 The German judge is not a "civil servant" in the strict sense, but does hold a
fixed salary position along with other senior civil servants according to grade. See Zeidler,
supra note 44, at 397.
499 See generally Damaska, supra note 35, at 501 n.47.
500 Jescheck, supra note 28, at 250-51 (The French judge has such an overwhelmingly

powerful position and enjoys such high prestige and trust that people believe that the
taking of proof is best safeguarded if left in his hands.).
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examine witnesses."50 1 English trial judges 'usually come from the
top ranks of experienced barristers and are selected on the basis
of experience and competence. They have a form of tenure until
retirement and are not required to stand for popular re-election
during their term of office.

°2

Certainly, many of our state and federal trial judges are highly
competent, professional, and unbiased. However, we would be less
than honest if we did not recognize the uneven quality of our
judiciary, and that many judges are deficient in these qualities.
Trial lawyers, for example, are aware that certain judges are abysmally ignorant of the evidentiary rules or the principles of search
and seizure. Court administrators know that a robbery case assigned to Judge X will be tried in five days, but the same case, if
assigned to Judge Y, will last two weeks. Judge X will manage the
trial efficiently, directing the lawyers to concentrate on the relevant issues. Judge Y will allow the trial to be interrupted with numerous motions that should have been decided before jury selection and fail to control lengthy, irrelevant witness examination and
emotional and disruptive arguments between counsel. Even more
dangerous are examples of judges clearly favoring either the prosecution or the defense. Yet we cannot expect a uniformly high
quality judiciary when, as a general matter, our system provides
neither for the appointment of trial judges based principally on
the prospect of excellence on the bench, nor for their advancement primarily upon the merits of their judicial performance.
The dependence upon the electorate presents an even more
formidable obstacle to investing our trial judges with the authority
to deliberate and vote with lay jurors in a mixed-court system.
One need only think of the many highly publicized and bitterly
contested criminal trials, particularly in small communities, where
the judge, facing the next retention election, would be in the
unenviable position of being required not only to "put on' the
case," but to deliberate and vote on the verdict. Defense attorneys
also might feel a bit uneasy before a fact-finder who is subject to
such pressures.
Our trial judges recognize their vulnerability and point to the
important aspects of our adversary system, such, as the jury trial,
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LANGBEIN, supra note 29, at 75.
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See supra part II.C.l.b.
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that shield them from public reaction to unpopular decisions.
Judge James Carrigan remarked:
Preservation of jury trial is essential not just in the interest of
litigants and lawyers, but in the interest of courts and judges as
well. Having a jury in cases where a decision which is 'right but
hostility
unpopular helps to buffer and diffuse community
50 3
which otherwise is directed solely at the court.
Even those state appellate court judges subject only to nonpartisan retention elections may encounter strong pressures in
highly publicized controversial cases. Former California Supreme
Court Justice Otto Kaus faced a retention election at a time when
the Court had been subjected to considerable criticism for reversing numerous death penalty judgments and was asked to decide
the validity of a popularly enacted "Victims' Rights" initiative. He
later remarked, "I found it totally impossible to work on cases
dealing with [the initiative] and not have in mind, to some extent,
that my retention depended on that vote."5 4 In his view, ignoring the political consequences 5 of such decisions is. "like ignoring
50
the alligator in your bathtub.1
In summary, structural and political aspects of our systems of
judicial selection and retention present formidable obstacles to
transferring authority over criminal trials from lawyers to judges.
The ability and independence of trial judges are as significant as
the system of justice in which they operate.
(c)
Changing
Views
of Adversary
and
Nonadversary
Systems.-Currently within Continental systems there is growing
recognition of certain benefits associated with the adversary
process. For example, in 1970, Jescheck remarked that while he
found a "Continental consensus"506 against such adversary aspects
as the American-style jury, he saw "[m]uch greater interest . . . in
readapting the German trial so that the parties adduce the proof
through direct and cross-examination, with the judge, as in
America, limited to posing only supplemental questions to
guarantee the completeness, the clarity and the correctness of the

503 Jim R. Carrigan, The American fJny-Vanishing or Only Shrinking?, FLA. B. J., Jan.
1981, at 20, 26.
504 Bill Blum, Toward a Radical Middle: Has a Great Court Become Mediocre?, A.B.A. J.,
Jan. 1991, at 48, 52.
505 Id.

506 Jeschcck, supra note 28, at 244.
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results."5" 7 However, Jescheck cautioned that "[i]n contrast to the
law in the United States, German scholars almost unanimously feel
that the duty to clarify the facts (and thus the judicial right to
examine the files) must be preserved, because no court could otherwise accept the responsibility for the correctness of its decisions. " "' He concluded that "Germany should move toward an
adversary process, because cross-examination appears to be the
psychologically preferable method of extracting the truth, provided
that the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding process is guarded by
the check of a judge familiar with, the contents of the file."5"
Professor Zeidler praised the common law trial as the best arena
in which to develop such talents as imagination and creativity,
noting that "its dynamic and competitive character is a powerful
stimulus to individual effort."510
The Italians recently reconstructed their criminal process
jettisoning their traditional, Continental-style trial procedure and
adopting several significant aspects of the adversary system. The
1988 Italian Code of Criminal Procedure implanted "an accusatorial soul in a European body"5 11 by transferring to the parties
the primary responsibility for producing the evidence, including
direct and cross-examination of witnesses. 512 Under the new procedure, the judge's knowledge of the case is limited because she
does not receive the entire dossier. Consequently, she must rely
on opening statements and the lawyers' presentation of evidence.
The Code includes new -evidentiary rules, framed on the hearsay
principles, designed to encourage oral, in place of written, proof.
However, the Code retains significant aspects of the nonadversary
system such as the mixed court (as opposed to the American-style
jury), the unitary trial procedure, in which guilt and punishment
are decided in a single proceeding, and full discovery for the
accused. Recognizing that their old procedures had become increasingly inefficient to the point of becoming dysfunctional and
that the new trial procedures likely would worsen the situation,
the Code drafters introduced western-style plea bargaining in less

507
508
509
510
511
512

Id. at 250.
Id.
Id.
Zeidler, supra note 46, at 159.
Amodio & Selvaggi, supra note 12, at 1212.
Id. at 1220.
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serious cases and, for all cases, a3 form of summary trial having
51
many plea bargain characteristics.
Some have attributed these reforms to the need "to cure the
ailments of a 'de-lawyerized' system" and to reject "shortcomings
[of] inquisitorial patterns framed on the judge's pivotal position .... 514 Others believe the reforms were intended to cure
a system of investigation and trial that had become inefficient and
overburdened, largely due to increasing defendants' procedural
rights and the complexity of pretrial and trial procedures without
allowing plea bargaining or other alternatives to formal trials.5 15
While the reforms are most likely the result of many different
pressures, they provide evidence that some Europeans are beginning to regard the traditional nonadversary style judge as too
powerful and are looking favorably upon aspects of the adversary
system. In light of this skepticism regarding the powers of the
Continental judge, we would be wise to hesitate investing our
judges with similar powers in serious criminal cases, particularly
when our trial judges face formidable hurdles in acquiring the
competence, neutrality; and respect that those in such dominant
positions should possess.
The verdict is not in on this somewhat adversary, somewhat
nonadversary approach, and it remains to be seen whether, as has
been suggested, these reforms will pave "a European road to the
accusatorial system,"516 or ultimately will be rejected as unworkable. The new system may require procedures unacceptable in
other countries, or create unforeseen problems that may actually
worsen matters. For example, because the new trial process will be
more time consuming, the Code introduces procedures to reduce
caseload pressures, such as plea bargaining, that are common to
the American system, but generally disfavored on the Continent.
Furthermore, the changes may have been a response to particular
Italian problems such as an inefficient legal system burdened by
overwhelming caseloads and threatened by organized crime.

513

Id. at 1219-20; see also Fassler, suf-a note 33, at 263-67; Jeffrey

J.

Miller, Note, Plea

Bargaining and Its Analogues Under the New Italian Criminal Procedure Code and in the United
States: Towards a New Understanding of Comparative Criminal Procedure, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.

& POL. 215 (1990).
514 Aimodio & Selvaggi, supra note 12, at 1224; see also Fassler, supra note 33, at 246
(The Code represents the acknowledgement that justice is more likely to be achieved
"through a dialectical process, rather than by the solitary research of an 'instructive'
organ whose evidentiary acquisitions may become sources of prejudice at trial.").
515 Miller, supra note 513, at 221-23.
516 Ansodio & Selvaggi, supra note 12, at 1224.
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Only experience with the new structure will tell how workable
a "fit" the Italians have constructed. However, the Italian experience demonstrates that it is politically possible for a country to
move away from a traditional nonadversary approach and combine
significant adversary elements into a more mixed system. This
suggests that we may benefit by ceasing unquestioned worship of
our adversary system and our knee-jerk dismissal of the nonadversary Continental approach. Instead, we should seriously consider
the possibility that our traditional adversary system can adopt sig-

nificant reforms by borrowing from distinctively different trial
models.
(d) Problems Encountered in Piecemeal Incorporation of Nonadversay
Procedures.-Nevertheless, we should not underestimate
the
difficulties we would encounter attempting to import individual
aspects of Continental trials without fully understanding all the
complexities of adversary and nonadversary systems and how they
interrelate to form a particular balance. For example, limits on
the power of Continental prosecutors should be viewed in light of
the great advantage given them by the liberal rules of evidence
and the unitary trial. Combining the issues of guilt and punishment allows liberal admission of evidence of defendant's
character and background, including prior convictions, 1 7 and
puts considerable pressure on him both to testify and to confess
his guilt. If he remains silent, he forfeits his right to present evidence to mitigate punishment. If he speaks, but denies guilt, he
may find it awkward, in the next breath, to assert mitigating
circumstances. Defense counsel faces a similar dilemma in closing
argument if he chooses both to assert defendant's innocence and
to explain why defendant deserves a lenient sentence if found
51 8
guilty.
The Continental trial strikes a different balance of forces than
our own, but it aims at a balance nevertheless. Greater judicial authority and more favorable rules of evidence and procedure compensate for the prosecutor's reduced powers. We have our own

517

The German code provides that evidence of prior offenses be introduced only as

fhr as necessary, but "in practice the defendant's rap sheet is usually read into the record
at the very end of the trial before the closing arguments." Weigend, supra note 123, at
62.
518 For these reasons, Gernan academics often urge a two-phase proceeding modeled
after our system, but practitioners fear that it will lead to increased trial time. Id. at 64.
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particular balance of trial forces, and any borrowing of nonadversary aspects should take into account the effect on that balance.
C. Problematical "Half-Steps" to ActivatingJudges
in the English or Continental Mode
1. English Summary and Comment Powers
Empowering our judges in the English or Continental manner
raises other serious questions. Judicial authority could be significantly enhanced by giving judges both the power and the responsibility to sum up and comment on the evidence, similar to those
currently possessed by English judges. 19 However, this would
greatly increase the judge's work load as well as the length of
trials. The judge's summing up often occupies a substantial portion of the English trial-one day in a trial lasting five or six days
is not uncommon. The judge must pay close attention to the testimony, take copious notes, and occasionally ask the witness to
pause or repeat testimony in order to assure an accurate and
complete summation. Our lawyers may object to the judge's account of witness testimony, ask for the opportunity to respond,
and challenge the fairness and completeness of the summation on
appeal. Furthermore, defense attorneys may reasonably object that,
unlike in England, where the prosecutor cannot answer the
defense's closing argument and the judicial summation provides a
balance, the judge's summing up in this country would merely add
weight to the prosecutor's already powerful closing argument.
2.

Continental-Style Authority to Examine Witnesses

Some have suggested that the judge should have greater control over the order of proof, including the authority to conduct
the initial examination of witnesses. 2 ' Professor Alschuler contends that the judge's examination ordinarily could be cursory and
involve merely inviting the witness's narrative of the events such
that "[a] more detailed probing of the witness's testimony would
remain the task of the opposing attorneys, each of whom could

519 The Continental judge also suns up the case and comments on the evidence, but
usually does so during deliberations. See Casper & Zeisel, supra note 3, at 150-51.
520

See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1004; Hein Kotz, The Reform of te Adversay Process,

48 U. CHI. L. REv. 478, 483 (1981); Maechling, supra note 6, at 63; Pizzi, supra note 6,
at 365.
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cross,-examine the witness in turn. "521 Professor Pizzi suggests that
the judge conduct a more complete examination of witnesses, with
522
counsel playing a backup role and filling in any gaps.
The idea of a more judicially-controlled presentation of testimony in a more natural form is very appealing. Eliminating the
opportunity for an initial, one-sided presentation of the facts, as
well as the stilted manner of first presenting evidence in the form
of direct and then cross-examination, would not be a great loss
provided the opportunity for questioning by the lawyers was available at some point. However, absent incorporation of other Continental procedures-in particular, providing the judge with the
complete case file and investing the judge with the power and
responsibility to produce the proof, direct the trial, and arrive at a
just result-I doubt that the suggested revisions would, as Professor Alschuler concluded, enhance "the efficiency and the coherency of the trial process."'2 I suspect just the opposite would result
from such a half-step adoption of an aspect of Continental procedure.
First, the procedure would require the judge to become familiar with the evidence available in the prosecutor's case file prior to
trial, unless the judge only asks witnesses open-ended questions,
such as, "What do you know about this case?"5 24 Reviewing only
a "limited pretrial 'dossier"' containing lists of witnesses with summaries of their expected testimony, as Alschuler has suggested,5 25
would create further inefficiencies because the parties would be
required to prepare these summaries. Questions would be raised
concerning their accuracy and completeness, providing yet another
ground for hearings and appeals. Furthermore, if the judge's initial examination elicited no .more than a simple cursory narrative,
the tripartite examination would likely be more confusing and less
efficient than existing procedures. A superficial examination inviting narrative responses most likely would be disjointed and incomplete and would require counsel to "fill in" later by going back
over the-same ground. As a result, presentation of witness testimony would likely become less efficient, more confusing, and provide

521 AIschuler, supra note 6, at 1004.
522 Pizzi, supra note 6, at 365.
523 Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1004.
524 Such general questions pose obvious problems in a system governed by hearsay
and other complex exclusionary rules.
525 Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1004.
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opportunities for unfair emphasis by repetition. Moreover, in our
system, where witnesses are often interviewed, and at times "prepared," by the lawyers, judges will usually know less about the case
than the lawyers, even if the judge reviews the complete case file.
This judicial deficiency would undoubtedly show up in the judge's
examination and provide a source of confusion and controversy. If
we are to maintain a coherent and efficient system of proof, we
must place the primary obligation for developing the evidence
against the accused on either the judge or the prosecutor, and
assure that the one responsible has full knowledge of the case.
Even with adequate judicial enlightenment, requiring our trial
judges to conduct the initial examination of witnesses would pose
other serious problems. First, even the knowledgeable judge who
actively questions witnesses runs the risk of-conveying to the jury,
consciously or unconsciously, a judicial view of the witness' credibility or the state of the evidence. Judicial impartiality would be
further endangered if the judge's examination were limited to
questioning prosecution witnesses, because, in essence, the judge
would be putting on the state's case against the defendant, which
usually consists entirely of evidence pointing to defendant's guilt.
This problem is less serious in Continental trials, where the judge
calls and questions all witnesses, including those offered by the defense. A similar procedure could work here, absent constitutional
or statutory impediments to requiring the defendant to deliver to
the court the names and addresses of his witnesses before trial.

52 6

Another problem with judicial examination of witnesses arises
from our judges' traditional umpirage role. Aside from the duty of
assuring the defendant of a fair adversary contest, our present
system fails to obligate judges to actively pursue truth and justice
in a criminal jury trial. As a result of their long-accepted position
as passive referees, our judges might have some difficulty taking
the initiative in conducting witness examination. More important,
without a clearly defined purpose and responsibility, judges left to
roam at large in the examination of witnesses may easily slip into
the appearance of partiality, if not suffer an actual loss of objectiv-

526 The Supreme Court has permitted the prosecution to discover the names and
addresses of alibi witnesses and statements of defense witnesses after they have testified

on direct. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78 (1970). However, the Court has not yet passed on the constitutionality of a broad discovery requirement covering the names and statements of all witnesses the defense intends to call at the trial.
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ity. It is not surprising that the common law tradition requires the
judge to stay aloof from the contested trial battle to assure maintenance of apparent as well as actual impartiality. As Lord Green
put it, the judge, in examining a witness, "descends into the arena
and is liable to have his vision clouded by the dust of the conflict."5 27 In light of such problems, one may suggest defining for
our trial judges a duty to pursue truth and justice, while at the
same time reducing the intensity of the battle between attorneys
in the trial arena, such that judges may descend from their lofty
positions and participate in the search for truth without losing
clear vision.
3.

Judicial Obligation to Seek Truth and Justice

Full awareness of our criminal trial judges' limited duty to
pursue truth would undoubtedly shock most Europeans and probably surprise many Americans as well. Not only do we free our trial
judges from responsibility for presenting relevant evidence, we fail
to impose upon them any clear and direct obligation to "do justice," in the sense of furthering the determination of truth and
enhancing the verdict's integrity. While the Constitution and various rules of procedure require our judges to protect the
defendant's rights in specified contexts, such as waiver of the right
to jury tria5 2 and waiver of the right to counsel,529 neither the
Supreme Court nor our legislatures have encouraged trial judges

527 Yuill v.. Yuill, 1945 P. 15, 20 (Green, LJ.). One finds no lack of English condemnations of the over-active judge. Lord Dening quoted Lord Chancellor Bacon remarking
that "an overspeaking judge is no well-tuned cymbal." Jones v. National Coal Board, 2
Q.B. 55, 64 (Eng. CA. 1957). In more direct and absolute terms, Chief Baron Palles of
Ireland warned, 'he judge who opens his mouth closes his mind." Zeidler, supra note
44, at 395.
528 See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1968) (the court must assure an affirmative, on-the-record waiver of trial rights by a defendant entering a plea of guilty); see
also FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (waiver of the right to jury trial must be in writing with the
approval of the c6urt); FED. R. CRiM- P. 11(c) (the court, before accepting a plea of
guilty, must "address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and
determine that he understands" enumerated facts such as the nature of the charge, the
range of possible penalties, and certain consequences of the plea).
529 See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978) (when counsel for multiple
defendants makes a timely representation of the possibility of a conflict of interests, the
Sixth Amendment requires the judge either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk is too remote to warrant separate counsel); see
also FED. R. CRAM. P. 44(a) (assuring the indigent's right to appointed counsel); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 44(c) (obliging the court to take appropriate measures to protect the
defendant's right to conflict-free counsel).
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to intervene in the battle between the lawyers primarily to increase
the likelihood that the jury will reach an accurate result. On the
contrary, our courts more often caution trial judges against intrusion than against detachment in the fact-finding contest, demonstrating that, as a rule, our courts value the appearance of judicial
impartiality over active judicial inquiry.
Even
United
States
District
Court Judge
William
Schwarzer,53 ° an advocate of judicial intervention to protect the
accused from incompetent counsel, warned that judges cannot be
expected to take over the questioning of witnesses or make objections for the defense.53 1 He expressed what most likely represents the general judicial view that the judge's obligation to remain impartial takes precedence over any significant judicial
search for truth: "While it has been said that the judge may have
a duty to elicit those facts necessary to the clear presentation of
the issues, which may in extraordinary cases include calling and
examining witnesses and adducing evidence, his primary duty is to
remain, as well as to appear, impartial,"" 2 and "[t]he judge's
role in the adversary process does not include playing back-up
counsel for any party."5 33 The Supreme Court has encouraged
judicial intervention in the trial primarily in the context of upholding the rights of the criminal defendant, and, even then, for
the purpose of righting the balance of the adversary process, rather than independently seeking justice. 3 4 Under this view, the trial judge's primary goal is to assure that the adversary process is
functioning, and as long as the rules of the contest are not violated and the adversaries are engaged in a fair fight, the determination of truth and justice is secondary.
By and large, our rules of judicial conduct take the same
approach by remaining silent on the matter of "doing justice"
apart from avoiding partiality and conflict of interest. The principal statute governing the conduct of federal judges covers only the

530 Judge Schwarzer is currently director of the Federal Judicial Center.
531 William Schwarzer, Dealing with Incompetent Cmin-sel-The Trial Judge's Role, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 633, 663 (1980).
532 Id.
533 Id. at 669.
534 Thus, the Court has sought to protect the accused from incompetent counsel by
admonishing trial courts "that if the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution is to
serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of incompetent counsel, and
that judges should strive to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who
are representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts." McMann v. Richardson,
397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
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requirement of disqualification for reasons such as bias, knowledge
of disputed facts, and personal or financial conflicts." 5 The
American Bar Association's 1990 Code of Judicial Conduct," 6
which serves as a model for many state rules of judicial conduct,53 7 is only a bit broader. The Code provides that "[a]n in-

dependent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in
our society"' 38 and requires that judges observe "high standards
of conduct ... so that the integrity and independence of the

judiciary will be preserved."53 9 The Code also demands that
juldges act "at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary,"5 40 and
requires that judges maintain competence in the law541 and
avoid bias, prejudice,5 42 and conflict of interest.54 However,
the Code encourages judges to remain passive and remote in the
search for truth by its silence concerning the judge's duty to "do
justice" by intervening in the battle, when necessary, to elicit overlooked facts, curbing contentious counsel, or in other ways correcting adversary excesses that undermine the jury's ability to determine the truth.
On the other hand, the American Bar Association's Standards
Regarding Special Functions of the Trial Judge 44 take a more
balanced, but arguably more schizophrenic, view of the judge's duties. The Standards provide that the judge "has the responsibility
for safeguarding both the rights of the accused and the interests
of the public in the administration of criminal justice" and that
"[t]he adversary nature of the proceedings does not relieve the
trial judge of the obligation of raising on his or her initiative ...
matters which may significantly promote a just determination of
'
the trial."545
The Advisory Committee's commentary, while main535 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
536 In matters relevant to the present inquiry, the 1990 Model Code largely mirrored
the previous Code adopted by the ABA's House of Delegates in 1972 and modified in
later years.
537

See, e.g., CALIFORNIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

(adopted 1974 and effective

January 1, 1975).
538
539

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon I(A) (1989).
Id.

540 Id. at Canon 2(A).
541 Id. at Canon 3(B)(2).
542 Id. at Canon 3(B)(5).
543 Id. at Canon 2(B).
544 The Standards were first approved by the ABA's House of Delegates in 1972, and
were approved with modifications in 1978.
545 SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THlE TRIAL JUDGE Standard 6-1.1 (a) in

1 AM.

BAR ASSOC.
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tamining that the adversary process is the preferred procedure,
notes that "the adversary process should not be regarded as sacred" and urges judicial action "to give a jury the opportunity to
decide a case free from irrelevant issues and appeals to passion
and prejudice."5 46 The Commentary lists ways in which the judge
should intervene to achieve a just result, including questioning a
witness to elicit relevant and important facts when the case is not
being presented intelligibly or when counsel's cross-examination
"appears to be misleading to the jury."54 7 However, while encouraging judicial activity, the Standards warn against judicial intervention which intrudes upon the traditional adversary process: "[t]he
only purpose of a criminal trial is to determine whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused as required by law,
and the trial judge should not allow the proceedings to be used
for any other purpose."548 The Commentary warns that "[tlhe
judge should be aware that there may be a greater risk of prejudice from overintervention than from underintervention .

.

. [and

that] [w]hile the judge should not hesitate to exercise authority
when necessary, the judge should avoid trying the case for the
lawyers."54' 9 The result is a mixed message, implying that judges
should err on the side of passivity.
One might suggest the "modest approach" of explicitly placing
on judges the duty to further accurate fact-finding by seeking and
presenting information the advocates failed to develop, but stop
short of investing our judges with Continental-style powers such as
the authority to call and first question witnesses or otherwise direct the course of the trial. However, giving judges the duty to
seek truth without allowing them full knowledge of the facts and
significant authority to question witnesses or otherwise participate
in the presentation of the evidence would put judges in the untenable position of not possessing the power necessary to meet
their obligations. Suggesting that Germany move toward an adversary presentation of evidence, the respected German scholar HansHeinrich Jescheck stated a qualification: "provided that the ultimate integrity of the fact-finding. process is guarded by the check
of a judge familiar with the contents of the file."5 Jescheck rec-

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2d ed. 1986).
546 Id. at Standard 6-1.1 (a) cint. (footnote omitted).
547 Id.
548 Id. at Standard 6-1.1(a).
549 Id. at Standard 6-1.1(a) cat. (footnote omitted).
550 Jescheck, supra note 28, at 250.
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ognized that the judge must have full knowledge of the facts in
order to intervene effectively in the search for truth and justice.
Imposing an affirmative duty on judges to pursue the truth in
order to increase the likelihood of the jury reaching an accurate
result is a viable approach only if we reject the proposition that
the judge must remain a passive observer, ignorant of the facts
until the moment the parties reveal them and unable to significantly participate in the quest for truth.
4. Incompatibility of Our Adversary Structure with "Half-Step"
Approaches to Judicial Empowerment in the Continental Mode
I have sought to demonstrate that it would be both unfair
and unworkable to give a judge, who has no knowledge of the
prosecutor's case, responsibility for initial witness examination or
to impose on her the responsibility actively to pursue a just result.
Also, judicial questioning that produces a "cursory narrative," followed by a three-part witness examination, may produce confusion
and delay. In summary, the judge's primary examination of witnesses would be unworkable and unfair to both the prosecution
and the defendant 5 1 absent fundamental Continental procedures. These procedures include providing the judge" with the
complete case file and investing the judge with the primary power
and responsibility to produce the proof, direct the trial, and arrive
at an accurate and just result.
Judge Frankel accurately characterized our adversary system
when he said that it does not allow much room for effective or
just intervention by the trial judge:
The judge views the case from a peak of Olympian ignorance.
His intrusions will in too many cases result from partial or
skewed insights. He may expose the secrets one side chooses to
keep while never becoming aware of the other's. He runs a
good chance of pursuing inspirations that better informed
counsel have considered, explored, and abandoned after fuller
study. He risks at a minimum the supplying of more confusion
than guidance by his sporadic intrusions .... Without an

investigative file, the American trial judge is a blind and blundering intruder, acting in spasms as sudden flashes of seeming

551 Of course, such judicial questioning of witnesses would face formidable hurdles of
appellate review, and, given our adversary structure, it is not surprising that our appellate
courts tend to discourage trial judges from engaging in any significant or extensive questioning of witnesses. Se, supra part 1II.A.1.
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light may lead or mislead him at odd times.552
5.

Large-Scale Adoption of Fundamental Aspects
of Continental Trials: Shifting Toward the
Nonadversary Trial in Serious Criminal Cases

Because partial or piecemeal incorporation of nonadversary
aspects pose so many difficult problems, one may ask, why not go
boldly forward toward a full-scale nonadversary model? Educate
judges on the facts and give them the authority, responsibility, and
direction to conduct the trial and to seek justice. Frankel himself
left open this possibility. While he believed that, within our adversary framework, "the trial judge probably serves best as a relatively
passive moderator '553 and that, as a participant, the judge "is
likely to impair the adversary process as frequently as he improves
it,"554 his principal objection to the active judge appears to rest
on the position of the American judge as an uninformed and
undirected umpire whose intrusions are often "blind and blunder-.
ing." 555 He questioned "whether the virginally ignorant judge is
always to be preferred to one with an investigative file," and left
open the possibility of replacing our party examination of witnesses with "safeguarded interrogation by an informed judicial offi556
cer.
On the positive side, our judges might be given such powers
and responsibilities without equaling them to Continental judges,
who, along with lay members of the court, decide factual questions
and arrive at the verdict. One might find less merit in the criticism of pretrial judicial review of the "dossier" in this country,

552 Frankel, supra note 109, at 1042. The bleak outlook for trial reforms based on
the Continental model has lead some to focus on features of Continental systems outside
the criminal trial context. In his recent comparative work focusing on the French criminal justice system, Professor Richard Frase argues that small or incremental transplants
are possible, but most suggestions lie provides-as, for example, narrowing the scope of
the criminal law, limiting prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining, and reducing sentences-do not entail modifications of the trial process. Frase, supra note 32, at 550. He
contends that aspects of Continental trails such as open discovery, judicial control over
presentation of proof, relaxed evidence and procedure rules, or the mixed court "deserve
lower priority . . . because they are not likely to suggest feasible American reforms." Id.
at 666.
553
554
555
556

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1043.
1045.
1042
1053.
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533

where the judge is not part of the fact-finding body. Also, we need
not combine questions of guilt and punishment into a unitary trial
in order to invest judges with the knowledge and authority to
examine witnesses. Finally, Italy is an example of a possible European trend toward more creative combinations of adversary and
nonadversary procedures.
However, in light of our constitutionalized rules of criminal
procedure, lawyers' and. judges' inertia, and our "national character" which distrusts centralized authority, the quick answer, as I
have suggested, is that major changes like these Would not be
possible in this country, at least in serious criminal cases. Furthermore, even if such changes were possible, we should have reservations about importing the major components of the Continental
system because of our judicial selection and retention system. An
incorporated system that would place great powers in the hands of
trial judges, combined with our selection and retention system,
which often fails to assure a uniformly competent, motivated, and
impartial judiciary, would be a weak system indeed. Finally, as
Professor Gross has noted, the German and other successful
nonadversary systems depend on core elements that are "considerably trickier than a micro-chip: an efficient judicial bureaucracy,
with high standards for training and performance .... [and] the
integrity and the competence of German -prosecutors, the crea' 7
Even if our judges and
tures of another state bureaucracy."55
prosecutors had the security of civil service, a danger exists that,
in this country, such bureaucracies might become complacent,
inflexible, inefficient, unresponsive, biased, and entrenched. To
become skeptical about the wholesale'importation of the Continental system, one need only contemplate the prospect of a judge
employed by our Internal Revenue or Postal Service directing the
trial of a serious criminal case. Structure alone does not guarantee
fairness and efficiency. Before the recent changes, the Italian
nonadversary process was considered particularly' inefficient, and
Professor Mauro Cappellitti remarked, "[T]he Italian legal system
is like the German, except that it doesn't work."558

557 Samuel R. Gross, The American Advantage: The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85
MIcH. L. REV. 734, 749-50 (1987).

558 Id.at 750 (citations omitted); see also Miller, supra note 513, at 222-23 (citing
characterizations of the Italian criminal justice system as increasingly dysfunctional, incoherent, and inefficient).
Professor Merryman cites the 1987 vote to repeal laws protecting Italian judges from
civil liability for negligence in office as reflecting "popular dissatisfaction with the Italian
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Possibilities and Proposals

How, then, might we improve our polar-extreme adversary
criminal trial in light of the legal and practical barriers to reform
as well as the dangers in giving our judges Continental-style powers? First, while maintaining the adversary model, we should begin
enhancing the quality and independence of our judiciary, while
taking measured steps to shift authority from lawyers to judges.
Without abandoning the fundamental nature of our adversary system, we would strike a better balance if we gave the other participants, primarily the judge and the accused, a greater role in the
trial process. Also, within the basic framework of our adversary
structures, we should shift the focus of the trial from the lawyers
to the accused and to the discovery of truth. We can encourage
this shift if we relax our rules that exclude reliable evidence, encourage more active participation by the accused both pretrial and
at trial, and require full and open discovery from the prosecution.
Finally, in jurisdictions where we find the promise of an independent and competent judiciary, we could become more ambitious
and, at least in minor criminal cases, we could experiment with a
Continental-style trial procedure adapted to our own needs.
1. Measured Steps Toward De-powering the Lawyers
While Increasing the Quality, Independence,
and Authority of the Judiciary
We could begin the long-term and difficult project of upgrading the quality, motivation, and independence of our judiciary,
particularly our state trial judges, by methods such as merit committee review of judicial appointments, judicial education programs, and judicial retention and advancement systems that are
merit-based rather than political. Judge Frankel has questioned
"whether a substantial career of adversary jousting is clearly the
best training for the role of detached judging" 5 9 and has suggested experimentation with Continental judicial selection and
retention structures. He noted that "it would be enlightening if we
could begin to staff some of our courts, in some states or parts of

judicial bureaucracy," but cautions that "[w]e do not know how much of the Italian
problem is specific to Italian culture and how much is a more general hazard of a career judiciary." Merryman, supra note 106, at 1874-75.
559

FRANKEL, supra note 30, at 41.
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states, with career magistrates of the European model."" However, Judge Frankel's aim is "for the qualities of detachment and
calm reflection that we suppose ourselves to desire on the
bench,""' and I do not suggest a shift toward the Continentalstyle judicial system for this purpose. The worn out warrior often
my view, the greater competency
makes a good umpire. Rather, in'
and independence of judges that may flow from different selection
and retention structures are essential ingredients of a system*that
divests judges of their umpirage and makes them active participants in the search for truth.
However, even with our present judicial structures, we could
activate our judiciary without investing them with the powers of
Continental judges.5 6 Our trials would not lose their basic adversary character if our judges conducted jury voir dire, controlled
abuses by counsel, and participated to a greater, but still limited,
extent in the presentation of evidence, including the questioning
of witnesses. Judges now possess much of the authority necessary
for this greater activity,' 63 but'exercise it unevenly. Some will
read a novel on the bench, while others will occasionally ask questions of witnesses. Also, "we could prompt judges to become more
active in "case management" areas. For example, a judge could
encourage stipulations, clarify and narrow the issues prior to trial,
and avoid the disruption and delay of trial occasioned by overly
contentious counsel.
Substantial time could be saved by simply shifting responsibility for jury voir dire from lawyers to judges. While 75% of federal
judges currently do not permit oral participation of counsel in the
examination of prospective jurors, most states either give lawyers

560
561

Id. at 42.
Id. at 41.

562

Over the years, greater judicial control over the trial process has been urged by

many studies and commissions. See, e.g., C.E. GEHLKE, MISSOURI CRIME SURVEY COiMITTEE
363 (1926); NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 123, 180 (1931) (increase judge's control over the conduct of the trial).
Greater judicial management and control also has been viewed as a solution to the
problem of overall delay in the processing of criminal cases: "court delay can be reduced
only by judges who are willing to insist that attorneys meet reasonable deadlines for the
conclusion of pretrial activities and by trial-setting and continuance practices that create

an expectation of an early and relatively firm commencement of trial for those cases not
settled." NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION

IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS 84 (1978).
563

See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR AS'N, A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 6-2.2 to 6-

2.4, 6-3.1, 6-3.5 (1980).
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the primary responsibility for voir dire or allow them to share the
task with judges. 4 Not surprisingly, studies find that judiciallyconducted voir dire is quicker. Most federal judges who responded
to a Federal Judicial Center survey estimated that a typical voir
dire lasted 1 hour or less,565 whereas a study of attorney-conducted voir dire in New York found that the average voir dire lasted
12.7 hours (40% of total trial time).566 The selection process is
also expeditious in other adversary systems in which the main
questioning of jurors is assigned to judges. For example, in New
South Wales the average time spent selecting a jury is 30 minutes.

567

The recent California experience in judicial voir dire illustrates the extent to which judicial intervention that leaves the
adversary character of the trial intact could expedite the criminal
trial. For years, California gave lawyers in criminal cases the right
to personally question prospective jurors568 and to ask all questions relevant to peremptory challenges as well as to challenges for
cause.5 69 In capital cases, the court had to allow counsel to conduct the voir dire of prospective jurors individually and in sequestration. 570 It was not unheard-of for jury selection to take longer
than the presentation of the evidence. In one Oakland capital
murder case, jury selection lasted over eleven months, while the
71
trial itself was conducted in less than two months.
564 See V. HALE STARR AND MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION: AN ATTORNEY'S GUIDE
TO JURY LAW AND METHODS 39-40 (1985).
565 GORDON BERMANT, CONDUCT OF THE VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION: PRACTICES AND
OPINIONS OF FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 13 (1977).
566 Marcia Chambers, Who Should Pick Jurors, Attorneys or the Judge N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 1983, § B, at 4. Other studies have recorded instances where jury selection has taken
"as much as twice the length of time to try the case on the merits." See William B.
Enright, Don't Create an Adversarial Area, 70 A.B.A. J. 14 (Nov. 1984); Howell Heflin, Let
Lawyers Ask the Questions, 70 A.B.A. J. 14 (Nov. 1984); see also Cheryl Frank, Voir Dire
Struggle, 71 A.B.A. J. 28 (Sept. 1985).
567 Philip R. Weens, Comment, A Comparison of Juy Selection Proceduresfor Criminal Trials in New South Wales and California, 10 SYDNEY L. REv. 330, 343 (1984). Weens tells of
an American trial lawyer asking an English barrister when the trial begins under the
English system. The barrister responded, "When the jury is accepted by counsel and
sworn to try the issues." "Hell," the American lawyer replied, "in the United States the
trial is over by that time." Id. at 340 (citations omitted).
568 Prior to 1988, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1078(a) (West 1985) provided that the trial
court "shall permit reasonable examination of prospective jurors by counsel for the people and for the defendant, such examination to be conducted orally and directly by
counsel." In 1988, this section was repealed, but similar language was inserted in CAL.
ClV. PROC. CODE § 223 (West Supp. 1991).
569 See People v. Williams, 29 Cal. 3d 392, 407 (1981).
570 See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1 (1980).
571 People v. McDonald, Robinson, & Evin (Alameda County Superior Court, 1991)
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In 1990, a voter initiative gave the court the responsibility for
conducting the examination of prospective jurors, limited the
examination to questions "in aid of the exercise of challenges for
cause," and eliminated the sequestration procedure by providing
that when practicable, the examination shall occur "in the pres" ence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death
penalty cases."57 2 The effect was dramatic. Jury selection in ordinary felony cases, which previously.took several days, now is completed in a matter of hours. Jury selection in' capital cases which
lasted months when managed by attorneys, takes only days when
controlled by the judge. A capital murder case against two defendants in Marin County illustrates the significance of court-managed
voir dire.5 73 The defendants were tried separately. The first case,
using the old procedure, required two months to select the jury.
In the .second trial, conducted before the same judge but under
the new procedures, the judge selected the jury in two days. 4
Restricting, or better yet eliminating, peremptory challenges
would further expedite trials 75 and reduce lawyer influence over
the jury selection process, particularly in light of the increased
5 76
length and complexity of jury selection since Batson v. Kentucky
and its progeny. 7 We stand virtually alone in the world in our
extensive use of peremptory challenges. Peremptory challenges to
the lay members of the mixed court are unknown on the Continent, and England abandoned them in 1988.78 Prosecutors
would argue, however, that since many jurisdictions require unanimous verdicts, prosecutors must be able to exclude those jurors
5 79
who would not vote to convict regardless of the evidence.

(case available from author).
572 Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, § 7, CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 223 (West Supp.

1991). The California Supreme Court found that other aspects of the initiative violated
the California Constitution, but has not rnled on the legality of its jury selection provisions. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
573 People v. Segura & Diaz (Matin County Superior Court, # 11240, 1990-91) (case
available front author).
574 Discussion with the prosecutor and the defense lawyer in the first case.
575 Reducing the number of jurors would speed the selection process, but would
likely have little effect on overall trial time. A recent study of civil jury trials in selected
California cities found that both trial time and deliberation time are independent of jury
size. JURY COMPARISON, supra note 292, at 86-88.

576
577

476 U.S. 79 (1986).
See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.

578

See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.

579 Following California's 1990 restrictions on attorney-conducted voir dire, many
prosecutors complained of an increase in hung juries and acquittals. The prosecutors felt
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Such a reform might well require some relaxation of the traditional unanimity requirement58 ° , but we could compromise. Following the English, for example, we might allow a ten-to-two verdict
after the jury deliberates for a specified period without reaching
unanimity. 81 Fortunately, the Supreme Court has allowed the
states some flexibility in jury unanimity, permitting ten-to-two, and,
possibly nine-to-three, verdicts in serious criminal cases. 82 Thus,
states now have an opportunity to experiment with reducing or
eliminating peremptory challenges.
2.

Focusing the Trial on the Discovery of Truth

As noted previously, the excesses of our adversary system include a diminished respect for the discovery of truth. This is demonstrated by our formal, complex, and restrictive rules of evidence
and procedure, which shift the focus of the trial away from the

this could be attributed to their inability to probe juror attitudes and backgrounds to discover the "unreasonable" person who would not convict regardless of the evidence of
guilt. One San Francisco prosecutor cited the inability to discover "artichokes," referring
to jurors whose votes cannot be explained. Another felt that judges do not have the
same stake as lawyers in finding out as much as possible about prospective jurors. Prosecutors Complain About Judges' Voir Dire, THE RECORDER, Dec. .13, 1990, at 1. Also, the judge
has less knowledge of the facts and appreciation of the issues. As the Fifth Circuit noted,
it "is the parties, rather than the court, who have a full grasp of the nuances . . . of the
case." United States v. Ible, 630 F.2d 389,'395 (5th Cir. 1980).
Of course, without peremptory challenges, even the "clearly apparent artichoke"
could not be removed except for cause, and challenges for cause cannot reach those
who promise to follow the law, but are irrational or have a "hidden agenda." Defense
attorneys would complain of the inability to remove pro-prosecution "artichokes," but as a
general matter, may benefit from the elimination of peremptory challenges because very
often a hung jury results in either a dismissal or a more favorable plea bargain.
580 Alschuler has noted that other devices might also make the elimination of peremptory challenges more palatable. He has suggested expanding the grounds on which a
party can challenge for cause, or authorizing the judge "to select on a discretionary basis
those jurors who appeared best qualified to decide the case impartially." Alschuler, supra
note 242, at 207. However, I find these alternatives less workable and more open to
abuse because they would merely shift to the judge, who knows less about the case than
the attorneys, the power to pick or to strike jurors based on broad and ill-defined standards.
581 See supra note 247 and accompanying text. Notably, on the Continent, nonunanimous verdicts are the standard, and the prosecutor can appeal an acquittal. See supro part II.B.2.
582 See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (affirming conviction based on
nine-to-three verdict violates neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) (plurality opinion)
(upholding ten-to-two verdict against the argument that the Sixth Amsendment requires
jury unanimity); but see Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (the verdict of a sixmember jury must be unanimous).
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accused and the relevant facts.58 3 Our general disregard of the
effect of such rules on the integrity of verdicts often surprises
Continental observers."8 4 The Supreme Court uses, for example,
the exclusionary rule to deter police misconduct though it prevents the jury from hearing highly probative evidence and has no
necessary relationship to the extent of the official lawlessness." 5
Even more detrimental to truth discovery- are our "game rules,"
which operate to divorce the accused from the trial process, and
allow the contestants to hide their cards until played. It is difficult
to imagine a procedure more ill-suited to discovery of past events
than one that discourages the most important witness from participating in the process and allows each party to hide its evidence
from the other, surprising the opponent at trial.
Focusing the trial more on the accused and the discovery of
truth should have a high priority and could be accomplished without abandoning the fundamental nature of our adversary system.
Depowering lawyers would tend to shift the focus of trial toward
the accused and the discovery of truth. Further changes in our
rules of evidence and procedure would encourage disclosure of
the accused's knowledge of the case (both early in the investigation and at trial) and would require the prosecution to open its
files to the defense.
First, we might modify Miranda and associated rules that encourage pretrial silence and adopt procedures that encourage
suspects to speak early in the investigation. These procedures
might include a warning that, while the accused has a right to
remain silent and a right to a lawyer during questioning, a refusal
to make a statement can be disclosed to the jury at trial. 8 6 Fur-

583 See supra part II.C.5.
584 See supra part II.C.3.
585 The merits of the exclusionary rule have been debated extensively and will not
be considered here.
586 Presently, Miranda prohibits the prosecution's use, in its case-in-chief, of the fact
that the defendant remained silent or claimed the privilege in the face of police questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966). Prohibition of the use of
silence to impeach a defendant's testimony rests on the due process principle that this
use would be unfair in light of the implicit assurance of the Miranda warning that exercise of the silence right will cause no harm. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
Thus, Miranda's requirements would have to be modified before the prosecution could
use the defendant's silence following Miranda warnings and questioning in its case-inchief. The Court might allow the' prosecution to use silence to impeach the defendant's
testimony, provided Miranda advice was followed by a "no safe harbor" warning indicating
that the defendant's failure to speak could be made known to the jury if inconsistent
with his trial testimony. The disclosure would be used to judge the weight to be given to
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thermore, we might abandon that aspect of the hearsay rule which
prohibits the accused from using his prior consistent statements
ekcept in limited circumstances. 8 7 As a result of these changes,
whatever occurs during police questioning-whether the accused
confesses, denies guilt, or remains silent-may be disclosed to the
trier of fact. England takes a similar approach. The trier of fact is
told that the accused remained silent, even if the accused's silence
followed warnings of the right to silence. Consequently, the jury is
fully aware of the defendant's refusal to answer questions when
warned and interrogated by police. Barristers are well aware that,
though the jury is instructed not to draw an inference of guilt
from such silence, nothing can prevent the jury from actually
drawing these inferences.58 8 The defendant's exculpatory statement to -the police likewise usually comes before the jury, though
in England, consistent as well as inconsistent statements technically
are not admissible for the truth of the matters asserted.58 9 With
rare exception, the prosecution places in evidence the defendant's
reaction to police questioning, including exculpatory statements,
and when the prosecution does not, the accused may do so."'
Second, we should encourage the defendant to testify at trial
by abandoning Griffin and other rules that discourage the accused
from taking the stand.59 1 One of the first rules to eliminate

the testimony.
587 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(B); United States v. Carter, 910 F.2d 1524 (7th Cir.
1990) (defendant's prior exculpatory statement not admissible under state of mind exception of 803(3) because it referred to a past, rather than to a then-existing, state of
mind); United States v. Rodriguez-Pando, 841 F.2d 1014 (10th Cir. 1988) (tape recording
of defendant's statement to police the day following his arrest, in which defendant
claimed that he had been coerced to act as he did, was inadmissible because it was a
statement of memory of past events and beliefs); United States v. Nelson, 735 F.2d 1070
(8th Cir. 1984) (defendant's prior exculpatory statement was not admissible as a consistent statement under 801(d) (1) (B) because it was not relevant to rehabilitate).
588 See Van Kessel, supra note 5, at 10-15.
589 See Regina v. Pearce 69 Crim. App. 365 (1979). However, mixed statements--those
in part inculpatory and in part exculpatory-are as a whole admissible for the truth of
the facts asserted. Regina v. Sharp 1 W.L.R. 7 (1988); See ARCHBOLD, supra note 127, §

15-57(1) (2) (iii).
590

Glanville Williams, The "Right of Silence" and t1

Mental Element, 1988 CRIM. L. REV.

97, 99. The exception is noted in paragraph three of Pearce, which refers to "a rare occasion when an accused produces a carefully prepared written statement to the police, with
a view to its being made part of the prosecution evidence." Pearce, 69 Crim. App. at 366;
see ARCHBOLD, supra note 127, § 15-57.
591 The Supreme Court has hinted that the rules established by Griffin, or at least
some of their aspects, are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution, but, like
Miranda warnings, are prophylactic rules or procedural safeguards associated with the
privilege against self-incrimination. In United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1988), the
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should be the rule allowing impeachment by prior convictions.
Such impeachment acts as a powerful deterrent to testimony while,
at the same time, demands the impossible of the jury-that they
consider the conviction only as it bears on the defendant's credibility. Whatever the proper rules governing the admission of evidence of the defendant's prior convictions or other bad acts, they
should not turn on whether the defendant chooses to testify.
We could also alter our character evidence rules to provide
additional encouragement to testify. First, we might allow the defendant to offer evidence in support of his credibility as a witness
even though credibility has not been attacked. Currently, most
jurisdictions follow the Federal Rules of Evidence in allowing evidence of truthful character "only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise." 592 Second, we might restrict the defendant's
character evidence to prove his conduct, as well as the defendant's
character evidence to prove the victim's conduct, to cases in which
the defendant takes the stand. Under federal law, though choosing not to testify, the accused may offer evidence of his good
character and evidence of the victim's bad character in order to
prove conduct on a particular occasion. Yet, the prosecution may
5 93
offer character evidence for conduct only in rebuttal.
By removing the threat of prior conviction impeachment and
by giving the accused many advantages in testifying-avoiding adverse comment on silence and allowing him to introduce character
evidence going to credibility and conduct-our rules would encourage the defendant to take the stand. Even with these changes,
the accused would not have the same incentives to testify at trial
as the Continental defendant who faces a unitary trial on both
guilt and punishment, in which the judge calls the accused as the
first witness, asks for responses throughout the process, and calls
upon the accused to make a final, narrative statement. Neverthe-

Court referred to "[t]he broad dicta in Grffin to the effect that the Fifth Amendment
'forbids . . . comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence' . . . ." Id. at 33. In
his dissent, Justice Marshall referred to ,riffin's "general prophylactic nile." Id. at 41

(Marshall, J., dissenting).
592 FED. R. EVID. 608(a). California has eliminated this restriction on character evidence in support of the credibility of all witnesses. See CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 28(d); People v. Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 640-41 (Cal. 1989). Since my proposal is designed to en-

courage the defendant to testify, it extends only to the defendant as a witness.
593 FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(1)-(2).
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less, reforms proposed would greatly encourage the accused to
provide evidence and actively participate in his defense. (
However, greater emphasis on discovery of truth should not
be a one-way street, allowing the prosecution to learn the details
of the defense while secretly holding its cards until trial. Once
prosecutors can expect, in nearly every case, to have the benefit of
the accused's story early in the investigation, fairness demands that
the accused have early access to the prosecution's evidence. This
requires some means to protect the prosecution from the danger
of witness intimidation or elimination following open discovery.
While our constitutional and statutory rules of evidence stand as
formidable barriers to the use of witness statements in place of
live testimony, 594 provisions might be made for waiver of these
rights in exchange for full, Continental-style discovery of the
prosecution's evidence. 595 Our discovery rules might provide that
by asking for the names and statements of prosecution witnesses,
the defendant waives all confrontation and hearsay objections to
the use of those statements as substantive evidence if any of those
witnesses either testifies inconsistently or becomes unavailable at
the time of trial.5 96 Allowing use for the truth as well as for
impeachment of all inconsistent statements of witnesses is already
allowed in many jurisdictions. 97 In others, it would require only
a waiver of unconstitutional rules of evidence. Allowing the use of
the statements of unavailable witnesses would often require a waiver of both constitutional and statutory restrictions.
The waiver approach is an integral part of our criminal process, from plea bargaining through sentencing, and has been used
to support admission of prior grand jury testimony of prosecution
witnesses." Furthermore, some jurisdictions already use an anal-

594 See supra part III.A.1.
595 I owe the discovery-waiver suggestion to my colleague Professor Schlesinger.
596 A claim of lack of recollection might be treated either as inconsistent testimony
or as demonstrating unavailability, depending on the circumstances. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.
804(a)(3) (defining unavailability to include testimony as to lack of memory); People v.
Green, 479 P.2d 998 (Cal. 1971) (prior statements found inconsistent with witness's claim
of loss of memory at trial).
Alternatively, when the witness agrees to take the stand and to testify, but asserts
memory loss, the Supreme Court has found no confrontation clause or hearsay rule violation. The Court stated that a witness is "'subject to cross-examination' when he is placed
on the stand, under oath, and responds willingly to questions." United States v. Owens,
484 U.S. 554, 561 (1988).
597 See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966).
598 See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1358-60 (8th Cir. 1976) (By intimidating a prospective prosecution witness not to testify, the defendant waived his Sixth
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ogous approach in the discovery context whereby the -defendant
becomes vulnerable to prosecution discovery only if the defendant
first requests discovery. For example, federal discovery rules permit
the defendant to request disclosure from the government of documents, tangible objects, or reports of examinations and tests. After
compliance by the government and on the government's request,
the defendant must permit the government to inspect and copy
the same category of articles in the possession or control of the
defendant that the defendant intends' to introduce into evidence
in chief at the trial.599 The result is similar to a waiver rule providing that, by seeking discovery from the prosecution, defendant
waives all objections to discovery of similar matters. by the prosecution. Yet with my waiver proposal the consequences would be
more serious-admission into evidence rather than only disclosure-and many questions would remain, such as whether the
prosecutor's consent should be required as in the case of jury trial
waiver and whether the waiver should be limited to those statements given in a specified context.
To guard against the wholesale admission of questionable
statements, some minimal requirements could be imposed, such as
limiting coverage of waiver to those statements made to law enforcement authorities in circumstances that assure (1) that the
statements were actually made by the witness and (2) that the
witness perceived, the gravity of the situation and the duty to tell
the truth. Thus, the waiver might include only recorded statements given to a judicial officer or government attorney and made
under oath subject to penalty of perjury-a category of prior statements similar to those inconsistent statements, which Congress
thought reliable enough to characterize as nonhearsay and admit
as substantive evidence under section 801(d) (1) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.'

Amendment right of confrontation such that the court properly admitted the witness's
prior grand jury testimony.).
599 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A)-(B).
600 Rule 801 covers only a narrow group of inconsistent statements-those that are
"given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition," but does include witness testimony before the grand jury where
there is no opportunity for cross-examination. However, the Rule requires that the declarant testify at the trial and be "subject to cross-examination concerning the statement."
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). Under the proposed waiver rule, the witness's prior statements
could be used as substantive evidence if the witness either sought to disavow them or
became unavailable.
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With defendants providing their side of the case both early in
the investigation and at the time of trial, and with some evidentiary changes to protect against witness intimidation, no significant
barriers would stand in the way of full and open discovery of the
prosecution's evidence. With these changes, trials would be more
open to all relevant evidence, less affected by legal strategies and
surprises, and more focused on achieving a correct and just result.
3.

Ambitious Experiments with the Continental Model
in Misdemeanor Cases Before Federal Magistrates

Our adversary criminal trial system has become excessively
complex, burdensome, and contentious. Its problems are so acute
that, despite seemingly insurmountable barriers to ambitious experiments with fundamental nonadversary elements, we should
find ways to experiment with Continental-style approaches in less
serious cases and in contexts involving judicial structures that pose
fewer dangers than ordinary state trials. For example, we might
experiment with a mixed tribunal, including nonadversary Continental trial procedure in minor, nonjury criminal cases. This
would require waiver of a defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights, but the defendant could be given a choice between a traditional bench trial or a mixed bench of one professional and two
lay judges. In the mixed trial, the defendant would agree to an
"inquiry" by the presiding judge according to the usual Continental procedure in which the judge, armed with full knowledge of
the prosecutor's case file and inspired by a clear duty to arrive at
an accurate and just result, calls and questions the defendant and
other witnesses according to relaxed rules of evidence. The mixed
court would decide the questions of guilt and sentence in a single
proceeding.
At least some defendants may be willing to have their cases
tried pursuant to a procedure guaranteeing the right to full discovery, the right to present their side of the case in a narrative
manner without taking the oath, and, most importantly, the opportunity for a neutral judicial inquiry as opposed to a partisan
contest dominated by an aggressive prosecutor. Furthermore, since
the less formal and less adversary process would be short, its attraction could be enhanced by making it available at an earlier
time than a formal adversary trial. Even in states such as California
that give the defendant the right to a full jury trial-twelve persons and unanimous verdict-in all criminal cases including
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misdemeanors,0 1 many defendants might opt for a nonadversary
trial because of its speed, informality, and other advantages. Under
California's present system, defendants in misdemeanor cases who
request a jury trial, but who are both unable to post bond and are
ineligible for release on promise to appear, face either pleading
guilty to the prosecutor's plea bargain offer or spending up to
thirty days in jail awaiting trial. These defendants are often astonished to learn from their lawyers that, by pleading guilty, they
would be released within a few days or sometimes immediately,
but if they insist that they are not guilty and demand a jury trial,
they must spend a month in custody and possibly longer if convicted. To such defendants, an early opportunity to obtain full
discovery and present their side of the case in a Continental-style
proceeding might be very appealing.
Problems regarding judicial quality and independence would
remain, but could be largely overcome by using federal magistrates, who are not faced with the prospect of standing for election, and 4ho, since 1979, have been selected on the basis of
merit rather than politics. According to the merit selection procedures of the 1979 Magistrates Act, a majority of the judges of each
United States district court appoint full-time federal magistrates for
eight year terms 2 based on standards and procedures established by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Those
procedures provide for public notice of all vacancies and the establishment of "merit selection panels, composed of residents of
the individual judicial districts, to assist the courts in identifying
and recommending persons who are best qualified to fill such
positions.""° The Act also upgrades the qualifications of magistrates by requiring bar membership and five years of legal experience.

6 4
0

601 See CAL CONST. art. I, § 16; People v. Superior Court, 434 P.2d 623 (Cal. 1967).
602 28 U.S.C. § 631(a), (b), (e) (1988). Part time magistrates are appointed for four
year terms. Id. § 631(e).
603 Id. § 631(b)(5).
604 See Christopher E. Smith, Who are the U.S. Magstrates?. 71 JUDICATURE 143, 146
(1987).
The Judicial Conference also sought to increase the diversity of federal magistrates.
Judicial Conference regulations instructed committee members to make an affirmative effort to identify and give due consideration to all qualified candidates including women
and members of minority groups. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE SELECTION
AND APPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES 6 (1981). Since 1979, the number of
magistrates from these groups has increased both in absolute and percentage terms. See
Smith, supra, at 150 tbls. 7, 8.
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While district court judges strongly influence the selection of
magistrates through their appointment of the selection panel
members, their guidance of the selection process, and their ultimate power to choose among recommended candidates, a recent
study found that the new procedures have largely removed the
appointment of federal magistrates from the domain of partisan
party politics. 5 The selection of magistrates by the very judges
they will assist has another advantage. Because federal magistrates
today may undertake virtually any task within the province of district court judges, except presiding over felony trials and sentencing, 6 judges regard them as essential resources in the management of heavy and expanding caseloads and, thus, emphasize
competence rather than patronage in their appointment. ° 7 Not
surprisingly, at the time of appointment, magistrates average about
fifteen years of legal experience after graduation from law
school.608

Magistrates are protected from removal during their terms
except for "incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty, or physical
or mental disability."' 0 9 Although they are not as secure as federal judges, who have lifetime appointments, magistrates who perform within the bounds of competency are usually reappointed.610 Consequently, they provide a source of talented, ex

605

See Christopher E. Smith,

Merit Selection Committees and the Politics of Appointing

United States Magistrates, 12 JusT. Sys. J. 210, 229-30 (1987). The political nature. of the selection process relates to the power struggles and value conflicts between judges, rather
than to partisan affiliation and executive branch influence. Id. at 214-15. Even at the
judicial level, the study found "surprisingly little evidence of political party affiliations
affecting the selection of magistrates" and revealed "numerous examples of judges appointing magistrates from the opposite political party or not knowing the partisan inclinations of the selected appointee." Id. at 228.

606 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39 (1988); Smith, supra note 604, at 211.
607 See Smith, supra note 604, at 228 ("[M]agistrates are too valuable in the resourcescarce judiciary to permit primary emphasis on partisan political considerations.").
608 Smith, supra note 604, at 148-49.
609 28 U.S.C. § 631(i) (1988). Removal requires a majority vote of the district court
judges after a hearing based on specified charges. Id.
610 Previously, their positions were less secure because a single judge could block reappointment. Currently, however, magistrates are reappointed by a majority vote of the
judges of the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 631(f) (1988).
While federal judges who are political appointees are still very much in control of
the selection process despite the merit selection procedures, the merit process opens up
magistrate selection and removes it from direct control by either of the other two
branches as well as from control by popular election. In fact, appointment of magistrates
by district judges was considered essential to the constitutionality of magistrates undertaking judicial tasks as adjuncts to independent Article III judges. See Smith, supra note 604,
at 148.
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perienced, and relatively independent judicial officers in whom
one might confidently place the authority of Continental judges,
at least as an experiment in minor criminal cases.6 '
IV.

CONCLUSION

Many serious problems in our system of justice, as well as our
inability to solve them, stem from our worship of the adversary
model and our excessive reliance on principles and mechanisms
that we mistakenly believe are essential characteristics of this model. At the same time, we regard with smug detachment the lessadversary adjudication systems of other countries, which we dismiss
as "inquisitory." In this rapidly shrinking world, we are long overdue in looking outward to other adjudication systems and opening
ourselves to the possibility that other countries may have developed criminal trial procedures in many respects superior to ours.
Foremost among our adversary excesses is the extensive authority given to lawyers and the corresponding failure to give judges a stronger hand in the trial process. Also, our system gives too
little weight to the fundamental goal of reliable fact-finding. Under the guise of protecting "other values," mistakenly described as
essential to an"adversary system of justice, we have erected substantial evidentiary and procedural barriers to efficient and reliable
adjudication. We condone trial by surprise through our restrictive
discovery rules. Finally, we rely too much upon the traditional, lay
jury system and refuse to consider alternatives, partly because
lawyer dominance over the trial process calls for a weak and uninformed fact-finder.
One result has been the dramatically increased length and
complexity of the criminal jury trial. A corresponding increase has
occurred in plea bargaining and other alternatives to the formal "
jury trial. It has been-a slow process, but we are now weighted
down by a formal criminal trial albatross that we can afford to
offer to only a small portion of defendants. We also suffer a reduction in the quality of criminal trials; very often, our jury trial
system fails to fulfill its principal objectives of determining facts
and providing justice to the accused, the accuser, and the public.

611 Cf.Christopher E. Smith, Former U.S. Magistrates as District Judges: The Possibilities
and Consequences of Pronotion Within the Federal Judiday, 73 JUDIcATURE 268 (1990) (suggesting that greater consideration be given to the "broad pool of experienced" federal
magistrates for appointments to district courts).
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More rapid change possibly could have prevented this situation.
Professor Langbein has pointed out that
[i]f the developments that have rendered jury trial[s] impractical had happened in a concentrated and visible fashion, Americans might have had occasion to give proper consideration to
devising alternatives capable of preserving some of the jury
policies. What actually occurred over the last century was a
gradual and somewhat stealthy growth of bench trial and plea
bargaining. Only because this departure from our supposed
constitutional principles is now so familiar to us do we fail to
appreciate how astounding the phenomenon really is (and how
bizarre it appears to foreigners who encounter it afresh).612
Yet the American trial does serve one purpose-it is terrific
entertainment. Its dynamic, combative style is perfect for the visual
media of television and the movies. It is also sexy. Where else but
L.A. Law can one rely on seeing lawyers in either the courtroom
or the bedroom each week? What would we do without its progeny-those numerous permutations beamed at the American home
nearly every evening? Worse yet, what would we think of a
nonadversary "inquiry" by a neutral judge where "[t]he tactical
skills of a Perry Mason would fall on barren ground"?6 13 Professor Zeidler recognized the superior entertainment value of the
adversary trial: "[i]t is not by accident that crime novels and police
stories all over the world feature court-room scenes in which common law procedural rules are applied." 14 However, he pointed
out that "the tedious and bureaucratic style [of the Continental
trial] might, from time to time, have a mitigating and humanizing
effect upon those whose 'fate and existence are at stake." 6 5
Faced with such fine entertainment, we may lose sight not only of
the purpose of the trial, but of those it affects.616
I am far from optimistic that we are either willing or able to
significantly reduce the excesses of our criminal trial. Many obstacles stand in the way of reform, including a constitutionalized
code of criminal procedure, professional inertia on the part of

613

note 23, at 218-19.
Zeidler, supra note 46, at 156.

614
615

Id.
Id.

612

LANGBEIN, supra

616 Ironically, many actual criminal trials are so lengthy that they lose entertainment
value. One cable TV service has been taping criminal trials nationwide, but has shied
away from California trials because their length makes them "too boring." See Nancy
Rutter, Lex Popui: Daytime Television has Discovered the Law, CAL. LAW., May 1991, at 22.
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lawyers and judges, and our national character which resists attempts to centralize governmental authority in order to further
efficient litigation. In light of these obstacles, wholesale adoption
of major elements of the nonadversary system in serious criminal
cases at this time appears virtually impossible. Furthermore, the
dependence of nonadversary systems on the competence, efficiency
and independence of judges and our diverse and highly political
systems of judicial selection and retention argue against empowering our judges in the Continental mode in serious criminal cases.
Finally, while some contend that our trial system could be improved by adopting features of Continental trials and "blending
617
them with the best of our own traditions and procedures,"
piecemeal adoption of major nonadversary elements promises
little. Many elements would collide with constitutional barriers
while others would not make a workable fit or would create imbalances which would require further changes. In many respects, our
adversary trial procedure is simply incompatible with partial approaches to judicial empowerment. For example, our umpire-like
judges, who lack knowledge of the investigation, are ill-suited to
conduct the initial or primary examination of witnesses.
Nevertheless, by failing to take steps to correct the adversary
excesses in our criminal trial, we risk witnessing its further decline
and eventual eclipse. Because our criminal justice system does not
face significant competition, we can continue producing our criminal justice "trabbi,6 1 8 until the public becomes fed up with its
inefficiency and social damage. Remaining locked behind our
constitutional and psychological barriers with our eyes closed to
foreign alternatives, we may witness the eventual extinction of our
formal jury trial dinosaur, except in a few judicial tar pits and, of
course, on television.
We can improve our polar-extreme, adversary criminal trial
without abandoning its essential adversary character. First, while
seeking ways to enhance the quality and independence of our
judiciary, we should take measured steps toward increasing their
authority in areas such as jury selection, controlling abuses by
counsel, and case management. Judges might be encouraged to
exercise greater authority in questioning witnesses, with the goal of
furthering the efficient and reliable presentation of evidence.

617 See Alschuler, supra note 6, at 1003; Pizzi, supra note 6, at 366.
618 "The polluting, inefficient car produced by the industries of former East Germany.
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Following the English example of reducing or eliminating peremptory challenges while allowing non-unanimous verdicts, would further reduce trial time and allow for more jury trials. Next, we
should shift the focus of the trial from the battle between the lawyers to the discovery of truth by (1) modifying our complex rules
of evidence to allowing admission of more reliable and relevant
evidence, (2) encouraging the defendant to contribute to the
investigation and the presentation of the facts, and (3) requiring
the prosecutor to give full and open discovery of the fruits of the
official investigation. Moderating the extreme contentiousness of
our lawyers and their desire to win at any cost is also a desirable
goal, but is not likely to be accomplished merely by tinkering with
ethical rules governing lawyer conduct. Rather, structural aspects
of our adversary system should be changed because they most
contribute to the problem by encouraging and enabling lawyers to
frustrate truth-determining objectives in the pursuit of victory.
While movement toward the Continental trial, or even the
mixed but more adversary Italian trial, would face formidable
obstacles, we might attempt ambitious experiments in contexts
such as misdemeanor trials before federal magistrates. At these
trials, both the defendant's exposure to imprisonment and jury
trial requirements are limited, and merit selection and retention
systems promise a competent and independent trial bench. In
such cases, defendants might be persuaded to accept Continentalstyle procedures if administered efficiently, informally, and fairly
by competent and respected magistrates. A successful experiment
of this nature would be a large step toward breaking down the
psychological barriers we have erected against nonadversary procedures, and a possible first step toward removal of our constitutional barriers to such procedures.
Along the way to reform, we will have to reduce our expectations. We assume that we can have it all. We want our criminal
trial process to do everything and to satisfy everyone. We ask it to
police the police by means of exclusionary rules of evidence, provide an arena for a lively, entertaining contest, and arrive at an
accurate and a just result. However, like the profligate who seeks
to satisfy all desires and ends with little substance, we often come
up short-handed and disappointed in our criminal trial.
Everyone recognizes that independent values, such as freedom
and human dignity, occasionally must outweigh the efficient procedure necessary for reliable truth-finding. Nevertheless, compared
to most other civilized countries, we have considerably underval-
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ued the principal objective- of the criminal trial. By reducing adversary excesses in our trials-including technical rules of evidence, contentious lawyering, and passive judging-we can speed
up the trial process, make it available to more defendants, and
focus it more sharply on the central character of the trial-the
accused-and on the most important issue-guilt or innocence.

